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ABSTRACT
Guided by the Institutional Anomie Theory (IAT) of Steven F. Messner and Richard
Rosenfeld (2007), this study examines the strength and interaction of social institutions
(economy, education, family and polity) in relationship to homicides occurring in
Minneapolis, Minnesota between 2007 and 2011. It utilizes census tracts as the units of
analysis, an attempt to extend IAT from the cross-national to the local level. Rather than
focusing on specific offenders, it explores broader cultural and structural characteristics
employing exploratory, ordinary least squares (OLS), and geographically weighted
regressions (GWR). Although interactions did not reach statistical significance,
relationships were found between homicides rates and the institutions of family and
education.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
“Crime has an inherent geographical quality” (Chainey & Ratcliffe, 2005, p. 1).
The overall distribution of crime is not random; rather it is clustered. Clustering suggests
linkages between socio-ecological conditions and criminal behavior. Knowing where
crime is clustered on a crime map is helpful; however, it does not produce a complete
picture. It is critical that we go beyond simple pushpin or dot density crime maps if we
are to comprehensively understand what influences local crime rates. The incorporation
of criminological theories, such as the Institutional Anomie Theory (IAT) used herein, to
more thoroughly analyze crime clusters may provide cues as to why crime may be
occurring. Of particular interest to this study is the spatially differentiated distribution of
violent crime, specifically homicide.
Compared to other nations, “violent crime in the United States is more likely to
assume a deadly form” (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 22). According to the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (2012), in 2009, homicide was the second leading
cause of death for individuals of all races and genders aged 15 to 19 years in the United
States. The same was true for 20 to 24 year olds, accounting for 15.6% of all deaths.
These statistics are even more troublesome if one hones in on the homicide data
involving African American males. For black males aged 15 to 34 years, homicide was
the number one cause of death. Approximately half of all deaths of black males aged 15
to 24 year olds were attributed to homicide, with the rate dropping to 32.8% for 25 to 34
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year olds. It was not until black males reached 45 years of age that homicide dropped out
of the top five causes of death.
Like black males aged 15 to 34, Hispanic males in the same age group also faced
homicide as the second leading cause. Homicide is the third ranking cause of death of
Native American or Alaska native males in the same age grouping. For Asian or Pacific
Islander males aged 15 to 19 and 20 to 24, the homicide ranking is fourth and third
respectively. Non-Hispanic white males between 10 and 34 years of age show lower
homicide deaths, with fourth and fifth place rankings.
Black females between 15 and 24 years old face homicide as the second leading
cause of death. For Hispanic females, the homicide ranking shifts between second and
third. Homicide fluctuates between the fourth and sixth ranking cause of death for nonHispanic white females.
The current study focuses on homicides occurring in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Minnesota’s rate of homicides was highest for 20 to 24 year olds at 6 deaths per 100,000.
Between 2001 and 2005, homicide was the third leading cause of death for all individuals
aged 15 to 24 years, behind unintentional injury and suicide. This is somewhat better
than the national second-place ranking. By the age of 25, the homicide death ranking
drops to fifth. By the age of 34, homicide dropped out of the top 10 causes of death in
Minnesota.
Drilling down to the city level, a City of Minneapolis Health Department (2013)
fact sheet noted that in Minneapolis homicide is the number one cause of death for those
aged 15 to 24, with 60% of those victims being African American. From 2001 to 2003,
more than one-third of the deaths for Minneapolis residents aged 15 to 24 years were by
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homicide, a figure the Minneapolis Health Department (2013) points out is almost three
times the number of youth lost to auto accidents. Minneapolis Uniform Crime Reports
for the years 2005 through 2011 indicated an average of 41 homicides per year. A high
mark of 97 homicides per year was established in Minneapolis in 1995. In 2009, the
Minnesota Department of Health, Center for Health Statistics (2013), estimated 1,072.5
and 1,366.5 years of potential life lost to age 65 and 75, respectively, due to homicides
within Hennepin County, of which Minneapolis makes up a large share. Years of
potential life lost is calculated by subtracting the age at death from an actuarial
estimation. Such a calculation lends deeper comprehension of the impacts of homicide.
The City of Minneapolis, briefly, is a major Midwestern city that had a population
of 382,578 in 2010 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013). In that year, almost two-thirds (63.8%)
of its population identified themselves as being white, with 18.6% of the population
identifying as Black or African American. Two percent of the population was Asian, and
2% were American Indian or Alaska Native. Further, 4.4% of the population was of two
or more races. The median age in Minneapolis was 31.4, with nearly three-quarters
(73.67%) of the population 21 years of age and over. For the population aged five and
older, 19.9% reported a language other than English spoken at home. Regarding place of
birth, 85.4% of the population were native born and 14.6% were foreign born. Relative
to education, 88% of those aged 25 years or more had obtained at least a high school
diploma, and nearly half of males (45.5%) had obtained at least a Bachelor’s degree.
Workers aged 16 years or more had an average commute time to work of 22.2 minutes.
Between 2008 and 2012, almost one-quarter (22.5%) of residents lived below the
poverty level. Just over half of males (54.8%) and just under half of females (48.0%)
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who were 15 years of age or older had never been married. Additionally, 8.5% of males
and 11.7% of females reported their marital status as divorced.
Minneapolis and its twin city of St. Paul anchor a metropolitan area with a
population of 671,015. Using 2000 census data, The Brookings Institution highlighted
some of the significant demographic changes experienced by the Minneapolis-St. Paul
Twin Cities area. For example, the foreign-born population in the Twin Cities of
Minneapolis and St. Paul increased by 127% in the 1990s, making its “immigrant
community one of the most diverse in the U.S” (The Brookings Institution, 2003). It also
found that, while incomes in the Twin Cities “are among the highest in the Midwest”,
median incomes of blacks are about $17,000 less than it is for whites. Additionally,
while 42% of whites in the Twin Cities have obtained a bachelor’s degree, only 15% of
blacks and 13% of Hispanics have done the same. The Brookings Institution also
detailed many overall trends across the metropolitan areas that have been positive;
however, it cautions that such trends may conceal important issues related to race and
ethnicity.
Guided by Institutional Anomie Theory of Steven F. Messner and Richard
Rosenfeld (2007), this study considers the influence of the institutions of economy,
education, family, and polity on the distribution of homicides in Minneapolis. Using
exploratory methods and secondary data, this study was undertaken to consider potential
spatial variation to the relationships between institutional balance and homicides. This
study does not examine why a particular individual might have engaged in criminal
activity. Rather, it explores the broader cultural and structural characteristics in areas
where the homicides occurred.
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IAT is a distinctive theory of serious crime. While it is compatible with many
elements of existing cultural-social learning, disorganization-control, and anomie-strain
perspectives, as discussed in the next chapter, it provides a more complete explanation of
serious crime by examining the interactions that occur between culture and social
structure, rather than the traditional practice of emphasizing one or the other. Focus on
this interaction is apparent in Messner and Rosenfeld’s (2007, p. 67) recurring argument
that in the United States “the anomic pressures inherent in the American Dream are
nourished and sustained by a distinctive institutional balance of power [original
emphasis] dominated by the economy”. A more detailed theoretical explanation of IAT
is presented in the next chapter.
This study seeks to add to the existing body of IAT research that examines the
relationship between culture, institutional structures, and homicide rates. It includes
many operational definitions used in previous studies in an attempt to provide for
meaningful comparisons. Because this study uses census tracts as the unit of analysis, it
also makes an original contribution to IAT research by attempting to apply the theory at
the local level. The analysis of data is also distinctive in that it applies geographically
weighted regression (GWR) contained within geographic information system (GIS)
software to better understand how the relationships between homicide rates and
institutions can vary spatially in the context of IAT.
Although analysis of institutional data produced mixed results, overall, a positive
relationship was found between homicides rates and the percentage of individuals 15
years and older in the census tract who reported their marital status as divorced, the
percentage of children residing in single female-headed households, and the percentage
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of individuals over the age of 18 who have less than a high school education. These
findings suggest that where the family and education institutions are weakened, higher
homicide rates would be expected. Hence, this study provides partial support for IAT.
In Chapter 2, a more detailed description of IAT, predominantly based upon the
theoretical writings of Steven F. Messner and Richard Rosenfeld, is presented. It also
addresses more recent elaborations of IAT that they, along with colleague Helmut
Thome, have set forth. Chapter 3 summarizes the major empirical tests and applications
of IAT conducted by other researchers, as well as an additional study completed by
Messner and Rosenfeld. The specific research design and statistical methods utilized
within the current study are set forth in Chapter 4, including data sources and the
operationalization of variables. This chapter also examines some of the methodological
literature that informs the current study, such as that relating to geographic information
systems (GIS), geographically weighted regression (GWR), and census tract units of
analysis. Chapter 5 presents a detailed analysis of the data, complete with GIS-generated
maps to assist in deeper comprehension of the spatial distribution of homicides in
relationship to statistically significant independent variables. The overarching
conclusions and contributions of the current study are set forth in Chapter 6, along with a
discussion of the study limitations.
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CHAPTER II
INSTITUTIONAL ANOMIE THEORY
Introduction
Steven F. Messner and Richard Rosenfeld posit that crime, and particularly
violent crime, in America can be explained through Institutional Anomie Theory (IAT).
Briefly, IAT can be described as a sociologically-oriented, macro-level theory that
considers the relationship between crime, anomie, and the cultural and structural
frameworks of a given society. The primary cultural component of the theory is
comprised of the “American Dream”, which instills the belief that all individuals should
strive to achieve success. While it provides individuals with the inspiration to better
themselves and become successful, primarily through their own hard work and
determination, it also has a downside in that the society comes to view a person’s value
based upon whether or not that success is actually achieved. In America, success is
predominantly measured in monetary terms. In the present study, the structural side of
IAT is composed of the institutions of economy, education, family, and polity.
According to the theory, the American Dream allows for and supports a specific
arrangement of institutions that is conducive to producing violent crime. More precisely,
in America it creates an arrangement where the economic institution dominates all other
institutions. When this occurs, the non-economic institutions are less effective at
fulfilling social control functions and providing support to members of society. As a
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result of these roles being weakened and/or unfulfilled, individuals are freed to achieve
success through whatever means are necessary, including violent crime. Whether these
means are legitimate or not matters less than whether they are the most efficient means.
This chapter is organized as follows. Initially, the linkages between IAT and
other criminological theories are discussed. Next, for clearer understanding of IAT as a
whole, attention will shift to a dissection of IAT into its cultural and structural
components. Thereafter, the focus will be on the interactions that occur between the
culture and the institutional structure. While IAT was offered to explain different types
of serious crimes, a later section addresses the more specific application of IAT to
homicide offending. More recent clarifications and elaborations of IAT made by
Messner and Rosenfeld along with colleague Helmut Thome (2008) conclude this
chapter. This elucidation explores the subjective and objective manner in which
individuals can be influenced by culture and institutional forces, especially when the
economic institution is dominant over other institutions.
Crime and the American Dream
The main body of work relative to IAT was produced by Messner and Rosenfeld
in their book entitled Crime and the American Dream. It was first published in 1994, and
in 2012 it was printed in the fifth edition. Messner and Rosenfeld readily acknowledge
that their positions relative to institutional anomie stem from the early sociological works
of Emile Durkheim, Robert Merton, and Karl Marx. Their approach to institutions was
further broadened by the writings of Talcott Parsons, Robert Bellah, and C. Wright Mills.
Messner and Rosenfeld also link existing individual-level theories of crime with
compatible macro-level sociological theories: social learning theory with cultural
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deviance theory, social control theory with social disorganization theory, and strain
theory with anomie theory. This linkage results in what they designate as cultural-social
learning, disorganization-control, and anomie-strain perspectives. Messner and
Rosenfeld (2007, p. 51) contend:
“Each of the perspectives is associated with a dimension of social
organization. Cultural-social learning explanations emphasize how crime
varies with the strength of criminal subcultures. Disorganization-control
explanations emphasize the structural dimension, specifically, how crime
rates vary with the strength of social relationships and social controls.
Finally, anomie-strain theory unites the two dimensions of social
organization in its explanation of crime. “
Messner and Rosenfeld go on to elaborate on the strengths and limitations of these
perspectives, as well as the way in which they are compatible with IAT. More
importantly, they distinguish IAT from these perspectives and argue it more completely
explains serious crime using a macro psycho-social approach.
The cultural-social learning perspective purports to explain why crime can vary
depending upon the subcultural influences in one’s life. For example, Edwin
Sutherland’s (1947, p. 7) differential association theory suggests that deviant behavior is
learned, just as conforming behavior is learned, and criminal behavior occurs when there
is “an excess of definitions favorable to violation of law”. These definitions are shaped
by the interactions one has with others in society, producing “social reinforcement and
cultural validation” (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997, p. 51) of such behaviors. In other
words, criminal behavior can become normalized “in the sense that it requires socially
learned motivations and socially structured supports. Crime is normal, in a word,
because it is social, and it is no less social than conformity” (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997,
p. 51).
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To illustrate the point that crime can actually be viewed as conformity to social
norms, consider the act of stoning to death adulterous women in some other countries.
Americans may view such as act as barbaric and criminal. However, for someone
socialized into this, the stoning may be viewed as something expected by society.
Stoning in that context is not criminal; rather it is normal. Those casting stones are
conforming to, not violating, the norms of the group to which they belong, and they are
attempting to impose consequences on others for violating local customs. The act of
stoning then is only a violation of norms inasmuch as it is viewed negatively, to a greater
or lesser extent, by the larger global community.
In short, the cultural-social learning perspective enriches the cultural aspect of
IAT. But cultural explanations alone are not sufficient enough to explain crime. In fact,
such an approach can result in circular reasoning in that it only explains crime that has
cultural support (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997, p. 52). Culture does not exist in a vacuum;
it interacts with social structures. Consequently, to support the incorporation of structural
elements in the explanation of serious crime, Messner and Rosenfeld review assertions
from the disorganization-control perspectives that are consistent with IAT.
In doing so, Messner and Rosenfeld (2007, p. 53) review Hirschi’s (1969)
argument that social controls restrain some individuals from committing violations of
law. However, having weak bonds to society can diminish these social controls and lead
to criminal behaviors. Pointing out the criticisms of others that social control theory does
not fully address the fluctuations in bonds, Messner and Rosenfeld (2007) draw the social
disorganization theory of Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay (1969) into their
discussions in an attempt to address this gap.
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Shaw and McKay found that under certain conditions the social control
mechanisms of institutions can become weakened, meaning they lose influence over the
behaviors of residents. Shaw and McKay (1942, p. 165) suggested that in middle class
areas “the similarity of attitudes and values as to social control is expressed in institutions
and voluntary associations designed to perpetuate and protect these values”. This
appears consistent with the line of thought later set forth by Messner, Thome, and
Rosenfeld (2008) that collective values and norms can influence an individual’s
perception as to what means are acceptable in the pursuit of goal accomplishment.
Shaw and McKay also point out that, because the strength of these institutions
will vary depending upon the prosperity of a particular area of the city, the relationships
between crime and institutions may not be stationary across space. The relationship may
vary by geographical area. They suggest communities that have strong organizations,
institutions, and collective influences are more likely to have lower crime rates.
Theoretically, crime should be higher in communities where the amassed social control is
low, such as those communities with high unemployment rates, high ethnic
heterogeneity, and low socio-economic status.
In many respects, this line of thought meshes well with both the cultural and
structural aspects of Messner and Rosenfeld’s IAT. Each area will have its own unique
institutional balance and, therefore, differing crime rates as well. According to IAT,
where institutions are balanced, there should be lower rates of violence. For example,
these may be areas where families are strong and can provide both social control and
support for individuals, minimizing the anomic pressures to seek monetary success
through criminal acts. On the other hand, where the economic institution is dominant,
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families and communities are less able to serve as counterbalances and crime may
become viewed as an attractive means to goal achievement. This linkage will be
explained in further detail below.
Messner and Rosenfeld (2007, p. 54) maintain that the disorganization-control
perspective explains crime by answering the question of why some people violate group
norms. This approach has commonalities with IAT in that it binds together social and
environmental conditions. However, like the exclusion of structural influences in the
cultural-social learning perspective, the disorganization-control perspective has excluded
cultural influences. These exclusions are influenced, at least in part, by turf battles that
have formed between the perspectives (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 54). Messner and
Rosenfeld, on the other hand, argue that the explanatory power of IAT lies in joining the
strengths of these two areas. In creating such a bridge, they draw heavily from the
existing anomie-strain perspective.
The general anomie-strain perspective incorporated a combination of cultural and
structural elements, including the examination of both goals and means. Anomie results
when culture and social structures conflict (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 57). As with
IAT, anomie theory highlights that everyone in society is expected to pursue the
culturally defined goals of success. However, according to Merton’s version of anomie
theory, differential access to opportunities and means limits some segments of the
population from reaching their goals. In other words, as Messner and Rosenfeld (2007,
p. 58) posit, “[c]ulture promises what social structure cannot deliver – success, for all”.
Messner and Rosenfeld would later tweak this theory when developing IAT, morphing
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Merton’s focus on stratified opportunities to one more concerned with institutional
structures and balances.
Although Messner and Rosenfeld tend to draw heavily from the work of Merton,
they also reiterate highlights from the works of Emile Durkheim. Durkheim considered
societies to be anomic when they were unable to regulate the desires of citizens. In
Suicide, he posited that it is part of man’s composition to never be satisfied or fulfilled;
man will continually pursue higher, and then higher, goals. For Durkheim, there is no
end to this continual desire for more. In fact, he suggests it can become “a mark of moral
distinction” (Durkheim, [1897] 1966, p. 257). Given that industrialization of society was
accompanied by a reduction in social controls over the desires and longings of
individuals, Messner and Rosenfeld are even more direct. They refer to this incessant
state of desire as “morally obligatory” in today’s society (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007,
p. 61). Consequently, in a modern capitalistic society, anomie can result in a
criminogenic environment, unless it is offset by alternative definitions of success by
strong non-economic institutions.
Because people are not constrained and continually want what they cannot have
or cannot achieve, they become frustrated. They are continually unsatisfied and unhappy,
which Durkheim believed could lead to suicide. In similar ways, Rosenfeld and Messner
(2007) link the anomic cultural nature of the American Dream to higher crime rates.
Persons who are strained and frustrated may be susceptible to goal attainment by any
means.
It is imperative to highlight the linkage of such desires and frustrations of
individuals with broader cultural and structural properties, as anomie and IAT are macro-
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level theories. Merton, with his focus on legitimate opportunity structures, deliberately
diverts emphasis away from the idea of intrinsic character flaws within individuals
(Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 11). Like Merton, Messner and Rosenfeld also deflect
the notion of individual defects and concentrate on the anomic pressures produced by the
top-heavy cultural emphasis of achieving monetary success in American society
(Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 11; Messner, Thome, & Rosenfeld, 2008, p. 178).
However, instead of more narrowly focusing on class and legitimate opportunity
structures as Merton did, Messner and Rosenfeld look more toward the role of structure
or institutional balance in producing crime (2007, pp. 11, 62). Their viewpoint of social
structures, like Durkheim’s, is much broader. They posit that the role of social structures
is to counterbalance these cultural and anomic pressures. They maintain a macro-level
structural approach to understanding anomie and its impact on social control functions,
without casting shadows on individuals.
In summation, IAT is a distinctive theory of serious crime. While it is compatible
with many elements of existing cultural-social learning, organization-control, and
anomie-strain perspectives, it provides a more complete explanation of serious crime by
examining the interactions between culture and social structure. Messner and Rosenfeld
(2007, p. 67) argue that “the anomic pressures inherent in the American Dream are
nourished and sustained by a distinctive institutional balance of power [original
emphasis] dominated by the economy”.
To better understand Messner and Rosenfeld’s conceptualization of culture and
structure, the following sections address each of them separately. Thereafter, attention
will shift to the interaction between culture and institutional structures. That will be
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followed by more recent theorizing by Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld that expands and
clarifies IAT.
Culture – The American Dream
Messner and Rosenfeld (2007, p. 49) define culture as “values, beliefs, goals and
norms”. Borrowing from Talcott Parsons (1951, Chapter 14) they also include the
symbolic meaning behind behaviors as an element of culture. They refer to the American
Dream as the “dominant cultural ethos”, one predicated upon strong cultural pressures to
achieve monetary success accompanied by weak social controls relative to the means of
accomplishing those goals (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 9). It is the American Dream
that produces anomic pressures and emboldens individuals to achieve culturallyconstructed goals with a mindset of “anything goes” (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 67).
These anomic pressures are “nourished and sustained” by the unique institutional balance
within American society that favors the economic institution (Messner & Rosenfeld,
2007, p. 67). Social control and social support functions of non-economic institutions are
weakened when culture and structure interact within such an anomic environment.
The expression “American Dream” did not originate with Messner and Rosenfeld.
Rather, they trace it back to the writings of James Truslow Adams (1931) during the
Great Depression. They also recognize the claims of subsequent researchers such as
Charles Hearn (1977) and Elizabeth Long (1985) that, while the concept of the American
Dream has become more complicated over the years, it nonetheless remains a steadfast
part of American culture and consciousness. To buttress this point, Messner and
Rosenfeld (2007, p. 6) provide a number of wide-ranging undertakings that are associated
with attainment of the American Dream. For example, the purchase of one’s own home
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is often viewed as fulfillment of the American Dream. For others, both in historical and
current contexts, the American Dream can mean immigrating to America with the hopes
of building a better life. Messner and Rosenfeld (2007, p. 7) contend that the American
Dream’s emphasis on an individual’s pursuit of success, which is measured primarily in
monetary terms, acts like a “cultural compass guiding Americans in their everyday lives.”
The foundation of the American Dream is based upon several cultural value
commitments: individualism, universalism, achievement, and materialism (Messner &
Rosenfeld, 2007, pp. 68-70). American culture universally socializes and pressures
individuals to believe in and to strive for success. Absent success, the person’s social
worth will be viewed as low. Driven by a seemingly sacred American principle of
individual rights and autonomy, each person is adjudged by his/her own individual
efforts.
Given the disproportionate distribution of wealth and high levels of inequality in
modern American society, this universalistic pressure to succeed as an individual may
result in viewing others as competitors in the contest of success. Such strains can lead to
criminal behaviors. More specifically, Messner and Rosenfeld (2007, p. 10) point out
that this universalism:
“…actually presupposes [original emphasis] high levels of inequality. A
competitive allocation of monetary rewards requires both winners and
losers, and winning and losing have meaning only when rewards are
distributed unequally. The motivation to endure the competitive struggle
is not maintained easily if the monetary difference between winning and
losing is inconsequential. In short, the very fabric of the American Dream
weaves a fundamental tension. It provides the cultural foundation for a
high level of economic inequality, yet a high level of inequality relegates
large segments of the population to the role of ‘failure’ as defined by the
standards of the very same cultural ethos.
The American Dream thus has a dark side that must be considered
in any serious effort to uncover the social sources of crime. …it helps
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create and sustain social structures incapable of restraining criminogenic
cultural pressures.”
As just noted, the American Dream has been woven into the very fabric of
American society, so much so that “[a]nomie is considered a virtue” (Messner &
Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 87). It essentially describes who we are and what it means to be
American. The American Dream has been praised as being one of the driving forces
behind progress and success. At the same time, it has produced pressure to innovate in
order to succeed and achieve, at any cost.
Although all societies experience crime, America is distinguishable from that of
other societies in that it takes on the character of being “by any means necessary”; it has
an “unrestrained and dangerous character” (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 21). What
also distinguishes American society is its extreme focus on material gain and
accumulation as a measurement of success; it has been afflicted with the “fetishism” of
money (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 70). No matter how much a person has, he/she
may always desire more.
This culture is “expressed in, reproduced by, and occasionally impeded by social
structure” (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007, p.71). The pervasive and competitive pursuit of
more in America is criminogenic (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 71) when there are
comparatively weaker counterbalancing forces from non-economic institutions. High
crime rates in America, therefore, are rooted in its culture and institutional structure.
Hence, it is imperative to also understand the institutional structure side of IAT, which is
where attention is now turned.
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Structure - Institutions
For Messner and Rosenfeld, “[s]ocial structure consists of the patterned
relationships among persons and groups defined and organized through social
institutions” (2007, p. 49). They concur with Bassis, Gelles, and Levine’s (1991, p. 142)
definition of institutions as “relatively stable set of norms and values, statuses and roles,
and groups and organizations that regulate human conduct to meet the basic needs of
society”. Messner and Rosenfeld (2007, p. 35) added “[l]ocal institutions provide order,
meaning, purpose, and protection to area residents”. In his 2010 address to the American
Society of Criminology entitled “The Big Picture”, then-President Rosenfeld (2011, p.
11) clarified that institutions are not single entities, such as a church, a school, or a
political party. Rather, following Parsons (1951), an institution is “a system of rules for
governing the operation of social positions, the roles connected to them, and the
organization in which roles are enacted and goals are achieved (Messner and Rosenfeld,
2004)”.
The cultural value commitments, discussed previously, exist within this
institutional structure of American society. To Messner and Rosenfeld (2007, p. 71)
these institutions provide controls on human behavior in fulfillment of the basic needs of
members within a society. Each institution plays important roles. For example, the
economic institution exists to provide for basic human necessities such as food, clothing
and shelter. The institution of family plays several roles, including population
replacement and socialization of children to cultural expectations. In addition, it has the
potential to serve as a safe haven from the stresses in other aspects of life. While the
institution of education also plays a socialization role, it further serves to foster
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knowledge and human development. The institution of polity plays a social control role,
helping to ensure the collective good.
While these four institutions comprise the main institutional focus for Messner
and Rosenfeld, they readily acknowledge that there are other institutions, such as those of
religion and mass communication, which may also prove to be fruitful grounds for future
research. Further, institutions may not be totally separate and distinct from each other,
and one institution may rely upon another in order to function effectively (Messner &
Rosenfeld, 2007, pp. 72-73). In other words, their roles interplay. For example, when
discipline and child development are lacking within the institution of family, the
institution of education may need to first address those issues before there can be learning
of tangible subject matter materials. Without the support of parents and families,
teachers may find it difficult to fulfill their prescribed responsibilities in the area of
academic learning.
Each society has its own unique institutional balance (Messner & Rosenfeld,
2007, p. 74). American society, as noted previously, has a distinctive balance of power in
which the economic institution is dominant over non-economic institutions. Messner and
Rosenfeld suggest that when this economic dominance occurs, the ability of noneconomic institutions to fulfill socialization and social control functions that counter an
“anything goes” mindset is hindered. Unrestrained, this can put in motion a seemingly
perpetual downward spiraling. The non-economic institutions become devalued and are
relegated to a position of accommodation toward the economy. They, in turn, are not
able to provide individuals with alternative, non-economic measurements of success.
The economic, or monetary, measure of success prevails in the means-ends process.
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This unique institutional balance in America is shaped by the country’s distinctive
private ownership characteristics. It has a capitalist economy that encourages and
rewards competition and innovation (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 75). Piquero and
Piquero (1998, p. 64) bolster this idea, adding “capitalism legitimizes selfishness and
develops egoism at the expense of altruism”, as originally avowed by Bonger (1916).
Yet Messner and Rosenfeld urge that one should not be too hasty as to unequivocally pin
the culpability for high crime rates on a capitalist economy. Rather, they highlight the
words of Heilbroner (1991, pp. 539-540) that “‘American capitalism, not American
capitalism’ is responsible for the features of our society that distinguish it, for better or
worse, from other capitalist societies”. They also agree with Elkins (1968, p. 43) that,
from its early days, American capitalism was free from institutional constraints as it took
its shape, including its arrangement of economic domination; this was not the
environment in other societies (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 76). Capitalism was an
integral part of how society came to be structured in America. It was not a movement
that was later wedged into an existing framework. For example, rather than being
subjected to the edicts of feudalism or monarchies, Americans could have private
ownership and reap the profits. Each person could rise or fall on their own.
Currie (1991, p. 255) posits that “the pursuit of private gain becomes the
organizing principle of all areas of social life – not simply a mechanism that we may use
to accomplish certain circumscribed ends.” These entrenched drives that are produced in
an American capitalistic environment may remain in motion even after one’s initial goals
have been achieved. Recall the incessant desire for more. Pursuing monetary success is
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expected, but not everyone is able or disposed to achieving it through legitimate means;
therefore, crime becomes the means to those ends.
Again, Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld (2008, p. 178) emphasize that the focus
should not be on particular individuals and their specific behaviors. Rather, one must
examine why crime results from socialization processes within an economicallydominated environment. Likewise, Messner and Rosenfeld suggest that we must look
beyond explanations of crime that are based solely on cultural aspects or solely on the
structural conditions that exist within a given society. Instead, we should examine the
roles and interactions between culture and social structure that produce a criminogenic
environment. The next section discusses how culture influences and is sustained by
institutional structures.
Devaluation, Accommodation, and Penetration
Rosenfeld and Messner posit that economic dominance within a society may be
manifested in at least three ways: devaluation of non-economic institutions,
accommodation to economic institutions, and penetration of economic values into noneconomic institutions. Each of these is described more fully below.
Devaluation
Non-economic institutions become devalued in an environment where the
institutional balance of power is tipped in the favor of the economy. For example,
Messner and Rosenfeld (2007, pp. 76-77) state that the institution of education is
devalued when society loses appreciation for the value of intrinsic learning and instead
seeks to bolster monetary benefits for businesses, employers, and employees.
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Devaluation can also be discerned when one considers that teachers, in comparison to
those employed in the business sector, often receive relatively low salaries. They further
point out that the characterizations of being a “good student” or “master teacher” are not
held in highest regard.
Relative to the institution of family, they highlight that society now values
homeowners more than homemakers. So that parents may work, they entrust daycare
providers with the safety and socialization of their children, at low wages. They
emphasize that just under one-quarter of all children between the ages of 3 and 5 are
being raised by their parents alone, without the assistance of childcare (Messner &
Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 8).
Regarding polity, Messner and Rosenfeld draw attention to the fact that not voting
in an election is regarded uncritically; it is not viewed as a major character flaw in
America. However, if a person is able but unwilling to work, he/she may be quickly and
negatively judged. In other words, some roles and functions are valued more than others.
In particular, they are making the point that economic roles have come to carry more
weight, or value, than those in the non-economic realm, including that of polity. Messner
and Rosenfeld (2007, pp. 78-79) mention that one polity exception may be Americans’
desire to have the government become increasingly more involved in crime control
functions. However, they also clarify that while, in general, citizens may want the
government to stay out of their private business, crime control efforts protect their
property and monetary possessions (or economic well-being) from loss.
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Accommodation
If a non-economic institution finds itself in competition with the economy, the
former will often yield to, or accommodate, the latter (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007, pp.
79-81). For instance, family time is often dictated by the hours of employment. Further,
only those American businesses with more than 50 employees are required to follow laws
with regard to unpaid parental leave (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 79). This makes it
financially challenging for working-class parents to stay at home with their newborns.
Other industrialized countries, such as those in Scandinavia, rank ahead of the
United States when it comes to financial support and leave time for parents. In a study of
17 globally competitive countries with low unemployment rates, Earle, Mokomane and
Heymann (2011) indicated that the United States does not require paid parental leave
policies for mothers or fathers. Norway guarantees mothers and fathers 90-100 and 8797 weeks, respectively, of paid parental leave, at the rate of 80 to 100 percent, flat rate,
wage replacement. Likewise, Sweden guarantees 69 and 67 weeks of paid leave, while
Finland specifies 164 and 154 weeks. Germany, a highly industrious country, offers
mothers 66-118 weeks and fathers 52-104 weeks of paid leave. The United States was
the only country in their study that did not universally guarantee some type of paid leave
for mothers, and it was the only other country in the study, besides Switzerland, that did
not provide fathers with such a policy.
Regarding the institution of education, Messner and Rosenfeld (2007, p. 80)
argued it is geared more toward achieving occupational attainment than producing
intrinsic knowledge and understanding. In addition, time-flexible course schedules have
emerged to allow workers to supplement their skills without jeopardizing their
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employment status. Further, since educational institutions may rely upon private funding,
for a multitude of undertakings, school administrators may be quick to ensure their
donors receive benefits in return.
Messner and Rosenfeld (2007, pp. 81-82) acknowledge a similar situation can
arise between politicians and their donors and/or constituents, such that one must either
be independently wealthy to run for public office or run the risk of later finding
themselves in a compromising position in order to repay one’s debt. Messner and
Rosenfeld (2007, pp. 81-83) refer to the enormous costs of modern-day campaigning in
America. If these funds would be directed to the strengthening of the polity, rather than
potentially buying political offices that result in personal economic gain, the goal of
serving the collective good may be more attainable. In other words, while some
politicians may have genuine intentions of strengthening the polity institution, they may
find themselves overcome by and yielding to anomic pressures that, instead, favor the
economic institution. Financial connections (beyond mere salaries) and the status that
one achieves by holding public office becomes the overriding factor when decisions are
made.
Penetration
Economic influences may also penetrate or permeate non-economic institutions.
Non-economic institutions may take on the cost-benefit foci and processes preeminent
within the economic institution. For example, Messner and Rosenfeld point out that
schools and government offices are increasingly being managed through business models
focused on efficiencies and streamlining strategies, rather than being driven by sharp
attention to the changing needs of the collective good. The institution of family, Messner
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and Rosenfeld (2007, p. 83) assert, may be the institution most resilient to penetration by
economic norms; however, they also point out that the realm of the family institution has
become more business-oriented, as evidenced by emerging terminology such as partners,
division of labor, and marriage contract.
With non-economic institutions weakened by devaluation, accommodation,
and/or penetration, the dominance of the economic institution grows. This hinders and
inhibits the ability of non-economic institutions to fulfill social control functions or
provide support. As a result, non-economic institutions are no longer able to counter the
“by any means” pursuit of culturally-prescribed goals. In other words, the influence of
the economic institution overpowers the ability of non-economic institutions to keep
anomic pressures in check. The use of illegitimate and illegal means becomes a more
attractive and/or efficient way of achieving goals and defining oneself as successful.
The anomic environment, coupled with weak controls and support, becomes conducive to
crime.
Institutional Anomie Theory and Homicides
Messner and Rosenfeld (2007) offered IAT as an explanation for “serious” crime
in America, with subsequent studies applying IAT to violent, property, and white-collar
crimes.

Serious crimes are defined as those “involving significant bodily injury, the

threat of bodily injury, or, in the case of nonviolent offenses, significant economic harm
to victims, both individual and collective” (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 47).
Specifically related to homicides, Messner and Rosenfeld (2007, p. 20-27) compared
rates in the U.S. between 1996 and 2000 to those of fifteen other “advanced” and “postindustrial” countries. The United States had the highest homicide rate of the sixteen
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countries at 5.9 homicides per 100,000. At less than half that rate, Sweden had the
second highest rate at 2.6 homicides per 100,000. The next six countries (Australia,
Canada, The Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland) had rates between 1 and 2 per
100,000, and the remaining eight countries (Ireland, Denmark, Austria, Germany,
Norway, France, Japan, and England-Wales) had homicide rates less than 1 per 100,000.
It should be noted that the Russian Federation and South Africa, which have substantial
homicide rates, were not included within this comparison (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007,
p. 21).
Homicide rates within the United States have ebbed and flowed through the years.
However, Messner and Rosenfeld underscore that even when its rates were lowest, those
rates were still higher than the rates found in nearly all other advanced societies. Going
beyond these mere comparisons of crime “levels”, or rates, Messner and Rosenfeld
(2007, p. 21) emphasize the importance of further examining the “form” (original
emphasis) of crimes. The United States is characterized by crimes that tend to take the
form of “by any means”. In other words, crimes in America have a particularly
“unrestrained and dangerous character”.
Messner and Rosenfeld acknowledge that gun ownership rates are exceptionally
high in the United States. However, even if one were to exclude gun-related homicides
from the equation, they submit the United States would still have homicide rates much
higher than those found in “most other developed nations” (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007,
p. 24). Consequently, without taking the gun control debate head on, they do infer that
such measures would not be a panacea for eradicating homicide. Their argument is that,
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with or without firearms, crime in America takes the form of “by any means”. Factors
other than firearms must be considered in explaining high homicide rates.
A deeper understanding of homicide rates in the United States also requires that
the question of race be addressed. Official statistics shows that African American males
are disproportionately represented in homicide offending and homicide victimization.
Their risk of homicide as a cause of death is noticeably higher than that of white males.
In Minneapolis, homicide was the number one cause of death for black males between 15
and 34 years of age and approximately half of all deaths of black males between 15 and
24 years of age were attributed to homicide. In comparison, homicide ranks between
fourth and fifth cause of death for non-Hispanic white males. In Minneapolis, it was not
until black males reached 45 years of age that homicide dropped out of the top five
causes of death. However, that being said, if one were to compare the rate at which only
whites across America commit homicide to the rates of the fifteen countries previously
noted, America would still have a higher homicide rate than all of those countries except
Finland (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 27).
Another area Messner and Rosenfeld consider is variance in the quality of life, not
only across nations, but also across the United States. While some areas of the United
States are relatively safe and calm, other areas, such as those with high homicide rates,
can resemble war zones. They accentuate that quantitative cross-national studies can
sometimes hide irregularities, such as the reality of “acute pockets of fears” (Messner &
Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 33) that exist within certain areas of most urban American cities. In
such pockets, the fear and risk of crime can be omnipresent. To solidify this point, they
include narratives from people living in such areas. There are certain unwritten rules to

	
  

27	
  

living in these areas, such as knowing when it’s safe to go outside and where within a
home is the safest place to avoid being shot in your sleep.
Messner and Rosenfeld (2007, p. 35) suggest that “warlike conditions not only
kill and maim individuals; they also destroy institutions.” The damage to institutions is
perpetual in nature, meaning after the institution’s social control function is diminished,
crime rates go up, further diminishing the institution’s influence. This condition has
implications for institutions and individuals alike. Consequently, for Messner and
Rosenfeld (2007, p. 35), “[m]uch of the terror surrounding crime is due not simply to the
threat of individual victimization but to the sense that the protective cover of institutions
has collapsed, exposing individuals to all manner of unpredictable and uncontrollable
dangers.” For example, in addition to socialization, schools and families also play
protective and supportive roles. When these institutions are invaded by violence, such as
a shooting in the school hallway or the burglary of a home, the effects can be devastating
as fears are multiplied. If one cannot feel safe in their school or home, where is it safe?
Hence, the perception that some communities are like war zones.
Recent Theoretical Clarification and Expansion
Unquestionably, IAT is a macro-level theory that is highly abstract in nature. To
one not highly informed about the theory, and perhaps even to those who are, it can be
perplexing to understand how something as broad as culture and institutional structure
exerts pressures on individuals to commit violent crimes. This is an additional reason
why IAT is a theory that can be challenging to empirically test. Some relief from this
confusion and frustration is provided in a more recent article written by Messner and
Rosenfeld along with colleague Helmut Thome (2008). It adds and links micro-level
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application to the grander, overarching macro-level foundation. It clarifies and expands
how culture and social structure are exhibited within institutions.
Using Parsons’ Work to Clarify the Conceptualization of Institutions
Institutions influence behaviors in different ways. For Rosenfeld, Thome, and
Messner (2008), two ways of understanding these influences can be found in Talcott
Parsons’ (1990[1934], p. 319) “subjective” and “objective” approaches to institutional
research. Briefly, the subjective approach relates to the viewpoint of an actor and
enhances the ability to explain the behavior of an individual. On the other hand, the
objective approach describes the individual as a “sociological observer” and relates more
to the explanation of “institutional order” (Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld, 2008,
p. 165). This two-pronged approach to studying institutions sets the stage for
understanding how norms and values of the collective are key to comprehending
“institutional dynamics” and social controls (Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld, 2008, p.
165).
Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld (2008) assert that behaviors of individuals are
influenced by institutions on the subjective level, often as they navigate means-ends
judgments. To reach goals, or ends, the individual will consider the “suitability” of the
means to achieve those goals, and that “suitability” is not a constant across all decisions
or goal attainments (Messner, Thome, Rosenfeld, 2008, p. 165). Rather, “suitability” is
based upon a “specified standard of rationality”. In each situation, a different weight or
“standard of rationality” is applied to the process. In other words, what might be
acceptable means for reaching one goal may not be acceptable, or “suitable”, for
achieving another goal.
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This creates a rather complicated picture of the means-goals connection. How
does each individual assess the “suitability” and “standard of rationality” to be used in
their unique situations? Following Parsons (1990 [1934]), Messner, Thome, and
Rosenfeld posit that decisions are influenced and based upon the general consensus that a
collectivity has towards the ends. Further complicating matters is that such consensus
may not exist within a society. Parsons, and subsequently Messner, Thome, and
Rosenfeld (2008, p.165), conveys that divergent values within the collectively can create
a “highly unstable” environment. On the other hand, when values are shared within a
collective, there can be social order. In other words, if there is consensus on what means
are and are not acceptable toward achievement of each specific goal, there is stability.
The values and norms of the collective guide the “suitability” and selection of means in
achieving ends, and members of the collective are obligated and pressured to follow these
norms of society. If they do not, there will be consequences for their actions. For
Parsons, this is what institutions are built upon. Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld (2008,
p. 166) state that Parsons “restricts his conceptualization of institutions to the rules that
contribute to the emergence of these regular patterns of behavior.”
Further, the number of norms and values within a society can be copious, each
applying to specific courses of conduct. However, these norms and values can be
grouped together based upon their similarities. For example, some pertain to the
institution of families, while others may be tied more closely with the institution of
education. Recall that institutions can and do overlap. Sometimes this overlap is
complementary in nature. At other times, conflict can arise.
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Besides sanctions, why do individuals follow the norms of society? Why don’t
some people use whatever means are available? Parsons stated there are at least two
“sources of compliance”: moral and utilitarian authority. With moral authority,
individuals may consider the greater good of society in choosing the means to their ends.
In other words, when the individual himself/herself is contemplating available means to
achieving their goal, his/her personal view and valuing of institutional norms plays a role.
In this way, institutions exert significant influence and control, or moral authority, over
the behaviors of individuals. Individuals are likely to follow the prescribed rules when
pursuing their goals. The utilitarian approach, however, is more in line with a costbenefit analysis conducted by the individual.
In contrast with the subjective approach, Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld (2008,
p. 166) state Parsons “argues that institutions themselves can be thought of as constituting
a collective system. Each institution has implications for others.” As mentioned above,
each institution has particular functions and roles; however, these institutional roles can,
and often do, overlap. For example, the institution of education carries out, at least to
some extent, the socialization and disciplinary roles that families play during a child’s
development. Although the functions are often complementary, they may at other times
conflict, such as when parents accommodate the economic institution by working during
time periods when their children are not in school and they could otherwise be spending
time together as a family. Each society handles these dilemmas differently and,
therefore, can be described as having a different institutional balance. In clarifying these
points, Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld (2008, pp. 168-9) offer the example of the former
Soviet Union, which is characterized by a balance of power in favor of the political
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institution, not the economic institution. To explain weak structural integration, Parsons
(1990[1934] p. 332) provided the example of medieval church and state relations, where
each institution “claimed an allegiance which inevitably encroached on the requirements
of the other”.
Likewise, each society will have differing levels of “regulatory integration”
(Parsons (1990[1934], p. 332). Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld (2008, p. 166) state,
“this refers to the degree to which and the means by which institutional norms govern
behavior in practice.” When regulatory integration is high, individuals are more likely to
conform to norms because of the moral authority attributed to them. On the other hand,
when regulatory integration is low, individuals may no longer feel obliged to follow these
institutional norms. This was likened to a state of anomie.
Further Elucidation of the Relationship Between Institutions and Crime
In America, dominance of the economic institution is manifested through
devaluation, penetration, and accommodation, as noted in an earlier section. This
economic dominance can lead to criminal behaviors through “internalized normative
controls and informal social controls” (Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld (2008, p. 168).
Individuals are subject to many demands at the same time and may choose different
actions and means based upon what specific institution is involved and the authority it
exerts. Further, the process of cost-benefit analysis that is prevalent (and successful) in
the economic sphere can become dominant and “spill over” into other realms of decision
making (Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld, 2008, p. 169). In this setting, the norms of a
society, and consequently the influence of the corresponding institutions, bear less weight
and have less control over behaviors; the moral authority of these norms are overridden
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by the pressure to use the most efficient means. More specifically, the norms embedded
within non-economic institutions lose their authority and/or attractiveness. During
periods of chronic anomie, bonds and restraints relative to the individual are weakened
and they are freed to commit an illegal act as a means to their achieving goals.
The foundation of IAT is also built upon Durkheim’s (1964[1893]) contention
that due to the extensive division of labor an advanced society will depend less on
“mechanical solidarity” and far more on “organic solidarity”, where the emphasis on
collectivity gives way to an emphasis on individualism. According to this view, and if
one looks back far enough, they will find that violence has actually decreased because of
this shift. Rather than being concerned, for example, with defending the norms and
honor of a clan or family, today there is more respect for the lives of individuals. As one
interacts within society, people are viewed more as individuals than as members of a
collective group, such as their family.
However, although we can rise to and fall from success on our own today, at least
according to cultural beliefs, that does not prohibit an individual from acting in ways
congruent with and supportive of the greater good. This moral or “cooperative
individualism” can account for the willingness of individuals to allow the state, or “the
organ of moral discipline” in Durkheim’s (1958 [1950], p. 72) words, to manage aspects
of the greater good without regard to the personal cost-benefit analysis. According to
Durkheim, in a fair and just society, the state must have priority over the economic
institution, in part to ensure that very same individual freedom. When it is the individual
who is valued, rather than the collective, there should be a corresponding decrease in the
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level of violence experienced by that society, other things being equal (e.g. absent
anomie).
However, Durkheim believed that egoism where decision-making is self-centered
and not altruistic also emerges in advanced societies. Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld
(2008, p. 172) extend his work by positing that egoism is consistent with the economic
dominance that is prevalent in American society today, more so than “moral” or
“cooperative” individualism. Non-economic institutions, such as family, education, and
polity are not able to effectively carry out their roles of providing moral foundations and
social controls in society. For Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld (2008, p. 172), egoism
“provides the cultural foundation for economic dominance in the institutional balance of
power and widespread anomie”.
Whether an individual decides to commit a crime in furtherance of goal
achievement is dependent upon that individual’s perception of institutional norms and
how the various institutions should be valued, as well as the options that are available to
them (Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld, 2008, p. 173). The most efficient means may be
the option selected when non-economic institutions do not hold a particularly strong
moral authority for that individual. Again, this relates to the “spillover effect” that
Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld outline. When there is heightened anomie, the costbenefit analysis prominent in the economic realm bleeds over into other institutional
domains. The extent of this spillover effect is actualized in higher or lower crime rates.
In other words, if individuals strongly value non-economic institutions, they may
be less susceptible to the spillover influences. The institutions are more in balance and
social controls remain in tact. On the flip side, those who do not place strong emphasis
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or value on non-economic institutions may be more likely to pursue their goals by any
means necessary, including violent crime. Following Hirschi’s (1969) social bonding
theory, these individuals are not as attached to the broader society and the controls on
their behaviors are weakened.
Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld (2008, p. 174) tap the “marketness” continuum
set forth by Fred Block (1990) to further solidify their argument. The continuum has at
one end instrumental sentiments and expressive motives at the other. Like the distinction
between instrumental and expressive crimes, it can be said that one is propelled by
emotion and the other is driven by a cost-benefit analysis. Individuals make economic
decisions differently, with some being driven more by cost-benefit analysis and others by
a sense of greater good instilled by non-economic institutions. In line with an analogy
provided by Messner, Thome and Rosenfeld, this could be likened to the strong
conviction of some individuals who choose to boycott the new chain discount store built
within their communities and instead opt to continue their patronage of the locally-owned
hardware and grocery stores, pharmacy, etc., even though they know full well that that
patronage will personally cost them more money in their business transactions. In their
eyes, it is more important to be supportive of other people living within their
communities than it is to gain a “deal” from a discount chain with corporate offices out of
state. Individuals exhibiting this type of decision-making process would, according to
IAT, be less likely to use crime as a means to an end.
Putting this analogy into the context of criminal offending, Messner, Thome, and
Rosenfeld (2008, p. 174) reiterate that those who are at high risk of using violence and
crime as a means to an end would place greater emphasis on the monetary value of a
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transaction, giving the economic institution a higher ranking than the non-economic
institution. The views of these individuals regarding non-economic institutions has
become secondary to their prioritization of the economic institution. Further, their
perception of the moral authority of non-economic institutions would also be low. In
these situations, there are weak internal and external controls.
This recent publication by Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld (2008) is of particular
significance to the current study in that they call for more research to address both microand macro-level factors relative to IAT. This seemingly opens the door to studying IAT
at a more local level. While they still do not specifically address what micro units of
analysis are appropriate for applying and testing IAT, it appears from their work that
census-tract level studies would constitute an appropriate unit of analysis.
While the recent work of Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld (2008) clarifies and
elaborates on both the cultural and structural underpinnings of IAT and connects macrolevel theory to micro-level processes in meaningful theory, it is also important to take
note of other, older, developments relating to IAT, which are the focus of the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW OF
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Introduction
In Chapter 2, the Institutional Anomie Theory of Messner and Rosenfeld was
described in detail. This chapter describes and summarizes a chronological review of
research on IAT since Crime and the American Dream was first published in 1994. It
should be noted at the outset that because many concepts of IAT are largely abstract in
nature, Messner and Rosenfeld and other researchers have found it challenging to
empirically test (Chamlin & Cochran, 1995, pp. 414-415; Savolainen, 2000; Schoepfer &
Piquero, 2006; Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008). The availability and cost of directly
collecting complete data to more thoroughly analyze IAT adds to these challenges
(Sampson & Groves, 1989; Chamlin & Cochran, 1995, p. 415). This could, for example,
require extensive survey sampling or longitudinal studies that capture copious amounts of
data pertaining to various aspects of a subject’s life. Therefore, most prior tests of IAT
have used secondary data and indirect approaches to measuring the relationship between
various social institutions and crime rates. All of the studies reviewed in this chapter
(Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998;
Piquero & Piquero, 1998; Savolainen, 2000; Batton & Jensen, 2002; Stucky, 2003;
Maume & Lee, 2003; Schoepfer & Piquero, 2006; and Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008)
have found at least partial support for IAT.
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Previous Applications of Institutional Anomie Theory
Chamlin & Cochran (1995)
Researchers, including Chamlin and Cochran (1995, p. 426), call for continuing
the exploration of more empirical measures of institutional strength, rather than
acquiescing to critics who propose IAT is not falsifiable. They conducted the first test of
IAT, wherein they examined the role of institutions relative to the crimes of robbery,
burglary, larceny and auto theft offenses per 1,000 population using state-level data
extracted from the U.S. Census Bureau and Uniform Crime Reports. They viewed these
as instrumental offenses, meaning those driven by profit. Using weighted least squares
regression, they sought to understand the interactive nature of institutional variables.
As their measure of the economic institution, and more specifically absolute
economic deprivation, Chamlin and Cochran (1995) used data on the percentage of
families living below the poverty level. Highlighting Messner and Rosenfeld’s (1994)
posit that non-economic institutions may provide “alternative definitions of self-worth”,
they looked at whether family, religion, and the polity institutions could serve as
“countervailing forces” against anomic pressures (Chamlin and Cochran, 1995, p.417).
As a measure of family disruption, they utilized a ratio of yearly divorce rates per 1,000
to the yearly marriage rate per 1,000, reasoning that family disruptions, such as divorce,
can hinder informal social controls that can, in turn, lead to higher levels of economic
crime (Blau & Blau, 1982; Blau & Golden, 1986; Felson & Cohen, 1980; Sampson,
1986, 1987; Sampson & Groves, 1989; Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; see also Braithwaite,
1989; Sampson & Laub, 1993). Following Messner and Rosenfeld (1992), Chamlin and
Cochran (1995) set forth the principle that involvement in the polity can “produce a sense
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of public altruism” that combats anomic pressures. They operationalized polity as the
percentage of individuals voting in congressional elections, believing congressional
contests may have a more intimate connection between citizens and local polity than
would a presidential contest. Religion was measured as church membership, noting that
these entities can spread accepted norms and values to its members. Lastly, they utilized
race and age control variables, consistent with prior research (Devine, Sheley, & Smith,
1998; Felson & Cohen, 1980; Sampson, 1987), operationalized as the percentage of the
population that was black and the percentage of the population aged 18 to 24 years.
Examining the extent to which the economic institution impacted property crime
rates contingent upon the strength of non-economic institutions, Chamlin and Cochran
(1995, pp. 420-421) found support for their measures of family (positive) and religion
(negative); however, their economic deprivation variable did not show a significant main
effect on crime. Overall, the model produced an adjusted R2 of .96. They further
examined interaction effects between poverty and church membership, family disruption,
and voting participation. All were found to be significant. The models indicated a
positive relationship for the poverty-family interaction, while the poverty-church and
poverty-voting interactions were negative. They conclude that culture, structure, and
crime are interrelated. More specifically, they found that the level of crime experienced
in a society is impacted not by economic conditions alone but by the interaction that
occurs between economic and non-economic institutions.
Chamlin and Cochran (1995, pp. 423-424) also ran alternative models substituting
unemployment data and Gini indexes as measures of the economic institution, replacing
poverty as the measure. The Gini index, as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau, measures
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economic inequality, with values ranging from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect
inequality). The Gini-family interaction was not significant; however, the remaining
interactions were found to be consistent with the original models. The unemploymentfamily interaction in the alternative model also produced a significant outcome; however,
the coefficient sign was contrary to the theorized direction. Chamlin and Cochran
suggest that increased levels of divorce actually decreased the harmful effects that
unemployment had on crime. In other words, at least with their measurements, a
weakened family institution buffered the relationship between the economic institution
and crime, contrary to IAT. Chamlin and Cochran (1995, p. 424) conclude that the
criminogenic nature of economic inequality (Gini) and unemployment may be mitigated
by stronger levels of church membership and voter participation. Further, they
substituted presidential election voter participation, instead of congressional-level voting,
in an alternative model and found similar results between these operationalizations.
Overall, Chamlin and Cochran find support for the IAT of Messner and
Rosenfeld. They conclude non-economic institutions may mitigate the criminogenic
effects that the economic institution has on crime rates. Even though their study provided
“no direct measures of anomie and institutional controls”, they reiterate the statements of
Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) that strong non-economic institutions may decrease
anomic pressures, resulting in lower crime rates.
Messner & Rosenfeld (1997)
Messner and Rosenfeld provided the second partial test of IAT in 1997. They
examined the impact of decommodification on homicide rates on a cross-national scale,
guided by a previous decommodification study conducted by Gosta Esping-Andersen in
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1990. Decommodification refers to the extent to which a government shields and
insulates its citizens from the adverse impact of market fluctuations and pressures.
Messner and Rosenfeld indicate that decommodification can influence decisions such as
getting married, having children, and pursuing an education, depending upon how “free”
individuals feel they are from reliance upon the market. At least in the context of EspingAndersen’s approach, decommodification is connected to the institution of polity and
goes beyond the mere existence of government programs and welfare policies, reflecting
“the quality as well as the quantity of social rights and entitlements” (Messner &
Rosenfeld, 1997, p. 1395). Low decommodification can result when there are
impediments to receiving entitlements; whereas, high decommodification signals a
stronger buffering of market vacillations in an attempt to provide for a more
compassionate standard of living (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997, pp. 1394, 1397). This
study indicates that the United States, in comparison to the other nations included in the
study, has a low decommodification value.
Messner and Rosenfeld (1997, p. 1397) take Esping-Andersen’s foundational
work to the next level by integrating it with IAT, indicating that weak decommodification
can signal the dominance of the economic institution over the polity institution. When
economic dominance occurs, non-economic institutional roles become less desirable and
their social control functions become hindered. Thus, in those environments, it would be
reasonable to anticipate higher crime and homicide rates according to IAT. While several
prior studies found support for a negative relationship between welfare expenditures and
homicides (Fiala & LaFree, 1988; Gartner, 1990; Pampel & Gartner, 1995), Messner and
Rosenfeld apply macro-level IAT and the concept of decommodification in their cross-
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national study of homicide rates (1997, p. 1397). They constructed a proxy
decommodification index, taking into consideration factors such as “average annual
benefits per household, expenditures as a percent of GDP, and the percent of benefit
expenditures allocated to employment injuries” (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997, p. 1409).
In their analysis, Messner and Rosenfeld used ordinary least squares regression
techniques. They note that homicides can vary drastically from year to year. Also when
comparing the homicide rates from various countries, there can be much variance
between homicide totals. To avoid the potential pitfalls of skewness and heterogeneity,
they employed natural logarithms of multi-year average homicide levels.
Two measures of economic inequality were established as control variables,
including the Gini coefficient index of household income distribution. A measure of
economic discrimination, as set forth more fully in the work of Gurr and Scarritt (1989),
was also used. This latter measure is a value assigned to a nation that “represents the
most extreme level of economic discrimination experienced by any minority group in that
nation” (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997, p. 1403). Further, one of the control variables they
included was percentage of population over 64 years of age, based on the common
finding that younger individuals tend to commit more crimes (Krahn, Hartnagel &
Gartrell, 1986). The bivariate relationship between Gini values and homicides rates did
not reach statistical significance. The economic discrimination index was found to be
positively related to homicide rates. Overall, a significant and moderate negative
relationship between decommodification and homicide rates was found. In other words,
lower homicide rates were observed in nations having higher decommodification values.
This finding supports previous research that has drawn links between homicides and
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welfare expenditures. While findings are also supportive of the more general polityeconomic relationship described in IAT, Messner and Rosenfeld are keen to point out that
this does not diminish the importance of analyzing the relationships between the
economic and other non-economic institutions.
Hannon & DeFronzo (1998)
Building off of Messner and Rosenfeld’s 1997 study, Hannon and DeFronzo
(1998) utilized data from 406 large American metropolitan counties to probe the potential
moderating influences of welfare assistance on the effect of economic deprivation on
property crime (burglaries, larcenies, and motor vehicle thefts per 100,000) and violent
crime (homicides, aggravated assaults, robberies and rapes per 100,000) rates. In other
words, they explored whether receiving welfare benefits buffers, or moderates, feelings
of economic deprivation that can lead to criminal behaviors. They echo the question
whether government (or polity) can effectively play a role in diminishing the harsh
impacts that a market economy can have on individuals, especially those who reside in
disadvantaged communities.
Uniform Crime Reports and U.S. Census Bureau data were used to establish their
variables. Like Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) before them, they performed natural
logarithms of violent crime rates to reduce variance and more appropriately utilize
ordinary least squares regression techniques. They note Land, McCall, and Cohen’s
(1990) posit that inconsistent findings relative to the relationship between deprivation and
crime in past studies were most likely due to excessive collinearity, as well as differing
samples sizes and units of analysis. To partially combat this issue, Hannon and
DeFronzo suggest that researchers could create indices. They did not identify
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multicollinearity issues in their data given low bivariate correlations and variance
inflation factors (VIFs) under zero (1998, p. 387).
The welfare payment level used in their study was determined by the average
public assistance income per below-poverty line recipient, consisting mostly of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and General Assistance benefits. To adjust
for localized cost of living differentiations, they relied on average gross rent amounts,
which also included utility expenses. That amount was then divided by the national
average.
They also examined welfare participation, defined as the percentage of families
who lived below the poverty line and received public assistance funds. Their deprivation
index was comprised of the family poverty rate, percent of female-headed families, and
percent of the population that was black (Cronbach’s alpha = .85). Also included were
numerous control variables, including divorce, mobility over five years, female labor
participation, unemployment rate, single households, age, and an urbanism index which
included natural logged values for the size and density of population.
Their resource deprivation index exhibited the strongest influence over property
crimes, violent crimes, and property and violent crimes combined. Other variables found
to have a significant relationship with violent crime included divorce, urbanism, and
welfare index. The same variables were significant with regard to property crimes, as
were percent of women in the civilian work force, unemployment, and residential
mobility. While the percentage of one-person households did not reach statistical
significance for property or violent crime, it was found to be significant when all crimes
were totaled.
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Ultimately, Hannon and DeFronzo concluded that welfare assistance can mitigate
the linkage between disadvantaged populations and crime rates. In other words, those
populations that are disadvantaged receive at least some buffering advantages from the
anomic influences of direct market forces when they receive welfare assistance from the
polity institution. They suggest that this is supportive of IAT in that having the ability to
achieve monetary goals can reduce frustrations, which in turn allows non-economic
institutions to fulfill social control functions that keep criminal behaviors at bay.
Piquero & Piquero (1998)
Piquero and Piquero (1998) conducted a state-level examination of violent crime
(murder, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault) and property crime (burglary,
larceny-theft and motor-vehicle theft) rates, including a model that considered
moderating effects. Like other researchers before them, they highlighted that outcomes
of IAT studies can be sensitive to operationalization of variables. Their findings relative
to IAT were mixed.
These researchers appear to be in agreement with Messner and Rosenfeld that
“culture should largely be regarded as a constant”, but they also point out that structure
can vary not just across nations but states as well (Piquero & Piquero, 1998, p.68). They
further note that IAT has many commonalities with other macro-sociological theories,
including social disorganization (Shaw & McKay, 1969), routine activities (Cohen &
Felson, 1979), and Sampson & Laub’s (1993) family structure hypothesis. Indeed, many
different theories lay claim to variables such as economic deprivation and family
disruption to explain crime. However, Piquero and Piquero point out that with IAT the
difference lies in the interactions between economic and non-economic institutions, as
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well as the degree to which non-economic institutions “are able to offer alternative
definitions of success to that of material wealth” (Piquero & Piquero, 1998, p. 71).
They operationalized the institution of economy as the percentage of persons
below the poverty level. To control for urban differences, they also used the percentage
of population residing in those areas. Indicating that the institution of education had not
been measured in prior research, Piquero and Piquero (1998, p. 69) operationalized
education through three different variables: proportion of population enrolled full-time in
college, percentage of high school dropouts, and teacher’s salary relative to average
annual pay of citizens. In providing their rationale for these measures they briefly allude
that these measures may be problematic. Education not only enhances knowledge, which
would be a goal given institutional balance per IAT, but it may also be a means to
becoming gainfully employed in a well-paying career. For them, gaining an education, as
measured by their high school and college variables, also does not necessarily mean that
the education institution is somehow providing alternative definitions of success.
Family was operationalized as the percentage of single-parent families (Piquero &
Piquero, 1998, p. 70). This decision was supported by prior research findings that singleparents may not provide for adequate socialization and supervision of their children, in
part because the parent is away from the home while working (Messner & Rosenfeld,
1997; National Research Council, 1993). Further, the percentage of single-parent
families provide a measurement of family disruption (Sampson & Lauritsen, 1994).
Polity was operationalized two different ways: first, the percentage of population
receiving public assistance including Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
and Federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and; second, the percentage of
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population casting a vote in the presidential election. Data for all variables were obtained
through the U.S. Census Bureau. The public assistance operationalization appears
consistent with Messner and Rosenfeld’s research on decommodification, that
government may be able to provide a buffer against negative market influences, although
Piquero and Piquero (1998, p. 69) note that this operationalization “is amenable to a
number of different interpretations”. One could perhaps infer it fits more squarely with
measures of the economic institution rather than polity. The latter operationalization,
voter participation, aligns more strongly with the view of polity as government
involvement, which may result in increased altruism.
Using generalized least squares estimator, Piquero and Piquero found that
education (college enrollment) and polity (public aid) had significant negative effects on
property crime; whereas, the relationships relative to the economic institution (poverty),
family institution (single parents), and urban living were significant and positive.
Further, they found that the economy-education interaction relative to property crimes
was significant and negative; however, economy-family and economy-polity interactions
did not reach statistical significance. The economy-education interaction was significant
and negative, meaning having higher levels of college education diminished the effects of
poverty on property crime. The R2 values for the models that included different
interactions relative to property crime ranged from .64 to .67.
Regarding violent crime rates, the economy-education interaction was statistically
significant and negative, as it was for property crimes. Additionally, the economy-polity
interaction relative to violent crime rates was significant and negative; however, the
economy-family interaction did not produce statistically significant results. Violent
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crime models produced R2 values between .87 and .89. In comparing the property crime
models to those of violent crime, Piquero and Piquero noted that the effect of singleparent families was much stronger relative to violent crime and was in a positive
direction, meaning higher rates of violent crime were positively associated with higher
rates of single-parent families. In addition, they found that urban areas with higher
poverty levels had higher rates of violent crime, with lower violent crime rates in areas
receiving more public assistance and having higher levels of college.
Exploring alternative operationalizations of variables, they found that the
economy-polity interaction, substituting presidential election voting data, was not
significant relevant to property crimes. However, the economy-education interaction
using teacher salary to average annual citizen pay ratio was found to be positive and
statistically significant. Further supplementing high school dropout percentages for the
institution of education did not produce any significant results. R2 values for property
crime dipped to .59 to .62. Regarding interactions relative to violent crime rates, only the
economy-education interaction using the teacher salary to citizen income ratio was
statistically significant. Including alternative measures for polity (presidential election
voting) did not produce significant results. Using high school dropouts as an alternative
variable for the institution of education produced no significant interactions. R2 values
for the models containing alternative operationalizations and interaction terms ranged
from .84 to .86.
Overall, their study offered mixed support for IAT. Piquero and Piquero (1998,
pp. 79-80) concluded their findings by suggesting that the influence of institutions may
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be different depending upon the type of crime involved. They also found that the
operationalization of variables when testing IAT is very sensitive.
Savolainen (2000)
Savolainen (2000) also explored decommodification, or the protection of citizens
from the pressures of a market economy, using cross-national data and ordinary least
squares regression. At least part of his analysis was based upon the same data as Messner
and Rosenfeld’s 1997 work on decommodification. He found that the effect of
inequality, as measured by the Gini index, on homicides depends on the level of
decommodification, as measured by level of welfare spending. This interaction was
negative and statistically significant.
The study followed the practice of creating indexes of control variables to address
multicollinearity concerns. Savolainen includes life expectancy, GNP per capita, infant
mortality, elderly population, population growth, and urban development. Further, a sex
ratio was logged transformed and applied separately. The findings in this cross-national
study are supportive of IAT.
Batton & Jensen (2002)
Batton and Jensen utilized time series regression in their analysis of the effect of
the decommodification of labor on homicides using states as units of analysis. While
they did not find a significant relationship between decommodification and homicides
over the entire time period of 1900 to 1997, they did find a relationship for the more
condensed period of 1900 to 1945. Their research suggests that causality may have
temporal variations.
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Stucky (2003)
Noting a shortage of local-level studies, Stucky (2003) applied IAT and social
disorganization theory to city-level data, comparing the effects of local political
structures on violent crime (murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) across 958
American cities with populations over 25,000 using negative binomial regression
analysis. Because his initial data analysis showed signs of “severe multicollinearity”, as
evidenced by variance inflation factors (VIF) over 10, he created a deprivation index
using principal component analysis, comprised of percent poor, percent unemployed,
percent owner-occupied homes, and percent female-headed households. Separately,
Stucky also created two independent variables for the percentage of the total population
that were Black and Hispanic, having natural logged these to reduce skewness. Control
variables included regional location and age, as determined using the natural log of the
percentage of the population aged 18 to 24 years.
He found that “local politics had direct and conditional effects on violent crime”
(Stucky, 2003, p. 1123). For example, through the political institution decisions are made
with regard to zoning, business licensing, placement of recreation centers, etc. This, in
turn, can affect patterns of risk and offending. He suggests that even local politics, and
not just national politics as previously studied, can institute protective decommodification
measures. Using a deprivation index consisting of percent poor, percent unemployed,
percent owner-occupied homes, and percent female-headed households, he found that the
relationship between deprivation and crime can be moderated by local political structures.
Further, a negative relationship was found between overall city expenditures and violent
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crime rates. He suggested that future IAT studies take into account the differences in
local political structures when measuring the strength of institutions.
Maume & Lee (2003)
Published in the same volume of Criminology as was Stucky’s research, Maume
and Lee’s (2003) study addressed mediating and moderating influences. Maume and Lee
also laid additional groundwork for applying IAT at less than a cross-national level by
using counties with populations of 100,000 or more as units of analysis. Negative
binomial regression techniques were used in this analysis.
Maume and Lee (2003, p. 1154) operationalized dominance of the economy as the
Gini coefficient of family income inequality, as had Chamlin and Cochran (1995) before
them. Maume and Lee (2003, p. 1154) argued that this measure captures Merton’s
emphasis on social stratification, as well as Messner and Rosenfeld’s focus on economic
dominance. The institution of family was operationalized as the rate of divorce for
persons over 15 years of age. They opted to not measure family using data on femaleheaded households, as the data was “highly collinear” with other variables in their model.
Similar to Chamlin and Cochran (1995) and Piquero and Piquero (1998), Maume and Lee
operationalized polity as voter turnout, using presidential election data. Education was
operationalized as the average educational expenditures per person of school age over a
five-year period. They controlled for age (15-29 years) and percentage black population
across a final sample of 454 counties having populations over 100,000. Following from
the work by Hannon and DeFronzo (1998), Maume and Lee (2003, p. 1156) devised a
social welfare generosity index measuring “the average monthly welfare payments per
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poor person adjusted for cost of living (as the average proportion of local incomes
devoted to rent), and the proportion of poor families receiving welfare.”
Maume and Lee (2003, pp. 1163-1164) found that non-economic institutions
(using voter turnout, civilly engaged religious adherents, divorce rates, and welfare
expenditures) mediated the effect of economic inequality on both instrumental and total
homicides. In contrast, their measure of educational expenditures did not produce
statistically significant results. In analyzing moderating effects, they found the effect of
the Gini coefficient on instrumental and total homicides to be moderated by welfare
expenditures; however, the other non-economic institutions were not found to produce
significant moderating effects. Therefore, welfare payments appear to play both
mediating (attenuating) and moderating roles. While their mediating models relative to
instrumental and total homicides produced similar pseudo R2 values, non-economic
institutions produced a 43.2% reduction in the effect of the Gini coefficient on
instrumental homicides compared to a 34.38% reduction in the total homicide model.
Maume and Lee conclude this was “strong support for a partial mediating effect of
noneconomic institutions on instrumental homicide rates” (2003, p. 1164). Their models
relative to expressive homicide produced a 30.92% reduction in the effect of the Gini
coefficient.
Maume and Lee (2003, p. 1166) concluded by indicating their “reading of the
theory suggests that the effects of economic inequality on homicide will be attenuated in
the presence of non-economic institutions (the mediation effect), which is different from
the more popular explanation of prior research positing that the effects of economic
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inequality (or poverty) in crime varies according to the level of noneconomic institutions
(the moderating effect)”.
Schoepfer & Piquero (2006)
Schoepfer and Leeper Piquero (2006) pioneered the application of IAT to whitecollar crime, and more specifically embezzlement. Using states as units of analysis, they
used FBI Uniform Crime Report and U.S. Census Bureau data for their analysis. Their
study provided mixed support for IAT.
Like Chamlin and Cochran (1995) before them, they operationalized family as the
ratio of yearly marriage rates to divorce rates. For education, they used the percentage of
population that had not graduated from high school, following Piquero and Piquero
(1998). Polity was operationalized as the percentage of registered voters who voted in
general state and local elections. Economy consisted of the percent of population
unemployed.
Although Schoepfer and Piquero (2006, p. 232) found no multicollinearity
concerns with the bivariate correlations relative to their data, they caution that researchers
should not rest at that point. One must also check for multicollinearity when multivariate
models with interaction are used. They addressed this concern by following Jaccard,
Turrisi, and Wan (1990, p. 31), using mean-centering of variables involved in interaction.
Using Poisson regression, Schoepfer and Piquero (2006) found that polity,
education and economy were all significantly correlated with embezzlement; however,
family was not. The polity and economy relationships were negative, while the
relationship with education was positive. In other words, higher voting levels and
unemployment levels were associated with lower embezzlement rates; whereas, higher
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rates of high school drops outs were related with increased embezzlement rates. When
examining interactions, they only found statistical significance for economy-polity (voter
turnout), which was in the anticipated negative direction. While not all of the
relationships studied were significant, much of Schoepfer and Piquero’s findings are
supportive of IAT. They highlight that IAT research thus far has assumed culture is a
constant, and they further suggest that researchers consider adding a measure of culture in
their future studies.
Bjerregaard & Cochran (2008)
Bjerregaard and Cochran (2008) conducted a cross-national study that delved
deeper into the issues of mediating versus moderating effects of variables, including
dependent variables of both homicides and thefts. Crime rates were averaged over
multiple years and log transformed to address skew and heteroscedasticity concerns.
Ordinary least squares regression techniques were utilized in the analysis.
Bjerregaard and Cochran use three indicators of economic conditions, including
two indices. The first, economic freedom, was based upon several factors that indicate
very little government interference in economic affairs. The second index was economic
obstacles, operationalized by Gini coefficient of household income index values. A third
measure of economic dominance was social security spending as a percentage of gross
domestic product values. Family was measured as a factor variable including divorce
rates and percentage of females in the labor force. Education was operationalized as a
factor variable including pupil-to-teacher ratios and illiteracy rates. Polity consisted of
lack of voter turnout.
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The Gini coefficient was the only economic indicator to have a significant direct
effect on homicides. Family disruption had a significant positive relationship to
homicides only when the economic measure was economic freedom, not Gini or social
security, in both mediating and moderating models. Education did not rise to significant
levels, regardless of the economic measure applied in either mediating or moderating
models. Polity had a significant positive relationship to homicides when economy was
operationalized as social security in mediating models and a positive relationship to
homicides when Gini and social security measures were used in moderating models.
Bjerregaard and Cochran (2008) found limited support for both mediating and
moderating models with regard to homicide rates. For thefts, there is more support for
moderating models. On the balance, in their study, measuring the economy by the Gini
index appeared to be most fruitful.
In summary, Bjerregaard and Cochran (2008) submit their findings are
“consistently inconsistent” and analyses are very sensitive to how the economic
institution is operationalized. No clear line was drawn as to whether the effects on crime
were mediating or moderating. For them, the challenge for future researchers is to refine
operationalizations and to determine whether non-economic institutions mediate or
moderate the effects of the economy on crime.
Census Tracts as Units of Analysis
Maume and Lee (2003, p. 1151) point out that “Messner and Rosenfeld (2001) are
never completely clear on the appropriate level of analysis for testing their theory” (see
also, Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; Piquero & Piquero, 1998; Schoepfer & Piquero, 2006).
Prior studies of IAT have been conducted at the cross-national, state, county, and city
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levels. That being said, controversy remains whether IAT can be tested at anything less
than the cross-national data level. For instance, Bjerregaard and Cochran (2008, pp. 1845) emphasized that the intent was for IAT to be tested at a cross-national level. However,
other researchers believe that smaller geographic units of analysis are appropriate for this
purpose. Case in point, Chamlin and Cochran (1995, p. 426) suggest that city-level data
be included in future research designs. Piquero and Piquero (1998, p. 68) also address
smaller units of analysis, arguing that culture should be fairly constant across different
states. There may, however, be differences in their respective structural arrangements at
the state level. The current study also hypothesizes that the relationship between
homicides and structural, or institutional, arrangements will continue to be measurable at
the census tract level.
Messner and Rosenfeld (2007, p.44) themselves suggest that research should
focus on the question “why do levels of crime vary across social systems (for example,
nations, cities, neighborhoods)?” Whether their intention was to leave the door open for
future researchers to explore different units of analysis in IAT research is unknown. In
expanding the application of IAT to county-level data, Maume and Lee (2003, pp. 1138,
1150) indicated that to limit IAT studies to states and nations underestimates “the
explanatory power and analytical flexibility of the theory”. Given that “smaller
aggregate units such as counties also exhibit their own institutional characteristics”, they
further posit that IAT is a valid theory for use at the local county level (Maume & Lee,
2003, p. 1138).
Stucky (2006, p. 1124), after examining polity structures at the local level,
suggested “future institutional anomie research should focus on local variation in the
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strength of economic and noneconomic institutions”. For him, politics at the local level
can have a bearing on violent crime. These local institutions can make decisions about
zoning, business licensing, placement of recreation centers, etc., providing buffers for its
citizens and potentially changing the patterns of risk and offending within a community.
Shaw and McKay (1942 p. 165), although applying social disorganization theory,
discuss the similarity of outlooks that can exist within smaller geographic areas within a
particular city and that these attitudes can be sustained in institutions. They posit,
therefore, that the relationships that exist between crime rates and institutions may not be
constant across large geographical areas. Applying this view more specifically to IAT, in
local areas where the family institution is strong, family members receive greater support
and are influenced more strongly by social control functions. These areas would
theoretically have lower homicide rates.
Since it is more likely that homicides occur in urban, as opposed to rural, areas,
Maume and Lee (2003) suggest that state-level analyses may not appropriately address
heterogeneity. They argued for even smaller units, such as counties. One advantage of
utilizing GWR in statistical analyses is that it takes into consideration spatial
heterogeneity. Deane, Messner, Stucky, McGeever, and Kubrin (2008, p. 367) indicated
that “[s]patial models address the interdependence of place to partially accommodate the
mismatch between the scale of units of observation and the scale of social processes.”
Graif and Sampson (2009) analyzed census tract level data utilizing GWR to examine the
relationships between homicides and other variables related to the current study, such as
socioeconomic disadvantage, percentage of foreign-born population and language
diversity.
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Other homicide research has also utilized census tracts as units of analysis. For
example, Morenoff and Sampson (1997) used census tracts as units of analysis to study
the relationship between homicides and population change in the context of social
disorganization and neighborhood residential mobility. It is recognized that census tract
boundaries are arbitrary in the sense that social phenomena, such as homicide rates or
poverty levels, are not defined by or constrained within those borders. This is also true
for other units of analysis, such as cities, counties, and states. For example, one would
not see varying divorce rates on one side of the street or the other simply because that is
where the census tract boundary is located. Rather, there can be a contagion effect across
this demarcation, which can be accounted for within geographically weighted regression.
For example, a census tract will have a stronger likelihood of experiencing homicides if it
is in close proximity to another census tract that has had high frequency of homicides.
In comparing 169 publications, Weisburd and Piquero (2008) found that R2 values
varied according to the units of analysis employed, with neighborhood or census tract
units having higher R2 values (.621) than those produced by country (.568), state (.566),
or city/county (.302) units of analysis. Hipp (2007) also points out that the relationships
between variables can be hidden if the units of analysis are overly large. Hence, there is
indirect support within the literature for using smaller units of analysis, such as census
tracts, to study homicides.
Moreover, Messner and Rosenfeld (2007, p. 35) acknowledge the “struggle for
institutional control” occurs at the local level, indicating “local institutions provide order,
meaning, purpose, and protection to area residents”. IAT has also been linked with social
disorganization theory, with researchers of that theory indicating that local institutions
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have a mediating effect on social conditions, economic deprivation, and violent crime
(Peterson, Krivo & Harris, 2000, pp. 32, 34). Further, the impact of institutions as
neighborhood social control mechanisms differs by the strength of the institutions
(Triplett, Gainey, and Sun, 2003, pp. 442-3). When local institutions fall apart or move
out of an area, it may leave citizens feeling abandoned and alone in their struggles.
Messner and Rosenfeld further note that when local institutions disappear these areas
may appear war-torn which, in turn, may bring out a “warlike mentality” by the police.
There can also be a weakening of informal social controls when citizens lack the ability
to connect to broader social institutions through these local institutions (Hagedorn, 1991;
Wacquant, 1993; Peterson et al., 2000).
In their elaboration and expansion of IAT, Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld
(2008) address both macro- and micro-level elements that are relative to IAT. They offer
encouragement for additional studies that are focused on micro-level influences. Messner
(2012) further suggests that there may be value in future multilevel theorizing, including
the potential of integrating IAT with, for example, situational action theory (SAT). This
would acknowledge the micro-level symbolic interaction and environmental influences,
such as an individual’s perception of institutional functioning. For example, the extent to
which an individual views an institution as being legitimate can impact how much
credence they give to its social control directives. Messner (2008, p. 168) submits that
“[e]conomic dominance in the institutional balance of power can be linked specifically
with criminal behavior via both internalized normative controls and informal social
controls”. Drawing from Merton (1964, p. 226), Messner (2012, p. 10) suggested that
when there is “extreme anomie”, individuals are not guided by morality so much as they
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are with “pure technical expediency” of the means. The current research takes the
position that these processes can be distinguishable at the census tract level.
However, finding support for testing IAT at the census tract level is not as simple
as conducting a literature review of studies that have utilized census tracts relative to
other criminological theories. IAT is unique in its explanation of crime in that it
addresses cultural and structural elements, as well as the interaction between the two
elements. More current elaborations of IAT have also emphasized the linkages between
micro and macro processes. Previous IAT research suggests perceptions of institutional
authority and support may vary across geographical areas such as nations, states,
counties, and cities. Given the lack of studies to date, it remains unclear whether these
principles of IAT will hold true at the census tract level. However, following Hipp’s
(2007) logic, smaller units of analysis may uncover relationships that were previously
obscured when using larger units. In other words, it is fruitful to determine whether
perceptions of institutional salience, moral authority, and support continue to vary across
smaller census tract units.
Conducting research at the census tract level could provide for closer examination
of the linkages between micro and macro processes. Beyond addressing the question of
how crime can become a means to an end, shifting to smaller units of analysis may also
provide insights as to why certain “war-like” areas experience more homicides. These
nuances may be obscured if larger units of analysis are used.
In summary, while Messner and Rosenfeld are ambiguous in their original
research as to how to operationalize and study IAT, their more recent work suggests that
future applications of IAT that are sensitive to micro-level processes are not only
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acceptable but also encouraged. Using census tracts as units of analysis provides for the
aggregation of this micro data, keeping that data in the context of the geographical area
from which it was collected.
Summary of Empirical and Theoretical Literature
The extant literature has found the variables of poverty and deprivation, including
the Gini index (Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Piquero &
Piquero, 1998; Stucky, 2003; Maume & Lee, 2003; Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008);
divorce (Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; Bjerregaard & Cochran,
2008); female-headed or single-parent households (Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; Piquero
& Piquero, 1998); women in the workforce (Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008); percentage
of population that is black (Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998); urbanism (Hannon & DeFronzo,
1998); voting (Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; Schoepfer & Piquero, 2006; Bjerregaard &
Cochran, 2008); church membership (Chamlin & Cochran, 1995); decommodification
and welfare expenditures (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998;
Piquero & Piquero, 1998; Batton & Jensen, 2002); high school education (Schoepfer &
Piquero, 2006); college enrollment (Piquero & Piquero, 1998); local political structures
(Stucky, 2003); and unemployment (Schoepfer & Piquero, 2006) to be significant for
testing IAT and crime.
There is, however, a lack of consensus among IAT researchers regarding the
appropriate units of analysis. Researchers have studied crime at the level of nations
(Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008),
states (Piquero & Piquero, 1998; Schoepfer & Piquero, 2006), counties (Hannon &
DeFronzo, 1998; Maume & Lee, 2003), and cities (Stucky, 2003). Such a diverse body
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of literature suggests IAT should be studied across various levels. Stucky (2006)
advocates for future IAT studies that incorporate measures at the local level. Messner
and Rosenfeld (2007) at times acknowledge there are differences in the strength of local
institutions. Further, Messner, Thome and Rosenfeld (2008) encourage more research
with linkages between micro- and macro-level processes. It is unknown, or at least
unclear, what unit of analysis in future studies will be most significant.
Overall, research has found, at least, partial support for IAT (Chamlin & Cochran,
1995; Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; Piquero & Piquero,
1998; Savolainen, 2000; Batton & Jensen, 2002; Stucky, 2003; Maume & Lee, 2003;
Schoepfer & Piquero, 2006). In past IAT studies, variables such as the Gini Index,
divorced, and female-headed households have been found to be significant across
multiple units of measurement, including counties.
Hypotheses
The research questions within the present study are shaped by the aforementioned
literature. By employing exploratory spatial data analysis techniques, the relationships
and spatial variations between the dependent variable of homicide rates and the
independent variables representing the four institutions of economy, education, family,
and polity are examined. Comparing results across various census tracts can provide
insights as to the spatially-differentiated influences institutions have on homicides.
Following the recent trend, both OLS regression and GWR are employed and compared
to address the following hypotheses.
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Hypothesis 1
It is hypothesized that homicides are not randomly distributed across census tracts
in Minneapolis, rather they are clustered. This determination is based on the presence or
absence of homicides in each census tract; it does not factor in the influence of any
independent variables. For example, a statistically significant cluster exists when a
census tract having high homicides is surrounded by other census tracts that have high
homicides, utilizing a 95% confidence level. The null hypothesis would be there is no
pattern in the distribution of homicides locations across all Minneapolis census tracts. In
other words, homicides are randomly distributed.
Hypotheses 2 Through 4
It is hypothesized that non-economic institutions moderate the relationship
between the economic institution and homicide rates in Minneapolis census tracts. Null
Hypotheses 2 through 4 state that there are no interactions and that the non-economic
institutions of education (2), family (3), and polity (4) do not moderate the relationship
between the economic institution and homicide rates.
Hypotheses 5 Through 8
It is hypothesized that there are significant relationships between the strength of
social institutions and the rates of homicides in Minneapolis census tracts. Null
Hypotheses 5 through 8 state that there are no relationships between homicide rates and
the strength of the institutions of economy (5), education (6), family (7), and polity (8).
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CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
Introduction
This study seeks to add to the existing body of literature relative to IAT
examining the relationship between culture, instructional structures, and homicide rates.
It incorporates operationalizations of the economic, education, family, and polity
institutions similar to definitions used in previous studies to provide for more meaningful
comparisons. This study also makes two distinctive contributions to IAT research. First,
it utilizes geographically weighted regression within GIS software to more closely
examine the relationships between institutions and homicides across space. Secondly,
and most uniquely, following IAT research applied at the state, county, and city levels,
this study extends questions regarding IAT to census tract units of analysis. Originally
exercised at the cross-national level, IAT has subsequently been applied at the state,
county, and city levels by other researchers.
Units of Analysis
Following the logic set forth in the previous chapter, this study uses census tracts
as the unit of analysis. There are 116 census tracts across the city of Minneapolis. Sixty
of those census tracts experienced at least one homicide over the study period. Individual
census tract populations ranged from 1,163 to 10,346, with a total population of 382,578
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(U.S. Census Bureau, 2013). Variables are normalized to account for the population
differences between census tracts.
It is hypothesized that homicide distribution will vary across the census tracts of
Minneapolis. It is also hypothesized that the extent to which non-economic institutions
provide alternative measures of achievement will vary across geographical units as small
as census tracts. Levels of altruism, providing residents with relief from anomic
pressures, may also fluctuate at the census tract level.
Census tracts exhibiting weaker strength in their non-economic institutions will,
theoretically, experience a decrease in the moral authority of their non-economic
institutions. According to IAT, these areas likely have decreased social controls and are
less able to provide positive support, creating an environment that is conducive to a “by
any means” mindset. Therefore, these census tracts are likely to experience higher
homicide rates, per IAT.
Data Sources
The Minneapolis Police Department provided access to violent crime data
collected by the department for the years 2007 through 2011. Data used in the
operationalization of independent variables are derived from the U.S. Census Bureau’s
American Community Study (ACS), using five-year estimates for the years 2007 to 2011.
Thus, the census data used within this study covers the same time period as the police
department’s homicide data.
All data received from the Minneapolis Police Department has been handled with
extreme care and confidentiality. Data included latitude and longitude coordinates
indicating where homicides occurred, as well as where the victims of these homicides
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resided. In some cases, these coordinates are the same. Although point data maps of all
homicide locations created in GIS are heavily utilized during the research process, such
maps do not appear within the pages of this study. This omission is intentional,
recognizing the possibility that these maps could be used for nefarious purposes,
including the revictimization of others who resided with the homicide victim.
Homicide Rates as Dependent Variable
In the current research, the dependent variable is homicide rates. The term
homicide, as used herein, is comprised of murder, as well as negligent and non-negligent
manslaughter. FBI NIBRS-based supplemental homicide report forms that are submitted
through the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (2014) define these crimes as
“the willful (non-negligent) killing of one human being by another” and “the killing of
another person through negligence, with no willful intent”. In this study, homicide
counts ranged from 0 to 31 per census tract.
Messner and Rosenfeld (1997, p. 1401) discuss the popular practice in previous
research of using “multi-year averages” of homicides to avoid methodological concerns
regarding random fluctuations (Kick & LaFree, 1985; Krahn et al., 1986; Baller, Anselin,
Messner, Deane, & Hawkins, 2001; Cahill & Mulligan, 2007; McCall, Land & Parker,
2010). Accordingly, the current study utilizes homicide rates over a five-year period
from 2007 to 2011. Further, natural logarithms of homicide rates “reduce skewness and
induce homogeneity in error variance”, following Messner and Rosenfeld (1997,
p. 1401).
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Operationalization of Independent Variables
Challenges and Insights from Previous IAT Studies
As many researchers have pointed out, Messner and Rosenfeld do not provide
clear direction as to how institutional strength should be operationalized and measured
(Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; Piquero & Piquero, 1998; Maume & Lee, 2003; Schoepfer &
Piquero, 2006). Since IAT is a highly abstract theory, past studies have relied upon
proxy, or indirect, measures of structural elements. While this is not an ideal condition
in a scientific sense, there are no simple solutions.
A main task for researchers in IAT includes overcoming issues related to
operationalization sensitivities that result in inconsistent findings across studies. Future
research should focus on increasing the validity of the proxy measures of the strength or
weakness of institutions. Piquero and Piquero (1998) offered many insights in this
regard. In their study, they operationalized the education institution as the proportion of
the population enrolled full-time in college and the percentage of high school dropouts.
They acknowledge that such measures may be problematic. Is one measuring the value
individuals place on acquiring knowledge (education emphasis) or the fact that
individuals are banking on an education to gain employment that carries higher status
(economic emphasis)? To what extent, if any, is the education institution providing an
alternative definition of success to one that is monetary in nature?
Schoepfer and Piquero (2006) also point out ambiguities arise when divorce is
used as a measure of the family institution. They recognize the common interpretation of
this operationalization relates to family disruption, which infers divorce should be viewed
unfavorably, or as criminogenic. However, they also bring to light the fact that divorce
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can actually be a termination of family disruptions. In other words, if one breaks from a
toxic relationship, he/she may also be breaking free from stresses, abuses, and/or
violence. This has implications for adults and children alike.
Piquero and Piquero (1998, p. 69) noted that the use of public assistance as a
variable “is amenable to a number of different interpretations”. Some may argue this
pertains to the economic institution. In their study of the effects of decommodification,
Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) associated this variable with the polity institution. There,
public assistance was viewed as one way governments are able to buffer citizens from
market forces, freeing them to make decisions without regard to purely economic
pressures.
Many of the variables used to test IAT, such as economic deprivation and family
disruption, have also been utilized in the testing of other criminological theories. Piquero
and Piquero (1998) emphasize that IAT, however, is distinctive in that it addresses the
interactions between institutions, as well as the degree to which non-economic
institutions are able to provide alternative definitions of success and self-worth. The
explanation of how these variables explain crime, through main and interaction effects, is
different from other criminological theories. This goes along with the posit by Messner
and Rosenfeld that simply increasing or decreasing the strength of one institution will not
necessarily have the effect of reduced crime rates. If those changes are not also
accompanied by curtailment of cultural emphasis on monetary success, crime rates may
not be reduced.
The more recent work of Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld (2008) seems to pave
the way for a better understanding of the interactions between the cultural and structural

	
  

68	
  

components of IAT. Their further clarification and elaboration of the linkage between
micro and macro processes serves as a catalyst for taking a fresh look at IAT, yielding
new operationalizations that are innovative, effective, and replicable.
The focus of Messner and Rosenfeld’s own cross-national study in 1997 was
limited to an examination of the economic and polity institutions. Therefore, the
operationalization of variables for the current study is noticeably influenced by
definitions provided by previous tests of IAT. Only the Gini index (economic) and
public assistance (polity) variables follow directly from those variables employed by
Messner and Rosenfeld. It is acknowledged that operationalization of variables remains a
challenge in the current study.
Economy
The role of the economy institution is to provide for one’s food, shelter, clothing,
and other necessary needs. However, America is characterized by the dominance of the
economic institution over other institutions, which can result in reduced social controls
and support (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2007). Following the lead of previous research
(Land et al., 1990; Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; Maume & Lee, 2003; Bjerregaard &
Cochran, 2008), and perhaps even more importantly Messner and Rosenfeld’s own 1997
study, the current research operationalizes the institution of economy by using Gini index
of income inequality data.
Gini index values range from zero to one, with zero indicating perfect equality and
one corresponding to perfect inequality. In other words, if the value is zero, income is
distributed equally to everyone. If the value is one, then one person has possession of all
income shares. High values are indicative of greater economic inequality. For the five-
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year period of 2007 to 2011, the American Community Survey reported a national Gini
index average of 0.4695 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013). It had remained relatively stable
since 1993, but between 2010 and 2011, it increased 1.6% to .477 (U.S. Census Bureau,
2013). The American Community Survey five-year estimate (2007-2011) of the Gini
index in Minneapolis was .5018, and its statewide estimate for Minnesota was .4408
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2013).
Land et al. (1990, pp. 943-944) speak to the relevance of including both an absolute
and relative deprivation measure. The Gini index is a measure of relative deprivation.
As an absolute deprivation measurement, the current study also includes the variables of
median annual household income and the percentage of families who were living below
the poverty level in the past 12 months, as included in previous research (Chamlin &
Cochran, 1995; Piquero & Piquero, 1998; Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998).
The income and poverty variables both serve as proxies of the economic footing
upon which individuals exist. These are not direct measures of how prominently
individuals place the economic institution above non-economic institutions. That data is
not readily available, and it would be a daunting task to create such a direct measurement.
Thus far, however, these are the types of indirect measures that have been used in prior
IAT research, as well as other sociological studies.
The Gini index addresses the distribution of resources within a society. High values
indicate more inequality, or disparity, which theoretically links to higher homicide rates
as IAT suggests that individuals may feel greater pressure to use whatever means are
necessary in order to reach the same level of success as those positioned above them.
Being harbored from the effects of market forces would also free them to make decisions
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found in the non-economic realm, without the pressure to give greater weight to the
economic factors.
Education
The role of the education institution is to foster knowledge and human development,
as well as to provide further socialization of students. In the current study, education was
measured through the use of three variables. The first operationalization includes the
percentage of individuals over the age of 18 who have less than a high school diploma or
its equivalent, which is in line with prior IAT research (Piquero & Piquero, 1998;
Schoepfer & Piquero, 2006). Piquero and Piquero (1998, p. 69) were the first to use this
operationalization, arguing strong education institutions can reduce crime “by creating an
increase in the percentage of people who through their education, can become productive,
non-criminal members of society”. Piquero and Piquero (1998, p. 69) further argue that
the percentage of high school dropouts is an indicator of such “vitality” of the education
institution. Likewise, in the current study, having a high percentage of adults with less
than a high school education is, theoretically, indicative of a weakened education
institution. It is anticipated, therefore, that those areas of the city with a high percentage
of individuals with less than a high school education would experience higher homicide
rates.
The second measurement of education is the percentage of individuals aged 18 to
24 years who were not enrolled in college or graduate school, following in the footsteps
of Piquero and Piquero (1998). Low educational attainment and low college enrollment
would indicate a weak education institution. Piquero and Piquero (1998, p. 79) found
that college may have the socializing effect of creating “respect for formal learning and
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the pursuit of knowledge in such a way that such values are transmitted to others in the
population”.
Third, median earnings in the past 12 months for full-time civilians aged 16 years
or over employed within the educational services field is included. This variable is
incorporated following the logic laid out by Maume and Lee (2003), who used a ratio of
average educational expenditures per person of school age over a five-year period.
Piquero and Piquero (1998) also included a ratio of teacher salaries to overall salaries,
arguing “in a market society, the status of institutional roles is reflected in their market
values”. The offering of higher teacher salaries indicates more value is given to the
education institution. Such areas would theoretically experience fewer homicides.
It is recognized that the educational attainment and enrollment measurements
could be problematic, as Piquero and Piquero (1998) allude. Education, for example, not
only enhances knowledge, which would be a goal when institutions are balanced, but it
can also lead to becoming gainfully employed in the future. The latter outcome could be
associated with a commitment to monetary rewards. If that is the case, then some may
argue these measures are invalid. A high rate of high school educational attainment
could signal high commitment to the economic system, rather than the education
institution. However, if individuals are staying in high school, and even later pursuing a
college education, this means they continue to be attached to the educational institution.
With this connection, therefore, they may still be subject to at least some social control or
support functions offered by the education institution. Dropping out of high school, on
the other hand, would be associated with a disconnection with the education institution.
Termination of educational pursuits could be due to pressures to place employment and
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economic needs first. Therefore, being engaged in education indicates priority being
given to the education institution, not acquiescence to the economic institution.
Education is a socially-acceptable means of achieving one’s goals.
Education is not just a means to achieving success; it may be endorsed as a
suitable means of achieving success according to the collective. Further, the vast
majority of people end their formal academic studies at some point. It is the exception,
rather than the rule, that individuals pursue degree after degree after degree. This is
implied, for example, when references are made to a doctoral degree being a terminal
degree.
Family
The role of family includes population replacement and socializing children to
cultural expectations. It also serves as a safe haven to family members against stresses
that occur in other aspects of their lives (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2007). To measure the
strength of the institution of family, this study includes the percentage of the population
over 15 years of age who were divorced, shadowing past research (Chamlin & Cochran,
1995; Maume & Lee, 2003; Schoepfer & Piquero, 2006; and Bjerregaard & Cochran,
2008.) Where the family institution is strong, family members develop definitions of
success beyond those of an economic nature, diminishing anomic cultural pressures
(Messner and Rosenfeld, 2007). Past research has viewed divorce as a family disruption,
which hinders informal social controls and diminishes support, leading, in turn, to higher
levels of economic crime (Blau & Blau, 1982; Blau & Golden, 1986; Felson & Cohen,
1980; Sampson, 1986, 1987; Sampson & Groves, 1989; Chamlin & Cochran, 1995;
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Braithwaite, 1989, Sampson & Laub, 1993). Therefore, it is expected that areas with
high divorce rates will be characterized by higher homicides rates.
A second operationalization includes the percentage of children under 18 years of
age who are living in single-female headed households. This operationalization is based
upon prior research that has indicated single-parents may not be able to provide for
adequate socialization and supervision of their children, in part because the parent may be
away from home while working (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997: 78; National Research
Council, 1993: 155-156; Piquero & Piquero, 1998, p. 69). This operationalization is
informed by that used in prior studies (Sampson & Lauritsen, 1994; Piquero & Piquero,
1998; Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; Stucky, 2003).
The third measure of the family institution is the percentage of children under 18
years of age residing in single male-headed households, which is a parallel measure to
single female-headed households. In recent years, more fathers have been assuming the
responsibility of caring for their offspring. Hofferth, Pleck, Goldscheider, Curtin and
Hrapczynski (2013) indicate that between 1996 and 2008 there has been a 40% increase
in the proportion of children residing with single fathers, increasing from 2.5% to 3.5%.
If single-parent households without a father being present is theorized to have a
detrimental effect on child development and the weakening of social control mechanisms,
then it seems to logically follow that single-parent households without a mother being
present would experience negative consequences as well. A fourth variable is the
percentage of children residing with a householder who is someone other than their
parent. Non-parent householders would include grandparents, other relatives, foster
parents, or someone who is unrelated to the child.
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Polity
The role of the polity institution is to ensure attainment of collective goals
(Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007). A strong polity institution is characterized by a sense of
altruism and the freedom to make decisions based on non-economic reasoning, thereby
offsetting anomic cultural pressures. In the current study, polity is measured by the
percentage of the population employed as government workers at the local, state, or
federal level. These individuals would have a better grasp of governmental policies and
procedures. By making decisions and carrying out directives, they may also have a
stronger voice in what happens within their community and how funds are disbursed.
The decision to include such a measure was informed by Stucky’s (2003) finding that
responsiveness of different forms of local governmental structures can have an influence
on rates of violent crime. Bursik and Grasmick (1993, pp. 17-18) define public control as
“the ability of neighborhoods to secure external resources through ties with the local
government and police”. Velez (2001, p. 858) surveyed citizens regarding their
satisfaction with local services across 60 neighborhoods in three cities and found that
high values for these public social control measures reduce “household and personal
victimization risk”, especially in structurally disadvantaged neighborhoods.
Messner and Rosenfeld (1994, pp. 106-108) contend that being involved in the
polity can create a sense of altruism, curbing anomic pressures. Citizenship status was
also considered for inclusion in this study, with the thought that non-citizens may not
have the same rights for involvement in governmental affairs. Although non-citizens
may be able to voice their opinions on issues, they are not able to vote for elected
officials or other referendums that influence local-level institutions. However, Graif and
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Sampson (2009, p. 245) argue that immigration status may actually have a protective
effect against involvement in criminal events.
Important to this study, Graif and Sampson (2009) point out that language
diversity is an area not yet undertaken by many researchers. Therefore, the percentage of
the population 18 years and over that did not speak English well is included as a variable.
The rationale behind this choice is that the inability to speak the dominant language may
place barriers to involvement in the local polity, at least at the official level. The voices
of non-English speakers may not be readily heard and, therefore, may not be considered
or given due weight during decision-making processes. This variable is limited to
responses from those 18 years and older, the legal voting age in America.
Available response options regarding one’s own perception of their ability to
speak English were: very well, well, not well, and not at all. The American Community
Survey Subjects Definitions document indicates that some researchers will condense the
data by combining well, not well, and not at all and then report the compilation as not
very well. However, for this study, only “not well” and “not at all” responses constituted
a positive response for this variable.
An additional operationalization of polity is the percentage of households
receiving public assistance, food stamps or supplemental security income, following the
logic set forth in prior studies (Messner &Rosenfeld, 1997; Piquero & Piquero, 1998;
Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; Maume & Lee, 2003). While at first glance this may appear
to be an economic measure, it belongs in the polity realm if one follows the logic of
Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) in their research on decommodification. Public assistance
disbursements are an example of what Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) refer to as
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“indicators of expenditure patterns”, which in part are predicated upon the “ease of access
to welfare benefits”. In other words, this measure goes to how well governments buffer
its citizens from the effects of market forces, such as the freedom to make decisions
based on non-economic factors. Hannon and DeFronzo (1998) and Savolainen (2000)
found that welfare expenditures diminish the impact of economic deprivation on crime.
Additional support for this operationalization can be found in the work of EspingAndersen (1990), which preceded and informed Messner and Rosenfeld’s 1997 study.
To further clarify, the operationalization of polity through the variable of public
assistance funds is distinct from the variable of the percentage of families living below
poverty level. The latter variable is meant to be a measurement of the economic
institution, as set forth previously. The public assistance variable is meant to measure the
extent to which the government buffers market forces, shielding members of society from
having to make decisions based solely on economic reasons. Living below the poverty
level is likely a situation where decisions are first and foremost based on economic
reasoning if one recalls that the economic institution is designed to provide for basic
necessities such as food, shelter and clothing. In other words, public assistance, or
decommodification, should act as a counter-measure to the anomic pressures of the
economic institution. If decommodification levels are higher, then it would follow that
the influences of the economic institution would be lower. Consequently, homicides
should also be lower.
Homoscedasticity/Heteroscedasticity and Log Transformations
Homicide rates vary drastically from one geographical area to another, which may
produce a skewed data distribution. To address the presence of heteroscedasticity in past
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research, many researchers have opted to log transform crime rates and other variables
(Baller, et al., 2001; Messner, Baumer & Rosenfeld, 2004; Cahill & Mulligan, 2007;
Deane et al., 2008; McCall et al., 2010). Doing so brings the data closer to a linear
distribution. While some researchers have opted to log transform all of their variables,
there is debate regarding this practice. Suggesting a mixed model is acceptable, Land et
al. (1990) point out that if skewness and heteroscedasticity are not found for a given
variable, then log transformation should not be automatically employed across the board
to all variables. By transforming a variable that is already linear, you may actually
introduce “artificial nonlinearities” into your model (Land et al., 1990, p. 938). In the
current study, only homicide rates are log transformed, as log transforming independent
variables produced little, if any, advantage.
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and
Regression Models
Introduction
As noted earlier, “crime has an inherent geographical quality” (Chainey &
Ratcliffe, 2005). Geographic Information Systems (GIS) allows researchers to more
closely examine that geographical, or spatial, quality. For example, they may want to
know if homicides are unequally distributed across the census tracts of a particular city,
in this case Minneapolis. This particular study utilizes ArcGIS software, which is
produced by Esri. Initially, Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis (ESDA) tools found
within the GIS software will be used to obtain overall descriptive and graphic
descriptions, as well as preliminary information as to potential clusters, hot spots, and
spatial heterogeneity (see Messner & Anselin, 2004). These measures provide important
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information, such as skewness, data distributions, and local data variability. Histograms
and scatterplots are utilized to identify and address outliers. Other general descriptive
statistics, such as central features and median centers, are also obtained to gain a general
sense of the distribution of the data. With the assistance of Esri’s ArcGIS 10.1, many
statistical analysis techniques are utilized, including various regression models
(exploratory, ordinary least squares, and geographically weighted regression), to better
understand the relationships between crime and the various institutions across space.
Kernel Density
Density maps allows for visual understanding of spatial patterning. The steps
used in creating these maps take into account the occurrence of other homicides around
each individual homicide using a weighting function (see Fotheringham et al., 2002, pp.
44-51). Greater weight is given to an individual homicide when it occurs at or near
another homicide. Using a color ramp, these maps indicate the magnitude of offense
locations, showing the estimated proportion of total homicides that can be expected to
occur in a specific area. Effectively, an area near a known homicide location would have
increased probability of experiencing a homicide. In some cases, distinct patterns or
clusters will be visible.
Regression (Exploratory, OLS, and GWR)
As noted previously, exploratory regression, ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression, and geographically weighted regression (GWR) are utilized to examine the
relationships between dependent and independent variables in this study. Exploratory
regression is a tool included in ArcGIS 10.1 that provides considerable assistance to a
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researcher in determining which variables significantly contribute to successful model
building. Rather than going through the time consuming process of drawing out and
calculating a correlation for every possible combination of variables, a researcher can
utilize exploratory regression to systematically narrow the number of passing models for
any given set of independent variables.
One key purpose of exploratory regression is to ascertain whether any passing
models exist using the given data. In order to be considered a passing model, a total of
five tests or criteria must be satisfied when using ArcGIS. Esri (2010), the manufacturer
of ArcGIS, strongly cautions that it is unwise to proceed to further analysis until a
passing model is achieved. Otherwise, the validity of any subsequent findings and
inferences cannot be assured. These five tests include: Jarque-Bera (JB) p-value,
variance inflation factor (VIF), Koenker’s studentized Breush-Pagan p-value (K(BP)), a
spatial autocorrelation test (SA, the Global Moran’s I p-value), and Adjusted R2.
A statistically significant Jarque-Bera score indicates that model predictions are
biased. In other words, the residuals are not normally distributed. To pass the JB test, its
value must be more than .05.
Variance inflation factor values relate to the redundancy, or multicollinearity,
amongst independent variables. As previously noted, multicollinearity may be, at least in
part, responsible for producing inconsistent findings across previous studies (Land et al.,
1990). In the current study, maximum VIF values were set at 7.5, which is the value
recommended by Esri. Although consensus is lacking, some researchers have offered a
VIF of 10 as the maximum threshold (Myers, 1990; Stucky, 2003; Pallant, 2007), while
others suggest a more restrictive maximum VIF of 4 (Champion & Hartley, 2010).
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The Koenker (Breusch-Pagan) test addresses the concern of non-stationarity or
heteroscedasticity, and its limit was set to the recommended maximum of .05. A value
that is statistically significant (>.05) indicates that the model is not consistent and,
therefore, is not reliable. The spatial autocorrelation threshold was set to the Esrirecommended minimum value of .10, which signifies that regression residuals are
distributed randomly and are not clustering.
The minimum Adjusted R2 for this study was set at .4, which is more relaxed than
the Esri-recommended .5 minimum. This setting increased the likelihood of obtaining a
passing model despite the downward pull from a skewed dependent variable. An R2
value indicates how much of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by a
specific model. In other words, in this research, if a model did not explain at least 40%
of the variance in homicide rates, it would not be considered as a passing or sound model.
Although the interpretation of Adjusted R2 is very similar to that of R2, the former is
preferred since it takes into account the complexity of the model, including the number of
variables used.
The results of these five tests are produced in summary tables within the
exploratory regression output file. Researchers should carefully inspect these test values
to troubleshoot possible causes of model failure. The process of exploratory regression
can be extremely time-consuming and, at times, frustrating. However, it can
meaningfully strengthen the analysis. If the data does not produce a passing model, you
cannot be confident that you have a stable model and, thus, it would not be appropriate to
proceed to the utilization of OLS and/or GWR. Hence, exploratory regression is vital to
selecting a well-specified regression model, a step not universally proffered and advised
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with other statistical analysis software. For example, many researchers start at the OLS
stage when building models.
Once a passing model is identified through exploratory regression, the researcher
may proceed to OLS. OLS is a commonly used technique that allows the researcher to
examine the relationship between dependent and independent variables. This approach
assumes that data are normally distributed and variances are equal. OLS produces
singular results that pertain to the entire study area, thus it is referred to as a global
(versus local) model.
Since Messner and Rosenfeld’s first works on IAT, much has changed in the area
of geospatial analysis. For example, the OLS regression technique has been subjected to
scrutiny. Ratcliffe (2010) addressed the inability of OLS regression models to identify
potential interaction effects of spatially proximate phenomenon, since these models do
not take into account that factors in one geographical area can affect relationships in other
geographical areas. Geographically weighted regression (GWR) is one potential solution
to this concern. According to Chainey and Ratcliffe (2005), it was developed at
Newcastle University, UK and was first mentioned by Brunsdon, Fotheringham and
Charlton in 1996.
While some studies have used GWR in statewide comparisons, it can also reveal
strong spatial heterogeneity influences at the census block level per Cahill and Mulligan
(2007). From one location to another within a single city, the relationship between
dependent and independent variables(s) can be different (Baller, et al., 2001;
Fotheringham, Charlton, & Brunsdon, 2001; Cahill & Mulligan, 2007; Graif & Sampson,
2009). In other words, the relationship may not necessarily function in a uniform way or
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with the same strength across the entire geographical area under analysis. For example,
homicide locations may be clustered, and a more robust and geographically-sensitive
method may be desired to identify these clusters. Failing to take this into account can
produce flawed models (Baller et al., 2001; Cahill & Mulligan, 2007) and, subsequently,
faulty findings (Baller et al., 2001, p. 562). Deane et al. (2008, p. 364) add “if spatial
dependence violates the regression assumption that the error of prediction for an
observation cannot be predicted by its value on an independent variable, sample estimates
of the population regression coefficients will be biased.” Furthermore, this omission may
also be a contributing factor to why researchers produce inconsistent findings even when
they are using comparable variables (Graif & Sampson, 2009).
In the general sense of regression techniques, GWR is very similar to OLS.
However, to allow relationships between variables to vary spatially, it calculates a
spatially weighted regression equation for each unit of analysis (census tract), hence the
classification as a local (versus global) model (Esri, 2010). OLS, on the other hand, is a
global model that produces one regression equation for the entire study area. GWR
requires an N of more than 40. This is satisfied within the current research by including
all 116 census tracts across Minneapolis, as well as limited models that used only the 60
census tracts that experienced at least one homicide during the study period.
GWR is also set apart from OLS in that the researcher can use coefficient surface
maps to visualize how well each independent variable is predicting homicides in a
particular census tract, as well as any overall patterns or clusters that are occurring across
the entire study area. In other words, one can visualize where the models are best
performing. These maps help the researcher understand criminogenic influences at a
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much deeper level. This could provide significant empirical support for more effective
policymaking tailor-made to specific geographic areas within the city.
To explain the unique contributions of GWR, Fotheringham, Brunsdon and
Charlton (2002, p. 1) use the analogy of someone reading a book to understand the
climate of a particular country. In that book, only one quantity, the national average, was
included to describe certain characteristics of the nation, such as annual rainfall, hours of
sunshine, etc. When you think about it, the reader may be only slightly more informed
after reading the book. It tells us something, but it doesn’t help us predict differences in
phenomenon within smaller units of measurement. If that book pertained to the United
States, for example, undiscovered would be distinctions such as the drastic variance in
the amount of rainfall and hours of sunshine experienced between, say, the states of
Washington and North Dakota. These northern border states may share similar
latitudinal characteristics, but weather patterns are substantially different for a variety of
reasons. In the same way, OLS can sometimes fall short of providing us with rich
information. GWR holds the potential of telling us more about how relationships are
different across space. Continuing with the same analogy, it may be beneficial if we
were able to compare relationships from one state to another, from one city to another,
and the in case of the current research one census tract to another.
The paragraphs above have set forth some of the advantages of using GWR over
OLS. However, this does not mean that OLS should be omitted or that analysis should
begin with GWR. Rather, researchers and criminologists, such as Cahill and Mulligan
(2007), have begun to compare OLS and GWR regression models. They found that
GWR models can be more robust, providing deeper comprehension as to why crime may
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be occurring in one area and not another. While most assumptions of OLS and GWR are
equivalent, the importance of comparing results from OLS and GWR techniques stems
from the unique and divergent assumption of each approach regarding stationarity versus
nonstationarity of variable relationships. Charlton and Fotheringham (2007) point out
that OLS assumes a variable is constant across space; however, a more realistic approach
may be to assume that variables vary across an areal unit. The latter approach is
consistent with GWR. A basic premise of GWR is that closer neighboring points can
have a stronger influence than do distanced neighboring points. In a nutshell, the closer
homicides are to each other, the more weight those events are given in analyses.
Conversely, if homicides are greatly dispersed, it is less likely that the homicides are
impacting each other. This is reflected in the unique GWR regression equation for each
unit of analysis. Without spatial weighting, we know little about the heterogeneity across
the areal unit.
That being said, Charlton and Fotheringham (2007) caution researchers not to
routinely assume that GWR would be a better measure than OLS; instead, both models
should be analyzed and then compared. Therefore, in the current study, once OLS and
GWR processes are complete, then comparisons are made between the various models,
paying particular attention to the respective dependent-independent variable
relationships. To determine which technique is most appropriate given the specific data
in this study, Akaike’s Information Criterion (AICc) and Adjusted R2 values are
compared. In general, it is preferable to have higher Adjusted R2 values and lower AICc
values, which indicates a better fitting model for a specific set of data. Fotheringham, et
al. (2002, p. 69) indicate that AICc can be used to determine “which of the two models

	
  

85	
  

approximates reality more closely” by taking into consideration the differences in the
degrees of freedom between the models (Fotheringham, et al., 2002).
As background, R2 values provide an indication of model performance, ranging
from 0 (no fit) to 1.0 (perfect fit). This value is used to specify what percentage of the
variation in a dependent variable is explained by an independent variable (Esri, 2010).
When GWR is used, a Local R2 value is also provided for each case or observation (here,
by census tract) within the data. Adjusted R2 values are similar measures, however, they
take into account the complexity of the model being used by considering degrees of
freedom and normalizing the numerator and denominator (Esri, 2010). Therefore, this
value will always be less than the R2 value (Esri, 2010).
One additional step at this point is also to conduct a Local Moran’s I, sometimes
known as Anselin Local Moran’s or LISA. This tool indicates if there is statistically
significant clustering of a phenomenon, such as hotspots or coldspots. This means that
the distribution is not random, but patterned. This type of analysis is one of the first steps
in spatial analysis, and usually you would want to find clustering, not randomness. For
example, in the current study if homicides were distributed equally across all census
tracts, with no variance, it is unlikely that the model would produce significant
relationships between crime and institutional measurements. A Global Moran’s I tool, on
the other hand, is utilized to determine spatial autocorrelation and whether a model is
misspecified. An html results window includes z-scores and p-values. This is utilized
during the examination of regression residuals, and you would prefer to see residuals
distributed randomly, or without clustering. If that is not the case, the model is not stable.
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Distinctive Contributions of This Study
This study adds to the body of research that examines the relationship between
culture, institutional structures, and homicide rates. It incorporates operationalizations
similar to those in previous studies in an attempt to provide meaningful comparisons, as
well as new measures of commonly-used variables such as parentless households
(family) and percentage of population employed by the government to better understand
the strength of institutions at the local level. Additionally, prior assessments of IAT have
been conducted at the cross-national, national, state, and county levels. This study
attempts to extend the application of IAT to the census tract level within one major
metropolitan city.
It is also distinctive in that it utilizes and compares both a typical OLS regression
technique and GIS-based geographically-weighted regression. While GWR appears to be
gaining popularity among criminal justice researchers, an EBSCO Academic Search
Premier publication inquiry for “institutional anomie” plus “geographically weighted
regression” produced no results. Even the more generic and liberal search engine Google
Scholar yielded only two articles, Messner, Teske, Baller, and Thome (2013) and Deller
and Deller (2012), at the time the literature review was commenced. Expanding the
search to include anomie, in more general terms, produced only 11 articles. The research
undertaken herein is distinctive in the use of GWR in the context of IAT.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS
Introduction
Employing the research methods and design described in the previous chapter,
analysis was conducted to examine the relationship existing between homicide rates and
economic, education, family and polity institutions. There are 116 census tracts across
the City of Minneapolis. Each of these tracts is labeled within Figure 1. Because
approximately half of the census tracts experienced no homicides during the study period
of 2007 to 2011, the data was highly skewed. This is a substantial limitation of the study.
None of the interaction term were found to be significant. Consequently, many of the
findings of this chapter relate to subsequent analysis conducted using data from only
those 60 census tracts that experienced at least one homicide during the study period.
Overall, the data provides mixed support for IAT. More specifically, institutions found to
have significant relationships with homicide rates included the family (percentage
divorced, percentage of children living in single-parent households) and education (less
than high school attainment) institutions.
Descriptives
The data for the 2007 to 2011 study period included 258 homicides across the
City of Minneapolis, averaging between 51 and 52 homicides per year, with a range of 21
to 63 homicides. Figure 2 provides a visualization of the distribution of homicide rates
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Figure 1. Map of Minneapolis Census Tract Boundaries
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Figure 2. Logged Homicide Rates Per Census Tract, 2007-2011
(Note: Digits on the map indicate the census tract number.)
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1101

1102

1104

1098
107

1108
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110
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0.00
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1114
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119.98

0.65 - 0.88
0.89 - 1.07
1.08 - 1.29

120.01

120.03

1.30 - 1.69
1.70 - 2.14
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121.02

per census tracts in Minneapolis. One alternative research hypothesis was that
homicides would not be randomly distributed across census tracts, but rather would be
clustered. As hypothesized, a Local Moran’s I (z = 5.70, p. < .01) indicates that the
clustering of these homicides is not random. A pattern exists. There is less than a 1%
chance that the clustered pattern in the distribution of homicides occurring across the city
of Minneapolis is due to random chance. Areas with high homicides are surrounded by
other areas of high homicides. Therefore, Null Hypothesis 1, which stated there would
be no pattern in the distribution of homicide rates, can be rejected. This non-random
distribution supports further inquiry into explanation of homicide through IAT.
Table 1 presents rankings of the ten census tracts with the highest logged
homicides rates, as well as corresponding values and rankings of selected independent
variables. Census tract 1023 had the highest logged homicide rate of 2.139 homicides
per 10,000 population. In absolute terms, this census tract had the third highest frequency
of homicides (16) across all census tracts during the study period. Census tract 1023 had
an average population of 1,163 and a median annual income of $18,750, the 108th highest
income among all tracts given that a ranking of 1 indicates the highest median annual
income. Further, 19.29% percent of its population over the age of 25 has less than a high
school or GED education (Column E), ranking 83rd. Over half (55.47%) of the
population between the ages of 18 to 25 years in this particular census tract were not
enrolled in college or graduate school (Column F), ranking 38th out of 116. Column G
indicates that 24.49% of the population over 15 years of age reported their marital status
as being divorced, ranking 116th. It had the highest percentage of divorced population
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Table 1. Ranking of census tracts with the highest logged homicide rates and
corresponding rankings on demographic indicators
A)
Rank by
Rate
(Count)
1. 1023
(3)
2. 1259
(1)
3. 1016
(4)
4. 1257
(2)
5. 1028
(6)
6. 1021
(9)
7. 22
(16-17)
8. 1004
(7-8)
9. 1008
(5-6)
10. 32
(18-23)

B)
Logged
Rate
2.139
(16)
1.940
(31)
1.879
(13)
1.692
(17)
1.634
(10)
1.567
(8)
1.514
(5)
1.474
(9)
1.454
(10)
1.404
(4)

C)
Pop.
1,163

D)
Income

E)
High
School

Average
.507
$49,243
13.61
62.85
10.82
for all
tracts
Average
.980
$40,415
16.81
65.99
11.22
for tracts
having
homicide
Columns Include:
A) Rank by Logged Homicide Rate, Census Tract Number, (Rank by Count)
B) Logged Homicide Rate, (Count)
C) Population
D) Median Household Income
E) % Less Than High School Education
F) % 18-24 year olds not enrolled in college/graduate school
G) % of Population who claim Divorced status
H) % of Children in Single Mother-Headed Household

34.24

3,452
2,324
2,167
1,532
3,019
3,515
1,577

55.47
(38)
80.29
(90)
100
(116)
68.38
(64)
93.96
(112)
87.50
(102)
97.30
(115)
73.12
(70)
78.57
(85)
6.00
(44)

H)
Single
Mother
98.66
(115)
5.01
(83)
37.39
(65)
60.87
(102)
66.36
(111)
41.37
(72)
39.41
(68)
71.64
(112)
55.16
(93)
46.15
(77)

1,719

19.29
(83)
40.15
(115)
33.50
(110)
22.72
(95)
18.91
(81)
26.34
(100)
22.67
(94)
25.28
(98)
21.10
(88)
16.07
(75)

G)
Divorced
24.49
(116)
8.13
(29)
17.47
(109)
9.53
(50)
16.65
(106)
10.44
(64)
20.93
(114)
7.66
(26)
10.11
(57)
11.94
(75)

3,560

$18,750
(108)
$23,581
(100)
$21,369
(103)
$40,792
(67)
$25,772
(97)
$30,900
(91)
$27,805
(95)
42,733
(63)
32,750
(85)
44,917
(58)

F)
College

39.63

(Ranks out of 116 census tracts are indicated in parentheses. Rank of 1 = highest income, lowest
less than high school education attainment, lowest not enrolled in college, lowest divorce, and
lowest single female-headed household.)

	
  

92	
  

across the entire study area, and was the second highest tract with children living in
single-female headed households (Column H).
Across all 116 census tracts there was an average logged homicide rate of .507
per 10,000 population. Considering only those census tracts that experienced at least one
homicide, the average logged homicide rate was .980 per 10,000 population. Over the
study period, the City of Minneapolis averaged a total population of 381,833 (U.S.
Census Bureau, 2013) and an annual median income of $49,243. With regard to its total
population, 13.61% had less than a high school education, 62.85% of 18 to 24 year olds
were not enrolled in college or graduate school, 10.82% of those aged 15 and over
reported marital status as presently divorced, and 34.24% of all children were residing in
single female-headed households. With the exception of census tract 1259, the ten
highest homicide rates are all located in the northwestern quadrant of Minneapolis.
Although census tract 1259 had the highest count of homicides (31) during the study
period, its homicide rate was second highest.
Density/Hot Spot Mapping
Counts and rates only provide a partial picture of the distribution of homicides
across the study area. Density maps, such as provided in Figure 3, are used to further
indicate the magnitude of homicide locations and to estimate the proportion of total
homicides that can be expected to occur in a specific area. This is accomplished through
GIS tools that apply statistical weighting techniques related to distance decay. In other
words, close proximity to homicides increases the risk of experiencing a homicide.
Conversely, when there are no nearby homicides, an area’s risk of experiencing
homicides is lower. In Figure 3, areas shown in yellow, and to a lesser extent pink, have
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Figure 3. Density/Hot Spot Map.

Kernel Density - Homicides 2007-2011

Legend
Lowest Density

Highest Density

	
  

94	
  

disproportionately high rates of homicides. That is, the density of homicides is high.
Overall, these maps allow researchers to identify where crime events are clustering. At
least two areas of Minneapolis exhibit high homicide density. These are located in the
east central (most specifically, census tract 1259) and the northwest areas (including
census tracts 1004, 1008, 1009, 1257, 1016, 22, and 1023). A third area, which exhibited
somewhat less intensity than the two areas just mentioned, is located in the center of the
map. This area straddles census tracts 1261 and 1262. These are the areas that are most
likely to experience future homicides.
Choropleth Maps of Significant Variables
Figures 4 through 15. Univariate choropleth maps display a value assigned to a
specific geographic area such as a census tract. This promotes the detection of potential
patterns. These maps were compared to those of homicide rates and homicide density to
visually detect common patterns.
Analysis of Interaction Effects
Prior IAT studies have indicated the importance of considering interaction effects
between economic and non-economic institutions (Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; Piquero &
Piquero, 1998; Savolainen, 2000; Maume & Lee, 2003; Schoepfer & Piquero, 2006; Bjerregaard
& Cochran, 2008). Interaction between institutions is, in fact, one of the elements of IAT that
make it unique from other explanations of crime. It is hypothesized that non-economic
institutions can moderate the relationship that exists between the economic institution and
homicide rates. In other words, the effect of the economic institution on homicide rates will vary
depending upon the strength of non-economic institutions.
This study examines the interaction effects between select indicators of economic and
non-economic institutions in the explanation of homicide rates using three interaction, or product,

	
  

95	
  

Figure 4. Choropleth Map of Less Than High School Educational Attainment

Percentage of Population 25 Years and Over
with Less Than High School Education
2007-2011

Percentage
0% - 3.232%
3.232001% - 6.824%
6.824001% - 12.094%
12.094001% - 16.681%
16.681001% - 22.72%
22.720001% - 31.157%
31.157001% - 42.998%
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Figure 5. Choropleth Map of Non-Enrollment in College or Graduate School

Percentage of 18 to 24 Year Olds
Not Enrolled in College or Graduate School
2007-2011

Percentage
0% - 7.072%
7.072001% - 20.39%
20.390001% - 33.871%
33.871001% - 42.029%
42.029001% - 48.878%
48.878001% - 53.103%
53.103001% - 57.258%
57.258001% - 61.429%
61.429001% - 63.037%
63.037001% - 64.414%
64.414001% - 67.836%
67.836001% - 70.39%
70.390001% - 73.936%
73.936001% - 76.344%
76.344001% - 78.812%
78.812001% - 81.489%
81.489001% - 85.124%
85.124001% - 88.415%
88.415001% - 91.304%
91.304001% - 100%
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Figure 6. Choropleth Map of Median Annual Income

Median Annual Income
2007-2011

Dollars
$5,431.00 - $16,579.00
$16,579.01 - $26,119.00
$26,119.01 - $32,750.00
$32,750.01 - $40,000.00
$40,000.01 - $46,875.00
$46,875.01 - $54,183.00
$54,183.01 - $65,000.00
$65,000.01 - $79,571.00
$79,571.01 - $97,540.00
$97,540.01 - $125,086.00
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Figure 7. Choropleth Map of Percentage of Population Divorced

Percentage of Population over 15 Years Old
Reporting Divorced Status
2007-2011

Percentage
0.564% - 3.182%
3.182001% - 5.989%
5.989001% - 7.66%
7.660001% - 8.835%
8.835001% - 9.85%
9.850001% - 11.299%
11.299001% - 13.555%
13.555001% - 15.716%
15.716001% - 19.236%
19.236001% - 24.486%
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Figure 8. Choropleth Map of Children in Single Female-Headed Household

Percentage of Children 18 Years and Under
Living with Single Female Householder
2007-2011

Percentage
0% - 10.116%
10.116001% - 20.202%
20.202001% - 30.38%
30.380001% - 43.313%
43.313001% - 56.322%
56.322001% - 74.565%
74.565001% - 100%
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Figure 9. Choropleth Map of Children in Single Male-Headed Household
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Figure 10. Choropleth Map of Percentage of Children Living with Householder
Other Than Parent
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Figure 11. Choropleth Map of Gini Index of Income Inequality
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Figure 12. Choropleth Map of Percentage of Families Living Below Poverty Level
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Figure 13. Choropleth Map of Percentage of Speaking English Less Than Well
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Figure 14. Choropleth Map of Percentages Receiving Public Assistance
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Figure 15. Choropleth Map of Percentage Employed by Government
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terms (economy x education, economy x family, and economy x polity). Variable selection is
based upon those used in prior research. The Gini index and median annual household income
variables serve as indicators of the economic institutions. While median annual income is a
measure of absolute deprivation, the Gini index of income inequality provides a measure of
relative deprivation and has been utilized in many past studies (Chamlin & Cochran, 1995;
Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Piquero & Piquero 1998; Savolainen, 2000; Maume & Lee, 2003;
Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008). The percentage of the adult population having less than a high
school education was selected as an indicator of the education institution, following prior studies
(Piquero and Piquero, 1998; Schoepfer & Piquero, 2006). The percentage of the population that
is divorced is included as an indicator of the family institution, following its inclusion in past
studies (Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008).
The percentage of the population receiving public assistance, food stamps, or social security
funds is utilized as an indicator of the polity institution, following prior research that explored
decommodification and welfare expenditures (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Hannon & DeFronzo,
1998; Piquero & Piquero, 1998; Batton & Jensen, 2002).
In examining interaction effects, indicator variable values were mean centered to address
multicollinearity concerns, following prior studies (Piquero & Piquero, 1998; Savolainen, 2000).
Table 2 contains results from OLS interaction analysis based upon inclusion of median annual
household income as an indicator of the economic institution; whereas, Table 3 contains results
based upon Gini index values as an indicator of the economic institution. In each table, various
models are performed to examine the contribution of each interaction, or cross-product, term.
Model 1 contains only the main effects of the indicator variables, without interactions. Models 2
through 4 indicate the unique contributions of each interaction term. Model 5 simultaneously
contains all indicator variables, as well as all three interaction variables.
As depicted in Model 2 in Table 2, the first interaction term for the effect of economyeducation is examined. It is hypothesized that the effect of median income on homicides will
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vary according to the percentages of adults with less than a high school education. In other
words, where there is a low percentage of adults with less than a high school education, low
median incomes should have less impact on homicide rates. Analysis indicated that the
interaction was not statistically significant.
Model 3 examines the interaction term for economy-family. According to IAT, the effect
of low median income on homicides should be diminished where there are lower percentages of
divorced individuals. The economy-polity interaction is examined in Model 4. Theoretically,
higher levels of public assistance, food stamps, and social security disbursements should reduce
the effect that low income levels have on homicide rates. Model 5 simultaneously contains
indicators of all four institutions, as well as all three interaction terms. None of the interaction
terms in these models reached statistical significance.
Table 2. OLS Regression Analysis of Interaction Effects –Annual Median
Household Income
Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Median Income
-5.343
-2.629
-4.788
-4.426
-1.485
Less Than High School
1.691*
2.294*
1.698*
1.676*
2.378*
Divorce
-.678
-.594
-.405
-.385
-.405
Public Assistance
.354
.346
.337
.349
.349
Economy x Education
4.432
5.110
Economy x Family
2.659
-1.601
Economy x Polity
-1.869
-2.167
2
R
.223
.238
.226
.239
.257
Values are unstandardized coefficients.
* p < .05
Additional interaction analyses were conducted by substituting Gini index values as the
measure of the economic institution, instead of median annual household income. Recall that a
Gini index score of 0 would mean all households within a census tract have an equal share of
income; whereas, a Gini index value of 1 would mean one household has all of the income within
a census tract, indicating the highest level of inequality. It is hypothesized that higher Gini index
values will be related to higher homicide rates. The results are depicted in Table 3, following the
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same model compilation as that in Table 2 relative to income. As with the income models, using
Gini index values as an indicator of the economic institution did not produce any statistically
significant interactions.
Table 3. OLS Regression Analysis of Interaction Effects – Gini Index
Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Gini Index
1.490
1.323
1.510
1.504
Less Than High School
2.111*
2.181*
2.098*
2.068*
Divorce
-.518
-.526
-.456
-.458
Public Assistance
.415
.413
.419
.409
Economy x Education
-5.662
Economy x Family
-1.907
Economy x Polity
4.606
R2
.264
.268
.265
.277
Values are unstandardized coefficients.
* p < .05

Model 5
1.287
2.156*
-.486
.404
-7.128
.827
5.222
.283

As depicted in Model 2 in Table 3, the first interaction term for the effect of economyeducation is examined. It is hypothesized that the effect of a high Gini index value on homicides
will vary according to the percentages of adults with less than a high school education. In other
words, where there is a low percentage of adults with less than a high school education, high Gini
values should have less impact on homicide rates. The economy-education interaction term was
not statistically significant.
Model 3 examines the interaction term for economy-family. According to IAT, the effect
of high Gini Index values on homicides should be diminished where there are lower percentages
of divorced individuals. The economy-polity interaction is examined in Model 4. Theoretically,
higher levels of public assistance, food stamps, and social security disbursements should reduce
the effect that high Gini index values have on homicide rates. Model 5 simultaneously contains
indicators of all four institutions, as well as all three interaction terms. None of the interaction
terms in these models reached statistical significance.
As noted in Tables 2 and 3, having less than a high school education was positive and
significant in all interaction models. This suggests that areas having higher levels of individuals
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without a high school education are more likely to experience high homicide rates. With the
exception of this indicator of the education institution, none of the indicators, including
interaction effects, of the other institutions were found to be significant predictors of homicide
using either the Gini index or median income as indicators of the economic institution.
Consequently, this study does not find statistical support for a moderation hypothesis using the
specific operationalizations as set forth above. The effects of the economic institution, as
measured by annual median household income and Gini index, on homicide rates did not vary in
a statistically significant manner depending upon the strength of non-economic institutions.
Additional Exploratory Analysis
Given that no significant interaction effects were found, further exploratory analysis was
conducted utilizing exploratory, OLS, and geographically weighted regression tools within
geographic information system (GIS) software. Before advancing to OLS or GWR analysis, one
needs to determine which variables would soundly and meaningful contribute to model building.
Beyond theoretical considerations, the exploratory regression tool within ArcGIS provides
considerable assistance in this regard. This tool computes all possible correlations between all of
the selected variables.
In doing so, it also performs a number of tests that indicate whether there are any
potential models that meet minimum passing standards. These tests include the Jarque-Bera,
Adjusted R2, Koenker (Breusch-Pagan), variance inflation factor, and spatial autocorrelation.
Passing threshold tests in exploratory regression is meant to strengthen subsequent model
building in both OLS and GWR. While these steps may not be standard practice in the social
sciences, they are supported within the realm of geographic sciences.
Esri (2010), the company who designs and produces ArcGIS software, provides many
tools to assist researchers in interpreting these tests. For example, it posits that a statistically
significant Jarque-Bera score indicates that model predictions are biased. In other words, the
residuals are not normally distributed. To pass the JB test, its value must be more than .05.
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For this study, the minimum Adjusted R2 was set at .4, which is more relaxed than the
Esri-recommended .5 minimum. Some researchers may argue that this modified minimum
setting is still too stringent for the social sciences; however, the relaxed setting did allow for an
increase in the likelihood of obtaining a passing model, despite the downward pull from a skewed
dependent variable. An R2 value indicates how much of the variance in the dependent variable is
explained by a specific model. In other words, in this research, if a model did not explain at least
40% of the variance in homicide rates, it would not be considered as a passing or sound model.
Although the interpretation of Adjusted R2 is very similar to that of R2, the former is preferred
since it takes into account the complexity of the model, including the number of variables used.
Maximum VIF values were set at 7.5, which is the value recommended value by Esri.
VIF relates to the redundancy, or multicollinearity, amongst independent variables. Although
consensus is lacking, some researchers have offered a VIF of 10 as the maximum threshold
(Myers, 1990; Stucky, 2003; Pallant, 2007), while others suggest a more restrictive maximum
VIF of 4 (Champion & Hartley, 2010).
The Koenker (also known as Breusch-Pagan) test addresses the concern of nonstationarity or heteroskedasticity, and its limit was set to the Esri-recommended maximum of .05.
A value that is statistically significant (>.05) indicates that the model is not consistent and,
therefore, is not reliable. The spatial autocorrelation threshold was set to the Esri-recommended
minimum value of .10, which signifies that regression residuals are distributed randomly and are
not clustering.
Initial exploratory regression included the homicide rates of all 116 census tracts and
values for all 13 independent variables. This did not produce any completely passing models,
based on the criteria described in the paragraphs above, including low Breusch-Pagan and
Adjusted R2 values. Even relaxing the minimum recommended criteria was not fruitful. None of
the variable combinations yielded a sufficiently high Adjusted R2 value, even though obvious
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patterns could be discerned from univariate choropleth maps. An attempt to use homicide counts,
rather than rates, also failed to produce any passing models.
As previously noted, 48.3% (56) of census tracts experienced no homicides during the
five-year study period. Further, just over 60% of all census tracts had either zero or one homicide
during the study period. This produced a drastic skew in the distribution of homicide rates. An
examination of the scatterplots revealed that the inclusion of zero-homicide tracts was pulling the
regression line downward. To counter the skew, homicide rates were logged transformed.
Exploratory regression was attempted again, using the new logged homicide rates. This still did
not produce a passing model, leading to the conclusion that neither OLS nor GWR would provide
meaningful findings when including all census tracts.
Remaining Analysis Limited to Census Tracts
That Experienced Homicides
The issue of heavily skewed rare event data was an obvious limitation of this study. To
contribute to the broader realm of homicide study, this concern was addressed by hereafter
focusing solely on those 60 census tracts that experienced at least one homicide within the study
period. Certainly, subsequent findings do not directly address the original research questions.
However, there may still be value to future researchers to highlight some of results of this later
limited analysis.

A Local Moran’s I (z = 6.87, p. < 01) indicated that homicides continued to be
clustered, and not the result of random chance, across the census tracts experiencing
homicides. Thus, it is appropriate to continue to the next steps. Recall that this analysis
should be one of the first steps in spatial analysis, and usually you would want to find
clustering, not randomness. For example, in the current study, if homicides were
distributed equally across all census tracts, it is unlikely that the model would produce
significant relationships between crime and institutional measurements.
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In exploratory regression, the exclusion of the 56 census tracts with zero
homicides during the study period increased the Adjusted R2 value from .228 to .435,
which met the stringent .40 threshold set for a passing model. Recall that exploratory
regression computed correlations for all possible combinations of the 13 independent
variables, yielding 63 potential models in the current study. This process produced two
passing models, meaning the models passed all five of the threshold tests previously
mentioned. Both passing models included the variables of less than high school
education, divorce, single female-headed household, ability to speak English, and college
enrollment. One of these models also included median income.
The “summary of variable significance” output table produced by ArcGIS
provides a plethora of information to strengthen the modeling-building process, including
indications of which variables are most significant and to what extent the independentdependent variable relationship is positive or negative in direction. This summary relates
to all of the 63 possible variable combinations, not just passing models. For example, the
divorce and single female-headed household variables were significant in 100% of all
possible models tested. Having less than high school education was significant in
90.62% of the models. Being enrolled in college or graduate school was only significant
in about half of the models (53.12%). These three variables were all highly consistent in
direction, each exhibiting positive relationships in 100% of the models. Median income
was found to provide significant contribution in only 9.38% of all combinations, with
about one-third of those being in a negative and two-thirds being in a positive direction.
English speaking ability presented a very mixed result, being significant in 43.75% of
variable combinations. Further, there was a large split in direction, with 53.12% being
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negative and 46.88% being positive. Consequently, to avoid these ambiguities in
interpretation, it was decided that English speaking ability would be eliminated from
future models.
There were no multicollinearity violations, as evidenced by obtained VIF values
under 4. Higher values would have indicated a redundancy amongst independent
variables. To determine which of the two exploratory regression models provided the
best fit, the R2 and AICc values of each were compared. The final model was selected
based on the fact that it had a higher R2 and a lower AICc, as this indicates a better fitting
model. The selected model included the independent variables of less than high school
education, divorce, single female-headed household, college enrollment, and median
annual income.
Ordinary Least Squares Regression
After a passing model was identified through exploratory regression, the research
could reasonably progress to the next level of analysis. The five relevant independent
variables and the logged homicide rates across those census tracts that experienced at
least one homicide during the study period (hereinafter referred to as homicideexperiencing census tracts) were analyzed using OLS. The results are noted in Table 4.
Output indicates that the model is performing well. A non-significant Koenker
studentized Bruesch-Pagan statistic (p = .138) suggests that the model is geographically
consistent. Hence, nonstationarity and heteroscedasticity were not detected and it
appears appropriate to proceed with further analysis. Accordingly, the Joint F-Statistic
(prob. (>F), (5, 54) degrees of freedom: .000001*) was chosen for examination, and it
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Table 4. OLS Regression Analysis – Homicide-Experiencing Census Tracts
Independent
Unstand.
Standard.
tProb.
VIF
Part
variable
Coefficient Coefficient Statistic
Corr2
(b)
(B)
Income
0.000006
.233
1.718
.092
1.897
High School
1.385
.313
2.244
.029*
1.995 .0488
College
0.315
.180
1.549
.127
1.381
Divorce
3.049
.321
3.017
.004*
1.165 .0888
Single Female 0.839
.399
3.454
.001** 1.368 .1163
N=60
R2=.4743
Adjusted R2 = .4256
*=statistical significance (p < 0.05)
**=statistical significant (p ≤ 0.001)
showed to be a trustworthy measure of overall model significance. Therefore, variables
within this model are considered effective. The Jarque-Bera statistic (.627) was also nonsignificant, indicating residuals were normally distributed and the model was unbiased.
Finally, a Global Moran’s I computation was conducted, confirming that the residuals
were not significantly clustered.
Tolerance values ranged from .501 to .858, indicating that multiple correlations
between variables did not appear to be an issue. Variance inflation factor (VIF) values
ranged from 1.165 to 1.995, providing assurance that multicollinearity was not a concern.
A visual inspection of the plot comparing residual to predicted values displayed a random
pattern, indicating the model was properly specified. A systematic pattern in residuals
would have suggested violation of assumptions, such as a curvilinear relationship.
The R2 value for this OLS model was .474. In other words, approximately 47%
of the variance in homicide rates in census tracts experiencing homicides was explained
by the model that included the five independent variables of less than high school
education, enrolled in college, divorced, single female-headed households and median
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household income. Further, the Adjusted R2 value, which takes into account model
complexity, was .426. The income and college enrollment variables did not reach
statistical significance.
A brief analysis of the same data was also conducted using SPSS software. The
analysis-of-variance output table further indicated that the model achieved statistical
significance (p = <.001) and implied that there was a linear relationship between the
dependent and independent variables. Next, the coefficients output table was examined
to determine which variables were contributing to the prediction of homicide rates in
those tracts that experienced homicides. Standardized Beta values allow researchers to
compare independent variables as though they were measured on the same scale. In this
study, the single female-headed household variable exhibited the strongest unique
contribution to the model (Beta = .399, p < .05). The divorced (Beta = .321, p < .05) and
less than high school education (Beta = .313, p < .05) variables followed respectively in a
predictive contribution. Median income and percent enrolled in college or graduate
school did not reach statistical significance. Squaring part correlations values revealed
the unique contribution that each variable makes to the explanation of homicide rates.
This measure excludes any overlap or shared variance between the independent variables.
The single female-headed household variable uniquely explained 11.63% of the homicide
rates, while the divorced and less than high school education variables uniquely
explained 8.88% and 4.88% respectively. In this OLS model, the single female-headed
household variable was the best predictor of homicide rates.
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Geographically Weighted Regression
As noted above, exploratory and OLS regression was conducted using data only
from those census tracts that experienced at least one homicide. The next step is to
analyze the same data using geographically weighted regression techniques found in
ArcGIS software. Recall that GWR is a local model that facilitates examination of
variable relationships at the census tract level, versus the global OLS model that
addresses the relationship on a city-wide level. GWR accomplishes this by utilizing a
separate regression equation for each feature (Esri, 2010), in this case each census tract.
Thus, each census tract will have its own unique coefficient value, indicating the strength
of the relationship between the homicide rate and each independent variable. The
geographical distribution of these values can be visualized using coefficient surface
maps.
In conducting GWR, the researcher has the option to customize analysis
specifications, such as the kernel type (fixed or adaptive) and bandwidth (Akaike’s
Information Criterion, cross-validation, or some other user-specified value). In making
this decision, many combinations of these settings were explored to determine the bestfitting model. Utilizing an adaptive kernel allows the bandwidth to fluctuate depending
upon the density of data points (see Fotheringham, et al., 2002, p. 46). This process is
further influenced by the AICc bandwidth which allows GWR to determine the optimal
number of neighboring data points to consider within the analysis. This means the
kernels were allowed to adapt according to the density of nearby homicides; the census
tract’s regression equation was based not on a fixed, but rather an adaptive, distance.
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Where homicides are sparse, the kernels are small. When homicides are dense, the
kernels are larger.
As recommended by Esri, the GWR attribute, or data output, table was inspected
to ensure that condition numbers were not larger than 30. Values over 30 would have
indicated possible local multicollinearity concerns. A Global Moran’s I was also
performed on GWR residuals to ensure that these values were distributed randomly (not
clustered) and that the model was not misspecified. The GWR with the lowest AICc
value of 45.36 was eliminated, as it exhibited clustering of residuals. The GWR model
selected to advance to the next stages of analysis had an AICc value of 47.73. After
completing these initial steps, it was appropriate to move forward to the comparison of
OLS and GWR models.
Comparison of GWR and OLS Results
After effectively completing both OLS and initial GWR analyses, the next task is
to compare the results of each and determine which is the most appropriate method to
use. Per Fotheringham, et al. (2002, p. 96), if the AICc value from the OLS model is
lower than that of the GWR model, then the extra effort of conducting GWR may not be
warranted. In this study, the AICc values produced by OLS (45.356) and GWR (47.726)
are similar. Likewise, the Adjusted R2 values between the two approaches were almost
identical (.426 and .428, respectively). Nonetheless, GWR output is explored to gain a
sense of geographical relationships within this research.
Mapping of Residuals
The residual maps for both OLS and GWR are included below as Figures 16 and
17, respectively. These figures indicate areas of overprediction (blue) and
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Figure 16. OLS Residuals
OLS Residuals
(IE_Inc, ID_LTHS, ID_Colg, IF_Div, IF_SglF aross tracts experiencing at least one homicide)

2007-2011

StdResid
< -2.5 Std. Dev.
-2.5 - -1.5 Std. Dev.
-1.5 - -0.5 Std. Dev.
-0.5 - 0.5 Std. Dev.
0.5 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
1.5 - 2.5 Std. Dev.
> 2.5 Std. Dev.
(not included)

LTHS, Colg, SglF, Div, Inc

Figure 17. GWR Residuals
GWR Residuals
(IE_Inc, ID_LTHS, ID_Colg, IF_Div, IF_SglF)

2007-2011

StdResid
< -2.5 Std. Dev.
-2.5 - -1.5 Std. Dev.
-1.5 - -0.5 Std. Dev.
-0.5 - 0.5 Std. Dev.
0.5 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
1.5 - 2.5 Std. Dev.
> 2.5 Std. Dev.
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underprediction (red) within the regression model. This means the actual values are
either higher (red) or lower (blue) than what the model estimated. In other words, it
would be expected that the model in this study would underestimate or underpredict
homicide rates in areas that have positive (red) residuals. Areas in yellow are those
where the model is fitting well. Ideally, you will have a distribution with no patterns or
clustering of residuals, as this would indicate that the model could be missing a key
independent variable(s). As desired, a Global Moran’s I value of -.0012 (p=.795)
confirms that spatial autocorrelation was not detected and the model is unbiased; in other
words, GWR residuals were randomly distributed.
It should be noted that OLS and GWR residual maps should not be directly
compared; rather, each should be reviewed independently. Recall that the adaptive
kernels used in GWR were allowed to vary according to the density of nearby homicides.
Since OLS and GWR analyses were based on different kernel sizes, these comparisons
would be invalid (Fotheringham et al., 2002, p. 45).
Discrete reviews of the OLS and GWR residual maps indicate that areas with
some of the highest homicide rates also exhibit over- and under-prediction, suggesting
the model is not performing uniformly in these census tracts. Examining only the census
tracts with the ten highest homicide rates, the OLS and GWR models are either
performing well or under-predicting homicides. Over-prediction is not an issue in those
areas. While the overall model is performing acceptably and it is not unusual or alarming
to find random distribution of over- and under-predictions, it hints there could be room
for improvement in future research. It is unlikely a perfect model would ever be
developed; however, if one can determine what variable(s) may be lacking, explanatory
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power would increase. In other words, while these maps do not produce any substantial
concerns for the current research, they can be used to enhance model development in
future research.
Local GWR R2 values are shown in Figure 18. This map shows where the model
is performing best, with the darker coloring being preferred. Areas in white are census
tracts that did not experience any homicides during the study period. The GWR model in
this study better predicts homicide rates in northwestern Minneapolis than it does in the
southern half of the city. Future research could focus on why the model is performing
differently and what variables may differentially affect those areas.
GWR condition values are shown in Figure 19, indicating the stability of the
model. Lower values (indicated by a darker color) are preferred. This map shows that
stability is strongest in the northeastern and northern census tracts; therefore, there is
more confidence in the ability of the model to predict homicides in those areas.
As is typically the goal in research, it may be beneficial to produce models that
better explain homicides across all tracts. Perhaps even more beneficial may be the
examination of each geographic area experiencing high homicides in order to determine,
more specifically, what additional variables are most relevant to those specific
environments. This has the potential to produce more effective local-level policy and
decision-making.
GWR Coefficient Raster Surfaces
OLS is considered to be a global model; whereas, GWR is a local model.
Fotheringham, et al. (2002, p. 51) posited that “global values are nothing more than
spatial averages that can hide a great deal of information about the process being
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Figure 18. GWR Local R2 Values
GWR Local R2

0.388051 - 0.401861
0.401862 - 0.420270
0.420271 - 0.438737
0.438738 - 0.457090
0.457091 - 0.479674
0.479675 - 0.499717
0.499718 - 0.508526
(not included)

LTHS, Colg, SglF, Div, Inc

Figure 19. GWR Conditions Values
GWR Conditions

14.127467 - 14.534694
14.534695 - 14.872056
14.872057 - 15.103537
15.103538 - 15.383838
15.383839 - 15.845595
15.845596 - 16.365396
16.365397 - 16.874170

(not included)

LTHS, Colg, SglF, Div, Inc
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studied”. Although OLS produces global coefficient values relative to the relationship
between the dependent variable and each of the independent variables, these are singular
values across the entire study area. GWR does not rely solely upon such a singular value.
Rather, GWR produces local coefficient values for each census tract, providing much
richer spatial information.
In GWR, these local coefficient values are used to create coefficient raster surface
maps for each independent variable included in the model, as shown in Figures 20
through 24. These maps show changes and aerial variations across the study area,
providing richer information than that produced by OLS. For this particular study,
coefficients are larger in census tracts having darker coloring. In these areas, the
independent variable is a strong predictor of homicide rates. Conversely, in census tracts
that are shaded in light colors, the independent variable is not a strong predictor. For
instance, the percentage of the population that is divorced is a stronger predictor of
homicide rates in northern Minneapolis compared to those census tracts located in the
southern area of the city. Again, areas in white are census tracts that did not experience
any homicides during the study period and were, therefore, excluded from analysis.
A closer examination of the raster coefficient surface maps reveals some
interesting differences amongst the census tracts with the highest homicide densities.
Having a high percentage of adults who were divorced or who had less than a high school
education appears to be a strong indicator of homicides particularly in the northern areas.
These variables are comparatively weaker predictors of homicide in the south. Having
more children residing in single female-headed households had highest prediction values
around the center of the city, in and around the downtown (central) area. As one moves
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Figure 20. Map of Income Coefficients Figure 21. Map of High School
Education Coefficients
GWR/Local Coefficient Raster Surface
Less Than High School Education

GWR/Local Coefficient Raster Surface
Median Annual Income

0.000005 - 0.000006

1.186668 - 1.211867

0.000007 - 0.000006

1.211868 - 1.247389

0.000007

1.247390 - 1.283886

0.000008 - 0.000007

1.283887 - 1.347049

0.000008 - 0.000007

1.347050 - 1.474026

0.000008 - 0.000007

1.474027 - 1.550673

0.000008

1.550674 - 1.652521

(not included)

LTHS, Colg, SglF, Div, Inc

Figure 22. Map of College/Graduate
School Non-Enrollment
Coefficients

(not included)

LTHS, Colg, SglF, Div, Inc

Figure 23. Map of Single FemaleHeaded Households
Coefficients

GWR/Local Coefficient Raster Surface
Not Enrolled in College or Graduate School

GWR/Local Coefficient Raster Surface
Single Female-Headed Household

0.220829 - 0.236680

0.760846 - 0.784738

0.236681 - 0.254609

0.784739 - 0.803818

0.254610 - 0.270219

0.803819 - 0.815783

0.270220 - 0.289734

0.815784 - 0.828881

0.289735 - 0.306149

0.828882 - 0.840831
0.840832 - 0.853796

0.306150 - 0.324011

0.853797 - 0.870836

0.324012 - 0.369212
(not included)

LTHS, Colg, SglF, Div, Inc
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(not included)

LTHS, Colg, SglF, Div, Inc

Figure 24. Map of Percentage Divorced
Coefficients
GWR/Local Coefficient Raster Surface
Percentage Divorced

2.570754 - 2.696981
2.696982 - 2.803784
2.803785 - 2.959069
2.959070 - 3.100187
3.100188 - 3.249902
3.249903 - 3.362717
3.362718 - 3.465750
(not included)

LTHS, Colg, SglF, Div, Inc

outward in a radius fashion, the prediction strength decreases. All of the high homicide
areas noted above are similarly situated on this variable.
OLS regression analysis in this study indicated that there were three independent
variables that reached statistical significance in homicide-experiencing census tracts.
Recall that OLS provides one coefficient value for all census tracts, single female-headed
households (b =.839, p<.05), divorce (b=3.049, p<.05), and less than high school
education (b=1.385, p<.05). To broaden the interpretation of GWR output regarding
these three variables, additional raster surface coefficient maps are shown in Figures 25
to 27. These are similar to those depicted in Figures 20 to 24 above; however, here the
coefficient values are labeled directly upon the map within each census tract.
Additionally, imposed upon these raster coefficient surface maps is the homicide density
(hotspot) layer that was previously depicted in Figure 3. This should assist in
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Figure 25. Composite Map of Percentage of Children Residing in Single
Female-Headed Household Coefficients

Raster Coefficient Surface Map
Single Female-Headed Household
2007-2011

0.801191

0.80304

0.805762
0.808696

0.813437

0.812279
0.81243 0.813747

0.815783

0.8190260.820761

0.821178

0.823156

0.82735

0.825461

0.8268780.828881
0.83431
0.832357

0.83336 0.836007

0.840608

0.8408310.843137

0.848706

0.851567

0.8512
0.851032

0.861183
0.866314

0.826573
0.863497
0.834448

0.853796

0.870836

0.848648

0.820629

0.849321
0.858424
0.83363

0.824652

0.814298

0.792551
0.776787

0.83032
0.839276

0.8183790.809184

0.8189360.812177
0.803818

0.80007

0.784738

0.795253 0.789646
0.798571
0.778953

0.772126

0.77735

0.761 - 0.785
0.786 - 0.809

High

0.810 - 0.827
0.760846

0.828 - 0.843

Low

0.844 - 0.871
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Figure 26. Composite Map of Divorced Coefficients

Raster Coefficient Surface Map
Percentage Divorced
2007-2011

3.325223

3.265915

3.227984
3.284084

3.440926

3.362717
3.197021 3.233686

3.289711

3.17165 3.20908

3.46575

3.273875

3.457412

3.344944

3.1862063.225756
3.249902
3.094938

3.1418273.184038

3.299393

3.0460073.090899

3.306755

3.18517

3.336441
3.358536

3.204551
3.100187

3.193724
3.078052
3.08109

3.007851

2.888342

2.918517

2.959069

2.839061
2.752349
2.826374
2.845275
2.803784

2.852374
2.858849

2.696981
2.570754

2.7375342.752543

2.6662882.688678
2.683996

2.766754

2.786739

2.722218 2.759084
2.690865
2.710491

2.677522

2.571 - 2.738

2.618228

2.739 - 2.919

High

2.920 - 3.142
3.143 - 3.299

2.611846

3.300 - 3.466

Low
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Figure 27. Composite Map of Less Than High School Education
Attainment Coefficients

Raster Coefficient Surface Map
Less Than High School Education
2007-2011

1.652521

1.643535

1.628151
1.60873

1.564686

1.581259
1.589168 1.580274

1.565094

1.550673 1.53909

1.507737

1.520633

1.465172

1.498734

1.5033181.488795
1.452715
1.474026

1.4664511.447899

1.403924

1.4256081.410201

1.340639
1.301165
1.265554

1.347049

1.246523
1.240134

1.211518
1.196249
1.21091

1.198523

1.186668

1.206706

1.22901

1.207639
1.199639
1.229585
1.237981
1.221938

1.255062
1.267013

1.223955

1.235209 1.24326

1.250902

1.263

1.25956

1.211867

1.2334831.240054
1.247389

1.255119
1.252083
1.268769

1.274559

1.187 - 1.233

1.269609

1.234 - 1.301

High

1.302 - 1.426
1.427 - 1.539

1.283886

1.540 - 1.653

Low
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understanding the relationship between prediction strength of the independent variables
in conjunction with where homicides are most significantly clustered.
Table 5 presents the coefficient values of the three significant independent
variables for the census tracts with the ten highest homicide rates. The coefficients are
the same values as those presented in the maps, Figures 19 to 21.
Table 5. GWR Coefficients in Census Tracts with 10 Highest Homicide
Rates
Coefficients (GWR)
Census
Single Female% Divorced
% Less Than
Tract #
Headed
(Average:
High School
Households
3.027)
Education
(Average: .822)
(Average:1.356)
1023
.834
3.250
1.453
1259
.814
2.845
1.238
1016
.823
3.274
1.521
1257
.821
3.209
1.539
1028
.833
3.142
1.466
1021
.827
3.186
1.503
22
.829
3.226
1.489
1004
.809
3.284
1.609
1008
.814
3.234
1.580
32
.841
3.046
1.426
An examination of the single female-headed household coefficient surface map
(see Figure 25) indicates that the highest coefficients (.844 to .871) are located in and
around the downtown area (darkest shading at the center of the map), with a ring around
it wherein coefficients range slightly smaller at .828 to .843. In these two areas, the use
of this independent variable performs the best. In census tract 1259 (south central), the
single-female headed household variable is a weaker predictor (.814) of homicide in this
model.
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The raster coefficient surface map for percentage divorced (see Figure 26) depicts
the strength of this variable in predicting homicides to be strongest in the northern,
especially north-eastern, census tracts. It is a weak predictor in the southern census
tracts. Likewise, having less than a high school education (see Figure 27) is a stronger
prediction of homicide rates in the northern portion of Minneapolis.
Zooming out to the bigger picture of this study, regression models found two of
the family institution variables to be significant in predicting homicides. In fact, OLS
indicated that single female-headed households and percentage divorced were the top two
predictors of homicide rates. However, as can be deciphered from the GWR coefficient
raster surface maps, the ability of these variables to predict homicide rates follow
different patterns across the census tracts. The single female-headed household variable
is strongest in the downtown (central) area and loses power to predict as it extends
outward in a radius fashion. The percentage divorced variable, on the other hand,
predicts homicides most strongly in the northern census tracts. This power diminishes as
one moves in a southerly direction.
Alternative Models Used to Explore Gender Differences
To explore whether the educational attainment variable was impacted by gender,
OLS and GWR models were repeated. Instead of using the percentage of all adults with
less than a high school education, this variable was divided into male- and femalerelevant variables. While this variable looked promising using exploratory regression,
neither the male nor female less than high school variable achieved statistical significance
in OLS.
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To further ferret out gender differences, variables were created to signify the
percentage of each gender that were living in poverty and had less than a high school
education. Although it could be argued that these variables blur the lines between
economic and educational institutions, the goal was to probe whether failure to achieve a
high school education produced dissimilar economic pressures for males versus females.
In OLS, the inclusion of these variables yielded statistically significant results for males
(p = .019), but not for females. Consistent with the combined gender variable, the GWR
coefficient raster surface map indicated a strong north to south direction. Again, this
suggests that the male form of the variable was a stronger predictor of homicides in the
northern census tracts.
Recall also that the percentage of children residing in single male-headed
households did not reach statistical significance in the initial models. However, results
were significant with regard to single female-headed households. Therefore, it appears
males and females may experience different pressures or have different relationships with
social institutions at the census tract level. The relationship between the family
institution and homicides may be stronger regarding females; whereas, the educationhomicide relationship may be stronger for males. Given that this research is limited to
only those census tracts that experienced at least one homicides, versus all census tracts
across the city, and that the difference in values between OLS and GWR was not large,
these results need to be viewed very tentatively. However, this exploration could provide
intriguing propositions for future research.
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Summary of Findings
Revisiting the hypotheses, it was determined that the distribution of homicides
was clustered; therefore, the null hypothesis of a random distribution can be rejected.
Null hypotheses 2 through 4 could not be rejected, as non-economic institutions were not
found to have a statistically significant moderation effect on the relationship between the
economic institution and homicides rates. Hypotheses 5 through 8 hypothesized
significant relationships between the strength of social institutions and the rates of
homicides in Minneapolis census tracts. Since there were no passing models that
included all 116 census tracts, this study fails to reject the null hypotheses. However, by
limiting the statistical analysis to only those census tracts that experienced at least one
homicide, this research did produce statistically significant relationships between
homicide rates and the family and education institutions. This exploration provides a
contribution to the body of literature relating to homicides, institutional anomie theory,
and the utilization of GIS in criminology.
OLS and GWR essentially exhibited equivalent explanatory power for the data
examined in this study, as indicated by the adjusted R2 and AICc values. In other words,
allowing the modeled relationships to vary spatially in the regression analysis did not, at
least in this case, enhance the ability to explain additional variance in overall homicide
rates. However, GWR raster coefficients surface maps were used to display the strength
of particular family and education variables in predicting homicides within each census
tract, as well as the overall distribution across the city.
Relative to census tracts that experienced at least one homicide, it was found that
three of the original 13 variables had a statistically significant relationship with homicide
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rates. Two of these were measurements of the institution of family: percentage of
children living in single female-headed households and the percentage of the population
reporting divorced as their marital status. The other was having less than a high school
education, which related to the institution of education. Since the full dataset was not
utilized, findings should be viewed as tentative. Relationships between the independent
and dependent variables are only applicable to census tracts that had homicides; no
inference is made about corresponding relationships within census tracts having no
homicides. With these caveats, it appears that there may be some support, albeit mixed,
for IAT at the census tract level in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Introduction
This study contributes to existing research by extending examination of the
relationship between homicides and institutions in the context of IAT to the census tract
level, which follows previous research conducted at sub-national levels. This chapter
includes a discussion of key findings in terms of conclusions, limitations, and suggestions
for future IAT study. Overall, higher homicide rates were found to be associated with
higher levels of divorce, the percentage of children residing in single female-headed
households, and census tracts having a higher percent of the population with less than a
high school education. It is also distinctive in that it includes the utilization of GWR to
determine, beyond mere statistical significance, where specific variables have the
strongest predictive power across census tracts.
Messner and Rosenfeld posit that crime, and particularly violent crime, in
America can be explained through Institutional Anomie Theory (IAT), which considers
the relationship between crime and the cultural and structural frameworks of a given
society. The primary cultural component of the theory is comprised of the American
Dream, which instills the belief that all individuals should strive to achieve success and
that such striving will be rewarded, with success being measured in monetary terms. In
contrast to Merton’s focus on structural opportunities, Messner and Rosenfeld emphasize
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institutions, such as the economy, education, family, and polity as constituting the
structural side. They argue that the American Dream allows for and supports a specific
arrangement of institutions that is conducive to producing violent crime. More precisely,
in America it creates an arrangement where the economic institution dominates all other
institutions. When this occurs, the non-economic institutions are less effective at
fulfilling social control functions and providing support to members of society. As a
result of these roles being weakened and/or unfulfilled, individuals are freed to achieve
success through whatever means are necessary, including violent crime.
IAT is an abstract theory that has shown to be quite challenging to test. Further,
Messner and Rosenfeld have not provided specific guidance relative to the measuring of
institutions, the appropriate units of analysis, or whether non-economic institutions
mediate or moderate the effects of the economic institution. In the limited number of
studies that have attempted to test IAT, this lack of specificity has led to inconsistent
findings. Until the theory has been better specified, empirical tests will likely continue to
produce such inconsistencies. The current study provides no exception. That there were
numerous variables that did not reach significance is not an unusual finding in IAT
research. Like previous studies, the current study finds only limited support for IAT.
Contributions of Census Tract Analysis
Although the origins of IAT are linked to Messner and Rosenfeld’s cross-national
studies, it has subsequently been applied at the state, county, and city levels. Findings
have been inconsistent within and between these units of analysis. The current study is
distinctive in that it investigates the applicability of IAT at the census tract level,
following previous studies of IAT conducted at subnational levels (Chamlin & Cochran,
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1995; Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; Piquero & Piquero, 1998; Stucky, 2003; Maume &
Lee, 2003; and Schoepfer & Piquero, 2006). Messner and Rosenfeld (2007, p.44)
themselves suggest that research should focus on the question “why do levels of crime
vary across social systems (for example, nations, cities, neighborhoods)?” Messner and
Rosenfeld (2007, p. 35) also acknowledge the “struggle for institutional control” occurs
at the local level, indicating “local institutions provide order, meaning, purpose, and
protection to area residents.” This study, therefore, considers each census tract to have its
own unique institutional balance, as is the case for nations, states, counties, and cities in
other studies.
In supporting subnational units of analysis, Chamlin and Cochran (1995)
indicated that states were “adequate” for testing IAT, reasoning that it “focuses on social
dynamics that are likely to operate across various levels of social aggregation (cf.
Durkheim, 1858b; Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994)”. Piquero and Piquero (1998, p. 68)
argue “[i]nsofar as the structural level variables operate in a manner consistent with
Messner and Rosenfeld across different types of social systems, a test of IAT with statelevel data should be sensitive enough to detect differences in the impact of such variables
on crime rates.” Stucky (2006, p. 1124) further advocated that “future institutional
anomie research should focus on local variation in the strength of economic and
noneconomic institutions”, since politics at the local level can have a bearing on violent
crime. Shaw and McKay (1942 p. 165), although applying social disorganization theory,
discuss the similarity of outlooks that can exist within smaller geographic areas within a
particular city and that these attitudes can be sustained in institutions. They posit,

	
  

137	
  

therefore, that the relationships that exist between crime rates and institutions may not be
constant across large geographical areas.
Further, Maume and Lee (2003, pp. 1138, 1150) stated that to limit IAT studies to
states and nations underestimates “the explanatory power and analytical flexibility of the
theory”. Given that “smaller aggregate units such as counties also exhibit their own
institutional characteristics”, they further posit that IAT is a valid theory for use at the
local county level (Maume & Lee, 2003, p. 1138). Contrary to Bjerregaard and Cochran
(2008), Maume and Lee (2003) argued for county units of analysis by stating state-level
analyses may not appropriately address heterogeneity, since it is more likely that
homicides occur in urban, as opposed to rural, areas. Additionally, one advantage of
utilizing GWR in statistical analyses is that it takes into consideration spatial
heterogeneity. Deane, et al. (2008, p. 367) indicated that “[s]patial models address the
interdependence of place to partially accommodate the mismatch between the scale of
units of observation and the scale of social processes.”
Cross-national studies are based on aggregated data, as are census tract level
studies. When data is aggregated to the national level, differences within and between
smaller geographic areas are lost or obfuscated. While some seemingly argue this is
precisely the reason why IAT should not be studied at the sub-national level, this study
sets forth an argument that a deeper comprehension of the relationship between
institutional structure and homicides can be gleaned only if researchers can discover how
and why certain areas are more affected by homicides than others. That is, research
should address why high homicide areas vary from low or no homicide areas. Therefore,
this does not lead IAT away from its original purpose of explaining why America has
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uniquely high homicide rates. To arrive at that overall understanding of the sum of parts,
one must first understand the parts.
Recall the analogy of Fotheringham, et al. (2002, p. 1) that knowing national
weather averages tells us something about the weather in a particular nation. However, it
does not allow us to appreciate the temperature or snowfall differences between, say,
North Dakota and Florida. Similarly, IAT explains serious crime by telling us something
about America’s anomic culture and its economically-dominate institutional balance.
Subnational application of IAT has the potential to more precisely explain which areas of
America are different and why those areas are less able to counterbalance the anomic
pressures due to weakened non-economic institutions. Cross-national and subnational
studies alike have assumed that culture is a constant across all units in America; everyone
is expected to pursue the American Dream. However, the weaknesses of non-economic
institutions are not constant across the country, nor are the access to legitimate means.
These factors are not constant across census tracts either. It behooves us to understand
how and under what circumstance non-economic institutions can impact the relationship
between economic dominance and homicide rates.
For example, to say that homicides across the nation are, in part, due to a
weakened family institution, tells us something. However, to implement cost-efficient
and effective policy changes, policymakers would likely demand more detailed
information. Implementing policies to strengthen the family institution with the specific
objective of reducing homicides would, statistically speaking, have little or no effect in
areas with low or no homicides compared to areas where homicides are densely clustered
in space. With limited taxpayer funds, this precision has value. Large units of analysis,
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such as nations, do not provide this meaningful understanding. Census tract units allow
researchers to zoom into areas with high homicide density and compare characteristics of
those areas to areas with low or no homicide. Limiting the study to census tracts across
one major metropolitan city reduced some of the fog of abstractness that surrounds IAT,
although it certainly did not eliminate it.
Interactions
Prior IAT studies have indicated the import of considering interaction effects between
economic and non-economic institutions (Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; Piquero & Piquero, 1998;
Savolainen, 2000; Maume & Lee, 2003; Schoepfer & Piquero, 2006; Bjerregaard & Cochran,
2008). It is hypothesized that non-economic institutions can moderate the relationship that exists
between the economic institution and homicide rates. In other words, the effect of the economic
institution on homicide rates will vary depending upon the strength of non-economic institutions.
The current study examined the interaction effects between select indicators of economic
and non-economic institutions in the explanation of homicide rates using three interaction, or
product, terms (economy x education, economy x family, and economy x polity). Variable
selection was based upon those used in prior research. The Gini index and median annual
household income variables serve as indicators of the economic institutions. The non-economic
institutions included in the interaction analysis were education (percentage having less than a
high school education), family (percentage of population over 15 years of age who are divorced),
and polity (percentage of households receiving public assistance, food stamps and/or social
security funds). Contrary to expectations, none of the interaction terms were significant.
While median annual household income is a measure of absolute deprivation, the Gini
Index provides a measure of relative deprivation and has been utilized in many past studies
(Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Piquero & Piquero 1998; Savolainen,
2000; Maume & Lee, 2003; Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008). Interaction models based upon the
	
  

140	
  

Gini Index produced higher R2 values than the models utilizing median annual income as an
indicator of the economic institution. In other words, at least with the variables used in this
analysis, non-economic institutions appear to have more influence on the relationship between the
economic institution and homicide rates when relative, as opposed to absolute, deprivation is the
economic indicator.
As discussed in further detail in a section below, there are at least two potential reasons
for the lack of finding statistical significance in the interactions. One reason pertains to the skew
that results from rare event (homicide data), where the numerous census tracts with zero or one
homicides is distorting the data and diluting the relationship. The other reason relates to
operationalization sensitivities, especially those relevant to smaller units of analysis.
It may be that measures are not specific enough to produce statistical significance.
Hypothetically, census tracts having a low percentage of divorced individuals may somewhat
contribute to the ability of the family institution to moderate the linkage between the economic
institution and homicide rates; however, it may be more effective to measure how divorce rates
impact the strength of the family institution. In other words, what is needed is greater clarity and
validity when deciding how to measure institutions.
It is not altogether surprising that statistical significance of interactions was not achieved
in the current study. Most prior research also produced mixed results with regard to interactions.
For example, of the 12 interaction tests by Piquero and Piquero (1998), only five were found to
be statistically significant. Savolainen (2000) was successful in finding significance in four of the
six models executed in that study. Maume and Lee (2003) prepared five interaction models for
each type homicide grouping (total, instrumental, expressive), finding significance in only three
of the 15 models. One of three interaction models reached significance in Schoepfer and
Piquero’s (2006) study. Bjerregaard and Cochran (2008) examined 18 moderation models, eight
for homicide and eight for theft. For each crime type, only two of the nine models rose to
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statistical significance. As expanded upon below, until IAT has been better specified, empirical
tests will likely continue to produce mixed results.

Theoretical and Operationalization Concerns
Messner and Rosenfeld do not provide clear direction as to how to test IAT,
which presents substantial challenges in conducting empirical research. First,
operationalization of variables is not described in detail, leading researchers to use widely
varied operational definitions, resulting in inconsistent findings. Second, there is no clear
direction whether non-economic institutions are theorized to have mediating and/or
moderating effects on homicide. Thirdly, while Messner and Rosenfeld state IAT is
meant to address “serious crime”, failing to differentiate instrumental from expressive
crimes will likely continue to yield weaker linkages between IAT and crime. Each of
these operationalization concerns is addressed in further detail below. The discussion in
this section draws from the analysis conducted on homicide-experiencing census tracts.
Operationalization Sensitivity and Inconsistent Findings
First, prior studies have produced only mixed support for IAT since, as
Bjerregaard and Cochran (1998, p. 41) indicate, findings are “consistently inconsistent”.
Inconsistency may be attributed to operationalization sensitivity (Piquero & Piquero,
1998). Researchers have used various operational definitions to indirectly and partially
test IAT. None of the IAT studies discussed in Chapter 3 found all variables to be
significant. Combined with the fact that culture is not measured or included in analyses,
a complete test of IAT has not been conducted.
The current study, which draws substantially on previous operationalizations in an
effort to offer meaningful comparisons between studies, provides no exception. Of the
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thirteen independent variables in this study, only three were found to be statistically
significant in relationship to homicide rates. Although each independent variable was
uniquely measured, the overall intent was to determine the strength or weakness of each
of the four institutions in the context of IAT. For example, when the family institution is
weakened, it is less able to counter the anomic pressures of achieving monetary success
by any means. The number of non-significant variables does not necessarily indicate an
inability of IAT to explain homicide at the census tract level. Rather, the
operationalizations used in this particular study, in one specific city, did not predict
homicides in a statistically significant manner.
Education. Piquero and Piquero (1998) found a significant and negative
relationship between the percentage of the population enrolled in college and both
property and violent crimes at the state level. The current study attempted to replicate this
finding by measuring the percentage of the population aged 18 to 24 years who were not
enrolled in college or graduate studies. This variable showed promise in the exploratory
regression stage by being significant in 53.12% of passing models. Thus, it became one
of the five independent variables to be analyzed in OLS and GWR. However, during
these latter stages of analysis, it was not found to be statistically significant.
A comparison of the choropleth map for this variable (Figure 5) with the
homicide rate map (Figure 2), and to some extent the homicide density map (Figure 3),
provides some explanation for the non-significant finding. In the context of IAT, census
tracts with high percentages of non-enrollment (dark shading) are hypothesized to have
higher homicide rates (dark shading), as this indicates weak emphasis on the education
institution. However, census tract 1023, which had the highest homicide rate, was also
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characterized by moderate rates of non-enrollment. Census tract 1259, which had the
second highest rate of homicide, likewise does not exhibit the highest levels of nonenrollment. Conversely, census tract 6.01 exhibits a lower homicide rate with a higher
percentage of non-enrollment.
Regarding attainment of high school education, two previous state-level studies
produced conflicting findings. The current study found statistical significance (b=1.385,
p=.029) in the relationship between homicide rates and the percentage of the population
over the age of 18 years who had attained less than a high school diploma or equivalent.
This is consistent with Schoepfer and Piquero (2006), but contrary to Piquero and
Piquero’s finding (1998).
The raster coefficient surface map of less than high school attainment (Figure 27)
depicts a strong north to south direction, indicating stronger predictive power in the
north. This corresponds with the choropleth map (Figure 4) that depicts all ten census
tracts with the highest homicide rates also having high or considerably elevated
percentages of residents over 18 years of age without a high school education. Census
tracts with the highest percentages of less than a high school education are clustered in
two areas, one around the high homicide census tracts in the northwest and one around
census tract 1259, which had the second highest homicide rate. Generally speaking,
census tracts with lower homicides were also characterized by lower percentages of
residents with less than a high school education. This finding is consistent with IAT.
There is an appreciable difference between high and low homicide census tracts in
relation to educational attainment.

	
  

144	
  

Family. Consistent with Piquero and Piquero’s (1998) state-level finding relative
to single-parent households, the most significant relationship with homicides in the
current study was the percentage of children living in single female-headed households
(b =.839, p=.001). This finding supports the hypothesis that areas with high levels of
single female-headed households are likely to be accompanied by high homicide rates.
This operationalization is based upon prior research suggesting that single-parents may
not be able to provide adequate socialization and supervision of their children, in part
because the parent may be away from home while working (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997:
78; National Research Council, 1993: 155-156; Piquero & Piquero, 1998, p. 69). In turn,
there is less restraint from anomic pressures to achieve “by any means”. This is not
meant to suggest that single mothers do not care or do not attempt to provide a positive
environment; they may simply be overwhelmed by compounding economic stresses
given their socio-economic status and/or residency in areas of concentrated
disadvantaged.
That the relationship between single female-headed households and homicides
reached statistical significance and single male-headed households did not is deserving of
closer examination. Historically, if custody of children went to only one parent, it was
typically to the mother. However, there has been a trend in recent years toward more
fathers gaining custody (Hofferth et al., 2013). A possible explanation for the nonsignificance of the single-father variable is a product of where these fathers live in
relationship to where homicides are most frequently occurring. A comparison of the
choropleth maps regarding the percentage of children residing in either single male- or
female-headed households (Figures 8 and 9) reveals that there are distributional
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differences in these variables. One example of this can be found in census tract 1023,
which had the highest rate of homicides. A very high percentage of its children were
residing in single female-headed households, as depicted by dark shading. Conversely,
this census tract was characterized by a low percentage of children residing in single
male-headed households, as shown by the lightest level of shading. This in part may be a
statistical artifact, however, it is not safe to assume that a census tract with a high
percentage of single female-headed households automatically corresponds to low
percentage of single male-headed households; high-high and low-low distributions are
certainly possible. These types of spatial differences further highlight the importance of
clear operational definitions, as well as the exploration of potential interaction effects
such as those between family structure and poverty.
Consistent with Chamlin and Cochran (1998) at the state level, Maume and Lee
(2003) at the county level, and Bjerregaard and Cochran (2008) at the national level, but
in contrast to Schoepfer and Piquero (2006) at the state level, the current study also found
a statistically significant relationship between homicide rates and the percentage of the
population over 15 years who indicated they were divorced (b=3.049, p=.004). This
finding supports the hypothesis that areas with higher divorce rates will likely have
higher homicide rates.
The GWR raster coefficient surface map of the percentage of those fifteen and
older who were divorced (Figure 26) displays a strong northeast to southwest pattern in
predicting homicides across Minneapolis. Divorce is a strong predictor of homicide in
the nine census tracts with the highest homicide rates in the northwestern area of the city.
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Only one of these nine census tracts had a low divorce rate depicted on the choropleth
map. Therefore, significance would be expected.
Further, the census tract (1259) with the second highest rate of homicide across
the city is located south of the downtown area, slightly southeast of the center of the map.
However, the raster coefficient surface map shows considerably weaker predictive
strength of divorced in that area. The choropleth map (Figure 7) also depicts a low
divorce rate for that census tract, which logically corresponds with low predictive power
in that area.
Polity. Following the logic set forth in prior studies (Messner &Rosenfeld, 1997;
Piquero & Piquero, 1998; Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; Maume & Lee, 2003), one
operationalization of polity in the current study is the percentage of households receiving
public assistance, food stamps or supplemental security income. This was one of only
two variables in the entire study drawn straight from Messner and Rosenfeld’s (1997)
cross-national decommodification study. They utilized this variable as a measure of the
polity institution, indicating public assistance was one way government is able to buffer
citizens from market forces, freeing them to make decisions without regard to purely
economic pressures. However, Piquero and Piquero (1998, p. 69) also point out that the
use of a public assistance measure “is amenable to a number of different interpretations”,
and some may argue this variable actually is a measure of the economic institution.
In contrast to Messner and Rosenfeld’s (1997) and Savolainen’s (2000) crossnational findings, as well as Piquero and Piquero’s (1998) state-level and Hannon and
DeFronzo’s (1998) county-level finding, the current study did not find public assistance
to have a statistically significant relationship to homicide rates. In other words, higher
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levels of public assistance were not associated with lower homicide rates. A comparison
of the choropleth map depicting public assistance, food stamps, and supplemental
security income (Figure 14) to the map of logged homicide rates (Figure 2) indicates that
at least a couple of the census tracts with the highest homicide rates received lower levels
of assistance. In hindsight, including supplemental security income recipients in public
assistance may have confounded this variable by placing emphasis on areas with high
retirement populations who are, according to the age-crime curve, less likely to commit a
homicide.
The operationalization of polity through the level of public assistance funds is
distinct from the percentage of families living below poverty level as an economic
measure. The public assistance variable is meant to measure the extent to which the
government buffers market forces, shielding members of society from having to make
decisions based solely on economic reasons. Living below the poverty level is likely a
situation where decisions are first and foremost based on economic reasoning if one
recalls that the economic institution is designed to provide for basic necessities such as
food, shelter and clothing. In other words, public assistance, or decommodification,
should act as a counter-measure to the anomic pressures of the economic institution.
According to IAT, if decommodification levels are higher, it would follow that the
influences of the economic institution would be lower. Consequently, homicides should
also be lower. However, such a relationship did not exist in the current study.
Additionally, the measure of the percentage of the adult population who spoke
English less than well also did not reach statistical significance. The current study is the
first to use this variable in the context of IAT, using the rationale that the inability to
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speak the dominant language could place barriers on involvement in the local polity, at
least at the official level. It was postulated that voices of non-English speakers would not
be readily heard and, therefore, would not be considered or given due weight during
decision-making processes.
This variable was distinctive in that a choropleth map (Figure 13) depicts the
strongest clustering of census tracts with high percentages of those speaking English less
than well was located east and south of the downtown area (center of the map), as
opposed to the northwest area. Recall that the former area had only one census tract in
the top ten highest ranking census tracts; whereas, the northwest area contained nine of
the top ten. Although there is a visually observable pattern, the measure was not
sensitive enough to produce statistical significance.
This study also included an original measure of polity as the percentage of the
population employed as local, state, or federal government workers. This
operationalization was informed by Messner and Rosenfeld’s posits that the role of the
polity institution is to ensure attainment of collective goals and that being involved in the
polity can create a sense of altruism, which curbs anomic pressures. It was also informed
by Stucky’s city-level finding that responsiveness of different forms of local
governmental structure can have an influence on rates of violent crime. Further, although
not an IAT study, Bursik and Grasmick (1993, pp. 17-18) define public control as “the
ability of neighborhoods to secure external resources through ties with the local
government and police”. Therefore, it was hypothesized that those who work within
government would have a stronger voice in what happens within their community and
how funds are disbursed, which would ultimately correspond with lower homicide rates.
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However, results from the analysis did not provide empirical evidence to support the
hypothesis.
Economic. None of the variables measuring the economic institution were found
to have a statistically significant relationship to homicide rates in the current study. Of
the three measures, only median annual income was selected during the exploratory
regression phase for further consideration in OLS and GWR models. However, in that
later analysis it did not reach statistical significance, as noted more fully below.
The current study only adds to the inconsistencies regarding the Gini index and
crime. Some IAT research has produced significant linkages at the county (Maume &
Lee, 2003), state (Chamlin & Cochran, 1995), and cross-national (Bjerregaard &
Cochran, 2008) levels, while other studies have not found income inequality to be
significant at the cross-national level (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1994; Savolainen, 2000). A
census tract having a Gini value of 0 would indicate that every household within the
census tract has the same income; whereas, a Gini value of 1 would indicate that one
household has all of the income within a census tract. Therefore, values closer to 0
indicate less inequality within the bounds of a census tract.
The Gini index does not appear to be a particularly useful measure at the census
tract level. Many of the areas with higher Gini values had no or low homicide rates,
which would be contrary to IAT. This can be explained by the sensitivity of the Gini data
collection, since a “relatively small number of cases (especially in the upper end of the
income distribution) can affect these measures, while having virtually no effect on
median income” (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996).
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Areas of low or no homicide rates in west-central Minneapolis are characterized
by having some of the highest annual median incomes, as well as higher Gini values. In
other words, the Gini value indicates income is concentrated in fewer, not more,
households. However, what the Gini value does not reveal is that actual income amounts
are relatively high in that area, in comparison to other areas of the city. Areas of lower
homicide rates in east-central Minneapolis are characterized by both high and low median
annual incomes, as well as high Gini values. This general area is comprised of a complex
mixture of pocketed influences, such as a high immigrant population in one area and a
large research university in another where there would be significant disparity between
student, faculty, and medical staff incomes. Such a confounding mixture of influences
will produce higher Gini values that may or may not be related to elevated homicide
rates. Analyses are further complicated by the fact that the census tracts where
individuals work and reside may not be the same. The range of differences in income
distribution within a census tract must be understood within the context of actual income
levels.
Median annual income was found to be an influential variable in the exploratory
regression process. It consistently exhibited both negative and positive directions in
various attempts to produce a passing model. In the exploratory passing model that was
adopted for GWR analysis, income levels within a given census tract was influential in
9.38% of all possible models, with directionality being split between negative (31.25%)
and positive (68.75%) directions. In other words, in some census tracts income levels
were negatively associated with homicide, which would be consistent with IAT.
However, in other census tracts, income levels were positively associated with homicides.
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Therefore, income, in and of itself, did not predict homicides. This highlights the
challenge of finding significant differences amongst homicide-experiencing census tracts.
An examination of Table 1 conveys that the census tracts with the ten highest homicide
rates also exhibited some of the lowest incomes, yet it did not result in a finding of
statistical significance. One explanation for this is that instrumental homicides, which are
fewer in frequency, will be clustered where income and structural opportunities are low;
whereas, expressive homicides, not closely tied to monetary factors, are more likely to be
distributed randomly throughout the city. The differentiation of instrumental from
expressive homicides will be described in more detail below. In short, however, the
inconsistent relationship between income and total homicides contributed to a finding of
non-significance in later OLS and GWR models.
Summary of Inconsistent Findings. Overall, these discussions highlight the
challenge of operationalizing institutions in the context of IAT. Clearly, findings from
prior studies have consistently produced inconsistent findings. This study, by using preexisting definitions provided in other IAT studies, produced similarly limited findings of
statistical significance. As posited by Bjerregaard and Cochran (1998), support for IAT
will vary depending upon operationalizations and units of analysis. Without further
theoretical and empirical design clarifications, it is unlikely that this will change.
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Mediating versus Moderating Effects
The current study sought to find relationships, or main effects, between each of
the institutions and homicide rates: economy-homicide, education-homicide, familyhomicide, and polity-homicide. It was hypothesized, for example, that increased divorce
rates and the rate of single-parent households will be associated with higher homicide
rates. In the present study, no direct relationship between measures of the economic
institution and homicide were found.
Where a significant relationship between the economic institution and crime has
been observed, some researchers of IAT have also explored potential interactions
between institutions. The current study examined interaction effects between the
economic institution (using indicator variables of annual median household income and
Gini index) and non-economic institutions (using indicator variables of less than high
school attainment, divorce, and receipt of public assistance). This is an important
direction for future IAT research. It is critical to understand how and why non-economic
institutions affect the relationship between economic dominance and instrumental
homicides.
However, the lack of clarity and specific direction from Messner and Rosenfeld
with regard to potentially mediating and/or moderating effects of non-economic
institutions has likely contributed to inconsistent findings. Bjerregaard and Cochran
(1998, p. 42) articulate this well by indicating “it remains unclear, both theoretically and
empirically, whether non-economic institutions moderate or mediate the effects of the
economy on the rate of crime. The state of affairs may be due, at least in part, to the
challenging and complex nature of this theory and the lack of systematically collected
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cross-national data that properly operationalize its key concepts.” Understanding the
differences between mediating and moderating models can be perplexing, as evidenced
by inadvertent transposing of labels by those who have taken on such a task (Maume &
Lee, 2003, pp. 1147, 1149).
Even though some studies have conducted and compared both mediating and
moderating models, findings have been inclusive. Further complicating this issue is that
some studies have narrowed their dependent variables to instrumental homicides, while
others have not. Bjerregaard and Cochran (2008) compared mediating and moderating
effects using models for homicides and thefts. While they concluded that the debate
between mediating and moderating remains unsettled, they highlighted that their theft
models indicated greater predictive power of IAT than did their homicide models;
however, the “nature of the relationships observed (i.e., the direction, statistical
significance, and functional form of these associations)” was stronger in the homicide
models than in the theft models (Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008, p. 41).
However, what Bjerregaard and Cochran (2008) did not take into consideration is
the differentiation between instrumental and expressive homicides. In a study that
preceded theirs, Maume and Lee (2003) compared mediating and moderating models for
total homicides, instrumental homicides, and expressive homicides. In the Maume and
Lee study, separating homicide by types had the effect of increasing the ability of IAT to
predict instrumental homicides; the R2 value for expressive homicides was lower than the
R2 value for total homicides. It is conceivable, therefore, that Bjerregaard and Cochran
(2008) may have come to different conclusions regarding mediating and moderating
effects had they used instrumental, versus all, homicides as their dependent variable.
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Theoretically, IAT should have more explanatory power relative to instrumental crimes,
as described more fully in the next section. In short, researchers will continue to produce
inconsistent findings until there is theoretical and empirical design clarity.
Instrumental Homicides; Linkages with Concentrated Disadvantage
Messner and Rosenfeld (2007, pp. 43, 47) focus on “serious crimes”, which
include acts resulting in, or threats of, bodily injury, as well as acts that cause “significant
economic harm to victims”. Such acts are viewed as means, albeit illegitimate, to
achieving success goals. Some efforts have been made in previous IAT studies to
differentiate serious crimes as being either violent crimes or property crimes (Piquero &
Piquero, 1998; Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998).
Another suggestion for improving future IAT research, and subsequent policymaking processes, has been the separation of instrumental and expressive types of
homicide as dependent variables (Maume & Lee, 2003). Following Block and Block
(1991), Maume and Lee (2003, p. 1144) state that instrumental crimes carry motives of
monetary acquisition or gain; whereas, expressive homicides may result from anger or
passion. This is consistent with Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld’s (2008, p. 174)
discussion regarding the “marketness” continuum set forth by Block (1990). The
continuum has at one end instrumental motives and expressive motives at the other.
Individuals make decisions differently depending on the motivation, with some decisions
being driven more by cost-benefit analysis than a sense of greater good instilled by noneconomic institutions.
Segregating instrumental from expressive homicides in research may yield
different results compared to studying all homicides combined, as shown by Maume and
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Lee’s (2003) study of disaggregated homicides at the county level. While they found
support that IAT explains both instrumental and expressive homicides, they also found
that explanatory power is much stronger with regard to instrumental homicide (Maume
and Lee, 2003, p. 1137). To expand, Maume and Lee (2003) explain that, in Merton’s
view, inequality is linked to the social stratification system, with those in lower
socioeconomic areas being more strongly subjected to anomic pressures. There are fewer
legitimate opportunities and means by which to achieve (monetarily-measured) success
goals in these areas. Therefore, individuals find other means of achieving success,
including instrumental homicide. Using this logic, one would expect to find more
instrumental homicides in disadvantaged neighborhoods than in affluent communities.
However, recall that Messner and Rosenfeld (2007) argue that merely increasing
structural opportunities will not solve the issue of high homicide rates. For them, the
problem is more complex. As described previously, one of the strengths of IAT is that it
takes into account the effects that non-economic institutions can have on the relationship
between the economic institution and homicide. Strong non-economic institutions can
serve to buffer or balance over-emphasis on monetary success, resulting in fewer
homicides. Weakened non-economic institutions, on the other hand, provide less
resistance to anomic pressures and manifestations of economic dominance. For example,
parents may feel compelled to accommodate their employer, leaving children alone or
with a non-parent. That, in turn, decreases the social control and supportive functions of
the family. Weakening of the family institution can become criminogenic in that
unsupervised children and adolescents may learn “an excess of definitions favorable to
violation of law” from their peers on the street (Sutherland, 1947, p. 7). In other words,
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certain communities, such as those that are economically disadvantaged, can experience
compounding weakening and stressors that lead to instrumental types of crime.
Applying the logic of Merton, areas such as Northwestern Minneapolis would be
expected to have higher instrumental homicide rates because they are structurally
disadvantaged. The northwestern quadrant of Minneapolis contains nine out of ten
census tracts with the highest homicide rates. It is characterized by a high density of
African American or Black population, low white population, loss of population of 500
or more between 2000 and 2010, high percentage of housing unit vacancies (City of
Minneapolis, 2011), as well as higher density of low-wage workers, lower density of lowwage jobs, and a high percentage of racially concentrated areas of poverty (Metropolitan
Council, 2013).
Although the relationship between structural disadvantage and instrumental
homicide was not directly addressed in the current study, the study did build on the logic
of Messner and Rosenfeld in theorizing that areas such as Northwestern Minneapolis,
where descriptive choropleth maps depict similar patterns between homicide rates and
indicators of weakened non-economic institutions, would be expected to have higher
homicide rates. However, overwhelming statistical support was not found for this
position. One explanation for this can be drawn from Maume and Lee’s (2003) study,
which applied IAT at the county level. While they determined that total homicide rates
per county had a mean of 7.55, separating these by type revealed that substantially more
homicides were expressive (4.75) than instrumental (2.8). Their study demonstrates that
using combined homicides underestimates the power of IAT to explain instrumental
homicide.
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Expressive homicides are motivated by emotion, such as anger; they are not
directly linked to achieving monetary success. In contrast, instrumental homicides are
linked to areas with limited opportunities and legitimate means of achieving success. The
distribution of expressive homicide is more random, meaning there is less patterning than
would be expected with instrumental homicides. Further, at least in Maume and Lee’s
(2003) study, the frequency of expressive homicides is far greater than that of
instrumental homicides, hiding the descriptive and explanatory power of IAT in regard to
high homicide rates in America.
While efforts were made to acquire data that differentiated instrumental from
expressive homicides for the current study, the necessity of requiring the assistance of a
crime analyst in the data mining process was found to be cost prohibitive. Reasonable
inference, however, can be made that the inclusion of expressive homicides obfuscated
the relationship between instrumental homicides and weakened non-economic
institutions. In other words, the noise from expressive homicides made it difficult to find
relationships relative to instrumental homicides.
More specifically, when the distribution of homicides across the 116 census tracts
of Minneapolis was examined, the overall relationship between homicide rates and the
measures of institutions were not exceedingly dissimilar across census tracts, especially
with regard to those census tracts that experienced zero homicides and constituted over
half of all census tracts. Therefore, with the particular dependent and independent
variables used within this study, exploratory regression did not produce statistically
significant models that would predict homicides across all census tracts.
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Concluding the study at that point with an indication that null hypotheses 5
through 8 could not be rejected was justified. However, given that this study was
expanding the application of IAT to smaller units of analysis, the decision was made to
remove from the study all census tracts that did not experience a homicide during the
study period. This enabled the study to drill down deeper to determine if there were any
significant differences between census tracts having low (at least one) homicide rates
from those with high homicides rates. This approach yielded passing models in
exploratory regression, which were then further analyzed through OLS and GWR
regression.
However, removing non-homicide experiencing census tracts did not completely
resolve the original concern. The high number of census tracts with only one (14) or two
(16) homicides continued to influence significance testing. The combination of census
tracts with zero, one, and two homicides constitutes 74.14% of all census tracts with
homicides. Therefore, while three significant relationships were found across homicideexperiencing census tracts, it is not surprising that additional significant relationships
were not found. The differences in measured characteristics that exist amongst census
tracts with zero or low homicides, which constitute the bulk of census tracts, are far
smaller than the differences between those tracts with the highest incidence of homicide.
These differences could not be ferreted out by comparing all 60 census tracts that
experienced at least one homicide.
It is unknown, but conceivable, that the homicides occurring in the census tracts
with only one or two homicides were more often of the expressive type, not instrumental.
The noise from expressive homicides would thus make it difficult to find statistically
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significant relationships relative to instrumental homicides, which would be a truer test of
IAT. Therefore, it is strongly recommend that future IAT studies of homicide consider
instrumental homicides as distinctive from other types of homicide.
Census Tracts and Disadvantage. One benefit of the census tract unit of
analysis is that the influence of structurally disadvantaged communities on crime is more
apparent and easier to isolate. In some ways, IAT studies tend to move the discussion
away from using the labels structural disadvantage and legitimate opportunities, perhaps
in an effort to differentiate IAT from Merton’s work. However, a review of the
operationalization of the economic institution in previous studies shows many similarities
with measures of disadvantage. Messner and Rosenfeld (2007, p. 35) also recognize that
non-economic institutions in disadvantaged areas are hard hit; more specifically, they
state “[w]arlike conditions not only kill and maim individuals; they also destroy
institutions.”
That being said, structural opportunities are not the only factors to be mindful of,
as contended by Messner and Rosenfeld. One also needs to understand how and to what
extent non-economic institutions are able to buffer the effects of disadvantage and
economic dominance on crime. Further elucidation of IAT is needed. How weakened
non-economic institutions and reduced social controls lead to serious crime is graspable
in an over-arching sense. What that means in practice is murky. Continued efforts to
partner IAT with micro-level theorizing may prove fruitful.
Using census tract units of analysis may be particularly advantageous in this
respect as the relationships between disadvantage and non-economic institutions is not
obfuscated or averaged out, as is the case with larger units such as states or nations.
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Smaller units present even more potential for producing a richer understanding of how
and why the weakness of non-economic institutions impact the relationships between the
economic institution and crime rates. However, the smaller the units are, the more clear
the theory needs to be in order to ferret out differences.
This may be met with resistance from those who believe IAT should not be tested
at anything but the national level; however, there appears to be at least some promise that
IAT also has explanatory power within smaller units (Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998;
Piquero & Piquero, 1998; Stucky, 2003; Maume & Lee, 2003; and Schoepfer & Piquero,
2006). Regardless of the unit of analysis, IAT should remain a theory that supports the
study of differences between groups of people and the cultural pressures and institutional
influences they experience. Just as nations differ in this respect, so, too, do census tract
units. Some census tracts experience greater anomic pressures and weakened noneconomic institutions, coupled with characteristics of concentrated disadvantage, which
can be compared and contrasted to census tracts having higher socioeconomic
characteristics and more legitimate opportunities. In short, these pressures and balances,
as well as characteristics of concentrated disadvantage, do differ from one census tract to
another.
Future Operationalizations
In their cross-national comparison, Messner and Rosenfeld (2007) argue that the
high rate of serious crime in America can be linked to the anomic pressures of the
American Dream and an institutional balance of power that is dominated by the economic
institution. When this dominance occurs, non-economic institutions are hindered in their
ability to provide social controls and counterbalances to a by-any-means orientation.
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Sub-national applications of IAT have attempted to determine whether these distinct
characteristics and interactions hold true at the state, county, and city levels. The current
study attempts to apply these principles of IAT at the census tract level. Like nations,
these units exhibit unique institutional balances.
However, the level of abstraction and/or the lack of concise operational
definitions have led to researchers employing different operational definitions across
various units of analysis. Thus far, operationalizations have been very broad, which may
not produce enough difference between units to find statistical significance, as the
measurement simply does not drill down far enough theoretically or empirically. The
current study suggests that an increase in the clarity of operational definitions is in order,
especially when analysis is conducted using smaller units. More emphasis needs to be
placed on effectively determining how strong non-economic institutions exert social
control and lend support to individuals, or conversely, how weak institutions provide less
resistance to anomic pressures.
Some may argue that these discussions and operationalizations lead IAT away
from its original purpose, to explain serious crime in America at a macro level. That
original purpose remains intact. What’s being proposed herein is that IAT can also be a
conduit for richer understanding of micro-level consequences of the American Dream.
The current general operational definitions of institutions are inadequate to ferret
out these distinctions when smaller units of analysis are employed. New and narrowed
operationalizations will take considerable thought. Primary data collection, rather than
secondary analysis, would be most beneficial. Although these avenues are highly time-
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and cost-consuming, there is benefit in at least discussing what the future application of
IAT at a more local level might look like.
For example, involvement in the polity, as measured by voter participation, may
show enough difference between nations to be significant. However, at the subnational
level, operationalization of polity should more closely relate to how or why the polity can
potentially develop a sense of altruism resulting in reduced homicides. Many Americans,
and perhaps particularly those in areas of concentrated disadvantage, may not believe that
the political system truly works in their favor or creates a greater good for their
community as a whole. The African American community, in particular, has historically
entrenched reasons for distrusting the polity institution.
The economic institution cannot be made a scapegoat as one of its roles is to
provide for necessities in life, such as food, shelter, and clothing. It is, however,
according to IAT, criminogenic when it dominates the institutional balance of power and
sends the message that “anything goes” in achieving success. But what is economic
dominance and how can it be operationalized in a way that captures its relationship to
homicide rates? IAT posits that American society is inflicted with the fetishism of
money; success is measured in monetary terms. Variables could be shaped around that
concept. IAT also posits that economic dominance is manifested in three ways:
devaluation, accommodation, and penetration (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 78-84).
These manifestations are criminogenic when they are unchecked by strong non-economic
institutions. Operationalization could measure the extent to which these manifestations
are occurring across the study area.
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Another question to be addressed is how, and the extent to which, strong noneconomic institutions impact the economic-homicide relationship. Here examples of
buffering devaluation, accommodation, and penetration could be measured. For IAT to
have explanatory power, such a measure would need to have a negative relationship with
homicide: as mediating influences of non-economic institutions increases, homicides
decrease. Or conversely, where non-economic institutions are unable to buffer the
manifestations of economic domination, homicides will be higher.
Using the family institution as an example, an alternative research design can be
envisioned. Economic dominance hinders the social control and support functions of
non-economic institutions. Economic dominance, as manifested through
accommodation, may be operationalized as the dictation of work schedules to maximize
profit for the employer, without regard to the wellbeing of the employee and/or their
family. In the harshest terms, the workplace comes first; if the worker wants family time
with children, then that is for the employee to figure out when he/she is off the clock.
Research can be conducted to determine what makes a family-friendly work environment
and then measure it.
Accommodation should be measured in a way that captures how it leads to
criminal behavior. Accommodation includes working hours that overlap with when
children are being sent to school in the morning, when they get home in the afternoon,
when they do their homework in the evenings, and when they are sleeping and need their
parents on standby. Essentially, this encompasses most of the 24-hour day. But what
needs to be captured or measured is the harm caused by accommodation to economic
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dominance that can lead to crime and homicides; that is, if it’s unchecked by noneconomic forces.
One measure may be how many children and adolescents are left home alone
while the parent(s) work. The time of day when they are left home alone may also be
highly relevant. At this extreme, children are free to associate with delinquent others and
accumulate “an excess of definitions favorable to violation of law”, as Sutherland argued
(1947, p. 7). This may set children and adolescents on the path to criminal behavior.
Argument has been made in previous studies that a weakened family institution
(as measured by divorce and single-parent households, for example) has diminished
capacity to provide socialization, social controls, and support. It may also be an indicator
that the lack of a male role model in the home is criminogenic. Conversely, strong family
institutions provide strong socialization, social controls, and support. The question is
now how do strong socialization, social controls, and support buffer the economic
dominance-crime relationship? More important to the question of measurement, how do
the socialization, social control, and support found in a strong family institution buffer the
criminogenic nature of accommodation, devaluation, and penetration?
First, there is need for understanding what strong socialization and social controls
are. Strong families may socialize children to be mindful of the harms of economic
dominance and to find balance. For example, they may send the message that working
hard to provide for a family’s food, clothing, and shelter needs is viewed as normal or
expected behavior in American society. It is not inherently “bad” to achieve a minimum
standard of economic wellbeing; however, allowing money and wealth to define who you
or your family are can be problematic. This message signals that balance is important in
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life; therefore, you are also to seek non-monetary ways of defining yourself as successful.
Excessive emphasis on obtaining wealth, at the expense of one’s family or community, is
not acceptable and should not be the norm.
Looking at an extreme application of this line of thought, how do strong families,
in practice, carry this out? In two-parent households, one parent is consistently at home
with the children, indicating to the children that they have more value than the new boat
they could have acquired with a second salary or a second shift. These Ozzie and
Harriett or Leave It To Beaver types of households are becoming fewer, but that is not
the question here. Today’s family structure is what it is today. The question is not really
whether divorced or single parents constitute weak family institutions, although certain
linkages can be found. The question is how do strong families, in practice, show children
that accommodation to economic dominance must be, and is, balanced.
A parent could simply commit to taking time off from work to attend the child’s
baseball game, band concert, or swim at the lake. However, economic dominance creates
a pressure cooker for many parents. While some families can change their lifestyle to
exist on less income, parents of lower socioeconomic status cannot. They may not be
able to make ends meet as it is. The family institution must rely on the polity institution,
as measured by the level of financial support, to remedy this situation and provide
families with at least a minimal sense of financial wellbeing, such that decisions are not
based purely on economic cost-benefit analysis. Polity, could for example, develop
policies such as paid parental leaves in an effort to lessen the financial drawbacks that
occur when a parent reduces works hours to concentrate on family bonding and support.
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There are ways strong families instill family-friendly norms and provide
alternative definitions of success. Strong families socialize children to the norms of
society, exercise social control, and provide support. There are many non-economic
ways that families exhibit strength, such as eating meals together, gathering to celebrate
joyous occasions, gathering to comfort and support each other when one or more member
faces adversities (i.e., death in family, addiction, financial hardships), and working
together on projects. In essence, strong families indicate to members that their concerns
are heard and they are cared about and loved. Strong families, therefore, can fulfill the
role of providing members with shelter from an otherwise chaotic social environment. It
is this sense of belonging, which you cannot put a price tag on. This strong sense of self
and value as a family member is an alternative definition of success. An individual does
not need to have a high salary or the ability to keep the family’s head above water to have
this type of success.
Strong families also set boundaries and enforce them. Children in strong families
learn that it’s important to consider how their actions affect others. It hurts others when
you hit or bite them, so don’t do it. It hurts others when you steal their comic book, so
don’t do it. When you cheat to get ahead, others won’t trust you and you will be viewed
as a bad person, so don’t do it. There is honor in status achieved through legitimate
means. You cannot take something, by any means, just because you want it. With age,
these lessons involve more serious violations of norms and laws. Thus, a child learns
what is and is not acceptable behavior.
One additional factor that may impact the strength of the family institution is the
extent of its social network. Where strongly connected family members reside in
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proximity to one another there may be an increased likelihood of supervision alternatives
for children by vested individuals. Conversely, those who do not live near other family
members or who have strained relationships with their family may find it challenging to
find adequate supervision alternatives when they need to be away from home. Still,
others in this situation may have ample connections within the community.
Whether these connections should be considered extensions of families within the
family institution or part of the polity institutions is not clear-cut. Informal networking
may relate more to the family institution. For example, parents from two or more
households may agree to reciprocate supervision of all their children, ensuring children
are still receiving what they deem to be appropriate and like-minded socialization and
support. Formal networking efforts by the community, on the other hand, have more
similarities with polity. For example, a community group or organization may be formed
that connects suitable adults with children who may otherwise not have structure,
supervision, or positive role models in their lives. Another example would be parents
residing in a high-density housing complex who pool their resources to ensure adequate
group supervision, support, and development of their children. The difference here is that
someone other than a family member is providing the services. An argument could be
made these connections relate to the community’s ability to pull together in an effort to
strengthen the family and education institutions, combatting the effects of economic
dominance. In this way, there is a spirit of altruism, working together toward a greater
good. Further, there may be ways to distinguish a community institution from a polity
institution, at least at the local unit of analysis. The polity institution would be confined
more to official policy and rule-making structures; whereas, the community or
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networking institution would relate to how strongly local residents work together to
accomplish mutual non-legal goals. In other words, the mere presence of high rates of
divorce and single-parent households may not necessarily equate to high homicide rates.
Strong networks and communities may be able to fill the gaps that may otherwise be
criminogenic.
One final point of clarification should be made about the discussion above.
Families are under stress, and they can hold up an umbrella against the prevailing
economic downpour for so long. For families lacking a minimal sense of financial
wellbeing, decisions may already be based solely upon economic, or cost-benefit,
calculation. This discussion does not suggest families should continue to bend and find
more and more creative ways of exercising counterbalancing social control and support
functions with ever-diminishing amounts of time and support. Eventually, something has
to give. That is precisely why non-economic institutions are struggling to buffer the
anomic pressures of economic dominance. If crime is to be decreased, the ultimate
change has to take effect at the front end of the equation, i.e. economic dominance. This
is congruent with Messner and Rosenfeld’s (2007) argument regarding institutional
balance.
Summary Regarding Operationalization. The discussion above regarding the
need for improved operationalizations stems from the progression of understanding that
developed throughout the current study. At the census tract level, three statistically
significant relationships using broad definitions were identified. Broad, sweeping
measures may be sufficient to capture large differences that exist from one nation to the
next. However, local application of IAT will require more precision.
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Irrespective of the unit of analysis used in IAT studies, the inconsistencies in
findings between studies can be reduced through the development of more precise
operational definitions. The measurement of these concepts would be a considerable
challenge. Secondary data sources do not provide this type of specificity. Applying IAT
in this fashion at the local level will require ingenuity and effort.
Additional consideration should be given to the determination of if, or how much,
interaction occurs between the non-economic institutions. It is important to understand
these relationships as well. For example, to some extent, the family institution must ally
itself with the polity institution to effect laws and policies that act as pressure release
valves from the manifestations of economic dominance. In this regard, IAT continues to
be a work in progress.
Limitations
This study has limitations. Most findings from this study are specific to the
census tracts that experienced at least one homicide, in one major city. Further, the study
relies on secondary data analysis. Despite these limitations, the study still presents value
and contributes to the development of IAT.
Considering Only Homicide-Experiencing Census Tracts Across One City
With the operationalizations used in this study, a passing model that included all
census tracts was not achieved in exploratory regression. Consequently, rather than
concluding the study, the decision was made to attempt to discover statistically
significant relationships across those census tracts that experienced at least one homicide.
Although there was some improvement, as evidenced by the eventual finding of three
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significant independent variables in OLS and GWR models, it appears other variables
continued to be impacted by similarity across census tracts and the lack of complete
linearity. Further, using only instrumental homicides in future studies, rather than
combining all homicides, will also strengthen the design and substantially increase the
likelihood of finding statistically significant relationships.
The current study examined homicides that occurred within one metropolitan city.
Messner and Rosenfeld (2007, p. 74) indicate that each society will have a unique
institutional balance, with the term society being extended here to mean the population
residing within census tracts. It is clear that certain clusters of census tracts share distinct
characteristics, including high homicide rates, which set them apart from other areas of
the city. This can have policy implications specific to the city, and more specifically to
those smaller geographic areas within the city that experienced high homicide rates.
This, indeed, highlights the tenacity and advantages of using GWR.
Including census tracts from multiple metropolitan cities would result in more
generalizable findings. However, the advantage of using GWR to inform policy
development at the local level would be restricted, as findings no longer pertain to each
city’s unique institutional arrangement. Therefore, the researcher must be cognizant of
what it is they are trying to explain during the research design stage. Census tracts units
across multiple cities can be used to examine the applicability of IAT across America
more generally. Census tract units can also be used to examine the applicability of IAT
across one specific city, with the goal of developing a deeper understanding of what is
occurring within that particular city. Both approaches have value and potential policy
implications; the point is to be cautious and specific when designing future research.
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Secondary Data
An additional limitation of the current study (as well as past IAT studies) is the
use of secondary data. While data obtained from the Minneapolis Police Department and
the U.S. Census Bureau offers convenience and cost containment, it provides only proxy,
or indirect, measurements of institutions. The researcher is faced with the dilemma of
matching pre-existing data to what it is they want to measure, rather than data collection
efforts being driven by theoretical rationale. This is particularly critical when examining
IAT at more local levels. It is recognized that to drill down and truly discover how
individuals perceive and interact with their community’s social institutions would require
considerable time, effort, and expense.
Obtaining data that would allow the differentiation between instrumental and
expressive homicide in this study proved to be cost prohibitive. It is reasonable to
maintain that this lack of specificity contributed to difficulty in finding statistically
significant relationships. An additional concern with secondary data analysis is the
researcher has no control over data collection and cannot confirm complete accuracy.
Setting of Minimum Adjusted R2 Value Relative to Limited Analysis of
Homicide-Experiencing Census Tracts
During the exploratory regression phase of this study, the minimum adjusted R2
value was set at .40. Models that did not meet this threshold were not considered to be
passing and, therefore, were not considered in subsequent OLS and GWR analyses
related to the 60 homicide-experiencing census tracts. This is a stringent test to pass,
meant to produce only those models that are least biased. In an examination of past
articles published in Criminology, Weisburd and Piquero (2008, p. 472) found that the
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average R2 value achieved across those articles was .389. The extant literature on what
qualifies as an adequate or appropriate R2 value, however, is not conclusive.
Concluding Comments
The current study was able to identify three statistically significant relationships
using broad operational definitions. Future honing of other operational definitions may
lead to finding other significant relationships. One recommendation for future IAT
research is to differentiate between instrumental and expressive types of homicide, which
theoretically should yield stronger and more statistically significant relationships relative
to instrumental homicides. Implementing such changes in future IAT research will
increase the likelihood of more consistent findings across studies.
The current study is distinctive in that it utilized GWR at the census tract level.
Subsequent raster coefficient surface maps depict where variables are most strongly
predicting homicides. Higher percentages of residents who are divorced and those with
less than a high school education most strongly predict homicides in the northern areas of
Minneapolis; whereas, the predictive strength of having high percentages of children
residing in single-female headed household models has a radial pattern from the center of
the city, with slightly greater predictive strength in the high homicide census tracts
northwest of the city center than the high homicide census tracts to the southeast of the
center.
Previous IAT studies have exhibited consistently inconsistent findings. The
current study is no exception and, likewise, can only offer partial support for IAT. In
furtherance of a solution to this dilemma, this study offers additional comments regarding
operationalization sensitivities. In doing so, it also shows value in developing valid
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applications of IAT at the census tract level. Using advanced statistical techniques at this
level holds the potential for providing a richer understanding of how and why the
strengths and/or weaknesses of non-economic institutions can impact the relationship
between economic dominance and high instrumental homicide rates.
It seems IAT does tells us something about homicides across the census tracts of
Minneapolis: the distribution of homicides and disadvantage appear to have similar
patterns and higher homicide rates are associated with higher levels of divorce, single
female-headed households, and having less than a high school education. But what does
that mean? What do we do with it? Drawing from the literature of Messner and
Rosenfeld, the answer would seemingly be to strengthen family and education
institutions, which does have appeal. However, if it is disadvantage and economic stress
that is weakening these non-economic institutions in the first place and then continues to
perpetuate a circular motion from which individuals cannot free themselves, those wellintentioned efforts may be in vain. How does one focus on building a strong family,
learn new things and discover self-potential, or develop hope in the future when
economic pressures are so dominant? Hence, there is a need to more definitively
understand the influential or causal flow between variables.
For researchers adhering to strict cross-national application of IAT, this argument
may seem moot. At that level, the influence of disadvantage is blurred through the
process of aggregation. They may argue that IAT was not intended to explain crime
across smaller, subnational units of measurement. While it may be true that Messner and
Rosenfeld have not definitively indicated IAT is exclusively applicable to cross-national
study, it is also true that they have not definitively indicated that IAT cannot or should
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not be applied to smaller, subnational units of analysis. Until there is theoretical and
empirical guidance, the door is open, and it will likely continue to produce consistently
inconsistent findings, regardless of the unit of analysis utilized.
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